Precepts of Statecraft (intro-4)

This essay is addressed to Menemachus, a young man who has asked Plutarch for advice concerning public life. Nothing further is known of the young man, except that Pardalas of Sardis is mentioned as his fellow-citizen (813 f; 825 d); but some of those to whom Plutarch’s various essays are addressed are known to be real persons, and it is, therefore, probable that Menemachus also actually existed. Plutarch held at different times various public offices, and moreover he was highly regarded by his fellowcitizens and many others as a guide, philosopher, and friend; it is, therefore, not unnatural that a young man who was thinldng of entering upon a political career should appeal to him for advice and counsel, though it is also possible that Plutarch wrote the essay without being asked to do so and addressed it to Menemachus merely as a matter of form.

There is nothing profoundly philosophical and very little purely theoretical to be found here. Greece, like most of the known world, was a part of the Roman Empire, and the exercise of statecraft on a large scale was virtually limited to Romans. The ancient Greek city-states retained, however, their local self-government, subject to the supervision of the proconsul; they could enter into agreements with each other, and could send envoys to Rome if

occasion arose. A man could, therefore, find useful and honourable occupation in public life, as Plutarch himself did. Although he frequently uses the great men of the great days of Greece as examples, Plutarch gives the sort of advice which would be useful to one engaged insuch political activity as was open to a Greek in his time. Some of his advice is applicable only to his own times and its conditions, but the politician or statesman of any age may recognize many of his precepts as common sense, the application of which is limited to no time or place. The essay is, then, of interest, not only because it throws a sidelight upon the conditions in Greece in Plutarch’s time, but also on account of its own inherent value.

The reference to troubles which took place recently under Domitian (815 d, Chapter 19) may indicate that the essay was written not long after a.d. 96, the date of Domitian’s death.

If, Menemachus, it is suitable to apply to anything at all the saying

No one of all the Achaeans finds fault with the words thou hast uttered,

Nor will oppose them in speech; and yet thou hast reached no conclusion,[*]

it may be applied to those philosophers who urge people to take lessons from them, but give no real instruction or advice; for they are like those who trim the lamps, but fail to pour in oil. Therefore, seeing that the desire has been aroused in you a

Speaker of speeches to be, and also a doer of actions[*]

in your native State, as befits your noble birth, since you have not time to gain an understanding of a philosopher’s life in the open among affairs of State and public conflicts or to be a spectator of examples worked out in deed, not merely in word, and since you ask for some precepts of statecraft, I think it is not at all fitting that I should refuse, and I pray that the result may be worthy of your zeal and of my goodwill; and, as you requested, I have made use of a rather large variety of examples.

First, then, at the base of political activity there

must be, as a firm and strong foundation, a choice of policy arising from judgement and reason, not from mere impulse due to empty opinion or contentiousness or lack of other activities. For just as those who have no useful occupation at home spend most of their time in the market-place, even if there is nothing they need there, just so some men, because they have no business of their own that is worth serious attention, throw themselves into public affairs, treating political activity as a pastime, and many who have become engaged in public affairs by chance and have had enough of them are no longer able to retire from them without difficulty; they are in the same predicament as persons who have gone aboard a vessel to be rocked a bit and then have been driven out into the open sea; they turn their gaze outside, seasick and much disturbed, but obliged to stay where they are and endure their present plight.

