Answer to Philip’s Letter (6-8)

but they will prompt the king of Persia to become our paymaster and he is richer than all the rest together, and his power to interfere in Greece is such that in our former wars with Sparta, whichever side he joined, he ensured their victory, and so, if he sides with us now, he will easily crush the power of Philip.

Now, admitting these great advantages, I cannot deny that Philip has used the peace to forestall us in occupying many fortresses, harbors, and other points of vantage; only I observe that when a league is knit together by goodwill, and when all the allied states have the same interests, then the coalition stands firm; but when, like Philip’s, it is based on treachery and greed and maintained by fraud and violence, then on some slight pretext or by some trifling slip it is instantly shattered and dissolved.

Moreover, men of Athens, frequent reflection has taught me that not only do Philip’s alliances end in suspicion and hostility, but also the various parts of his own kingdom are not united by such satisfactory and intimate ties as people imagine. For although in a general way the Macedonian power carries some weight and value as an auxiliary, yet by itself it is weak and, in face of such a stupendous task, even negligible.