Against Callimachus (15-17)

I am astonished that, while he judges himself capable of recognizing that it was not probable that he was willing to take two hundred drachmas instead of the ten thousand, yet believes that I am incapable of discovering, if I had wished to lie, that I ought to have asserted that I had given him more. But this I ask—that in so far as it would have been an indication in his favor that the arbitration did not take place, if he had proved the falsity of the testimony, to that same extent it shall be proof in favor of my contention that I tell the truth concerning the arbitration, inasmuch as it is clearly shown that he did not dare to proceed against my witness.

I think, however, that even if there had been neither arbitration nor witnesses to the actual facts and you were under the necessity of considering the case in the light of the probabilities, not even in this event would you have difficulty in arriving at a just verdict. For if I were so audacious a man as to wrong others, you would with good reason condemn me as doing wrong to him also; but as it is, I shall be found innocent of having harmed any citizen in regard to his property, or of jeopardizing his life, or of having expunged his name from the list of active citizens, or of having inscribed his name on Lysander’s list.[*]

And yet the wickedness of the Thirty[*] impelled many to act in this way for they not only did not punish the evil-doers but they even commanded some persons to do wrong. So as for me, not even when they had control of the government, shall I be found guilty of any such misdeed; yet Callimachus says that he was wronged after the Thirty had been expelled, the Piraeus had been taken, and when the democracy was in power, and the terms of reconciliation were being discussed.