Over the bright calm sea

The fair-faced loves went past them to the mad

Outrage of the ship’s oars that plough the deep.[*]

These men cast the greatest discredit upon public life by regretting their course and being unhappy when, after hoping for glory, they have fallen into disgrace or, after expecting to be feared by others on account of their power, they are drawn into affairs which involve dangers and popular disorders. But the man who has entered upon public life from conviction and reasoning, as the activity most befitting him and most honourable, is not frightened by any of these things, nor is his conviction changed. For neither is it right to enter upon public life as a gainful trade, as Stratocles and Dromocleides and their set used to invite each other to come to the golden harvest (for so they called the orators’ platform in jest); nor ought we to enter upon it as if wTe were suddenly seized by an onset of strong emotion, as Gaius Gracchus did, who, when his brother’s misfortunes were still fresh, withdrew so far as possible from public affairs and then, inflamed by anger because certain persons insulted and reviled him, rushed into public life. And although he was quickly satiated with public affairs and fame, yet when he tried to stop and wished for a change and a quiet life, he found that his power was too great to be laid down but before he could lay it down he perished. And those who make themselves up for political competition or the race for glory, as actors do for the stage, must necessarily regret their action, since they must either serve those whom they think they should rule or offend those whom they wish to please. On the contrary, I believe that those who, like men who fall into a well, stumble into public life by mere chance and unexpectedly must be cast into confusion and regret their course, whereas those who enter into it quietly, as the result of preparation and reflection, will be moderate in their conduct of affairs and will not be discomposed by anything, inasmuch as they have honour itself and nothing else as the purpose of their actions.

So, after thus determining their choice in their own minds and making it invariable and unchangeable, statesmen must apply themselves to the understanding of the character of the citizens, which shows itself as in the highest degree a compound of all their individual characters and is powerful. For any attempt

on the part of the statesman to produce by himself at the very outset a change of character and nature in the people will not easily succeed, nor is it safe, but it is a matter that requires a long space of time and great power. But just as wine is at first controlled by the character of the drinker but gradually, as it warms his whole body and becomes mingled therewith, itself forms the drinker’s character and changes him, just so the statesman, until he has by his reputation and by public confidence in him built up his leadership, must accommodate himself to the people’s character as he finds it and make that the object of his efforts, knowing by what things the people is naturally pleased and led. For example, the Athenian populace is easily moved to anger, easily turned to pity, more willing to suspect quickly than to be informed at leisure; as they are readier to help humble persons of no reputation, so they welcome and especially esteem facetious and amusing speeches; while they take most delight in those who praise them, they are least inclined to be angry with those who make fun of them; they are terrible even to their chief magistrates, then kindly even to their enemies. Quite different is the character of the Carthaginian people; it is bitter, sullen, subservient to their magistrates, harsh to their subjects, most abject when afraid, most savage when enraged, stubborn in adhering to its decisions, disagreeable and hard in its attitude towards playfulness and urbanity. Never would these people, if a Cleon had asked them to postpone the meeting of the assembly on the ground that he had made sacrifice and had guests to entertain,[*] have adjourned the meeting amid laughter and the clapping of hands; nor would they, when a quail escaped from Alcibiades’ cloak while he was speaking, have joined eagerly in hunting it down and then have given it back to him[*]; no, they would have put them both to death for their insolence and their flippancy, seeing that they banished Hanno on the charge of aspiring to be tyrant, because he used a lion on his campaigns to carry his luggage! And I do not believe that the Thebans either, if they had obtained control of their enemies’ letters, would have refrained from reading them, as the Athenians, when they captured Philip’s mail-carriers with a letter addressed to Olympias, refrained from breaking the seal and making known an affectionate private message of an absent husband to his wife. Nor, on the other hand, do I believe that the Athenians would have borne with good temper the contemptuous pride of Epameinondas, when he refused to reply to the accusation against him but rose from his seat and went out from the theatre through the assembly to the gymnasium. And I think, too, that the Spartans would have been far from enduring the insolence and buffoonery of Stratocles, who persuaded the Athenians to make sacrifices on the ground that they had won a victory, and then, after a true report of their defeat had been received, when they were angry with him, asked the people what wrong he had done them seeing that, thanks to him, they had been happy for three days.[*] Now court flatterers, like bird-catchers, by imitating the voices of kings and assimilating themselves to them, insinuate themselves deeply into their good graces and decoy them by deceit; but for the statesman it is fitting, not to imitate the character of his people, but to understand it and to employ for each type those means by which it can be brought under his control. For ignorance of their characters leads to no less serious mistakes and failures in free States than in the friendships of kings.

