Letter 2: To Philip, I (1-5)

I know that all men are accustomed to be more grateful to those who praise them than to those who give them counsel,[*] especially if one offers his advice unbidden. And if I had not on a former occasion[*] given you with most kindly intent such counsel as I believed would lead to a course of action worthy of one in your position, perhaps even now I should not be undertaking to declare my view concerning what I has happened to you.

But since I then did decide to concern myself your affairs, in the interests of my own state and of the other Greeks as well, I should be ashamed if, when comparatively unimportant things were the issue, I am known to have offered you advice, yet now I should have nothing to say concerning more urgent matters, particularly since I realize that in the former case your reputation alone was at stake, whereas at present it is your personal safety, which you have been thought to esteem too lightly by all who heard the abusive reproaches directed against you.

In truth there is no one who has not condemned you as being more reckless in assuming risks than is becoming to a king, and as caring more for men’s praise of your courage than for the general welfare. For it is equally disgraceful, when your enemies threaten on every side, not to prove yourself superior to all the rest, and, when no urgent need has arisen, to hurl yourself into combats of such a kind that, if you succeeded, you would have accomplished nothing of importance, but if you lost your life, you would have destroyed all your present good fortune.[*]

Not every death in war must be regarded as honorable; on the contrary, although when death is incurred for fatherland, for parents, and for children it is worthy of praise,[*] yet when it brings harm to all of these and tarnishes the brilliance of past successes, it should be thought disgraceful and should be avoided as being the cause of great discredit.

I think that you would profitably imitate the fashion in which our city-states conduct the business of warfare. They all are accustomed, when they send forth an army, to take measures to secure the safety of the government and of the authority which is to decide what is to be done in the emergency. In consequence, if a single mischance befalls, their power is not also wholly destroyed; on the contrary, they can sustain many misfortunes and again recover their strength.