To Nicocles (41-45)

But the truth is that in discourses of this sort we should not seek novelties, for in these discourses it is not possible to say what is paradoxical or incredible or outside the circle of accepted belief; but, rather, we should regard that man as the most accomplished in this field who can collect the greatest number of ideas scattered among the thoughts of all the rest and present them in the best form.

Moreover, this has been clear to me from the first, that while all men think that those compositions, whether in verse or prose, are the most useful which counsel us how to live, yet it is certainly not to them that they listen with greatest pleasure; nay, they feel about these just as they feel about the people who admonish them; for while they praise the latter, they choose for associates[*] those who share in, and not those who would dissuade them from, their faults.

As a case in point, one might cite the poetry of Hesiod and Theognis and Phocylides;[*] for these, they say, have proved the best counsellors for human conduct; but in spite of what they say, people prefer to occupy themselves with each other’s follies rather than with the admonitions of these teachers.

And, again, if one were to make a selection from the leading poets of their maxims, as we call them, into which they have put their best thought, men would show a similar attitude toward them also; for they would lend a readier ear to the cheapest comedy[*] than to the creations of such finished art. Yet why should I spend time in giving single instances?

For if we are willing to survey human nature as a whole, we shall find that the majority of men do not take pleasure in the food[*] that is the most wholesome, nor in the pursuits that are the most honorable, nor in the actions that are the noblest, nor in the creatures that are the most useful, but that they have tastes which are in every way contrary to their best interests, while they view those who have some regard for their duty as men of austere and laborious lives.