So, then, the statesman who already has attained to power and has won the people’s confidence should try to train the character of the citizens, leading them gently towards that which is better and treating them with mildness; for it is a difficult task to change the multitude. But do you yourself, since you are henceforth to live as on an open stage, educate your character and put it in order; and if it is not easy wholly to banish evil from the soul, at any rate remove and repress those faults which are most flourishing and conspicuous. For you know the story that Themistocles, when he was thinking of entering upon public life, withdrew from drinking-parties and carousals; he was wakeful at night, was sober and deeply thoughtful, explaining to his friends that Miltiades’ trophy[*] would not let him sleep. And Pericles also changed his personal habits of life, so that he walked slowly, spoke gently, always showed a composed countenance, kept his hand under his cloak, and trod only one path - that which led to the assembly and the senate. For a populace is not a simple and easy thing for any chance person to subject to that control which is salutary; but one must be satisfied if the multitude accept authority without shying, like a suspicious and capricious beast, at face or voice. Since, then, the statesman must not treat even these matters carelessly, ought he to neglect the things which affect his life and character,

that they may be clear of blame and ill report of every kind? For not only are men in public life held responsible for their public words and actions, but people busy themselves with all their concerns: dinner, love affair, marriage, amusement, and every serious interest. What need is there, for instance, to speak of Alcibiades, who, though he was most active of all the citizens in public affairs and was undefeated as general, was ruined by his audacious and dissolute habits in private life, and, because of his extravagance and lack of restraint, deprived the State of the benefit of his other good qualities? Why, the Athenians blamed Cimon for wine-drinking, and the Romans, having nothing else to say, blamed Scipio[*] for sleeping; and the enemies of Pompey the Great, observing that he scratched his head with one finger, reviled him for it.[*] For, just as a mole or a wart on the face is more unpleasant than brandmarks, mutilations, or scars on other parts of the body, so small faults appear great when observed in the lives of leaders and statesmen on account of the opinion which the majority has of governing and public office, regarding it as a great thing which ought to be clean of all eccentricities and errors. With good reason, therefore, did Livius Drusus the tribune gain inreputation because, when many parts of his house were exposed to the view of his neighbours and an artisan promised to turn them the other way and change their position for only five talents, Drusus replied, Take ten and make the whole house open to view, that all the citizens may see how I live. For he was a man of temperate and well-ordered life. And perhaps he had no need of that exposure to the public view; for the people see through the characters, counsels, acts, and lives of public men, even those that seem to be very thickly cloaked; they love and admire one man and dislike and despise another quite as much for his private as for his public practices.

But, you say, do not States put in office men who live licentiously and wantonly? They do, and pregnant women often long for stones, and seasick persons for salt pickles and the like, which then a little later they spew out and detest. So the people of democracies, because of the luxury of their own lives or through sheer perversity, or for lack of better leaders, make use of those who happen to turn up, though they loathe and despise them, then take pleasure in hearing such things said about them as the comic poet Plato puts into the mouth of the People itself:

Take, take my hand as quickly as you can;

I’m going to choose Agyrrhius general[*];

and again, when he makes the People ask for a basin and a feather in order to vomit and then say,

Beside my platform Mantias takes his stand,[*]

and

It feeds foul Cephalus, most hateful pest.[*]

And the Roman people, when Carbo promised something and confirmed his promise with an oath and a curse, unanimously took a counter-oath that it did not trust him. And at Lacedaemon, when a dissolute man named Demosthenes made a desirable motion, the people rejected it, but the ephors chose by lot one of the elders and told him to make that same motion, in order that it might be made acceptable to the people, thus pouring, as it were, from a dirty vessel into a clean one. So great is the importance, in a free State, of confidence or lack of confidence in a man’s character.