Precepts of Statecraft (24-26)

A saying of Jason, monarch of the Thessalians, is recorded, which he always used to repeat whenever he was taking violent and annoying measures against individuals: It is inevitable that those should act unjustly in small matters who wish to act justly in great matters. That is recognized at once as the saying of a despot; but this is a more

statesmanlike precept: Win the favour of the people by giving way in small things in order that in greater matters you may oppose them stubbornly and thus prevent them from committing errors. For a man who is always very exact and strenuous about everything, not giving way or yielding at all, but always harsh and inexorable, gets the people into the habit of opposing him and being out of temper with him;

But he should let the sheet

Run out a bit before the waves’ great force,[*]

sometimes by giving way and playing graciously with them himself, as at sacrifices, public games, and spectacles in the theatre, and sometimes by pretending not to see or hear their errors, just as we treat the errors of the young people in a family, in order that the force of his rebukes and outspoken criticism - like that of a medicine - may not become exhausted or stale, but may in matters of greater importance, retaining its full strength and its credit, take a stronger hold upon the people and sting them into obedience. Alexander, for example, when he heard that his sister had had intercourse with a handsome young man, did not burst into a rage, but merely remarked that she also ought to be allowed to get some enjoyment out of her royal station. In making such concessions he did not act rightly or in a manner worthy of himself; for the weakening of a throne and outrageous conduct should not be regarded as mere enjoyment. But to the people the statesman will, so far as is possible, permit no outrageous conduct towards the citizens, no confiscation of others’ property, nor distribution of public funds, but by persuasion, arguments, and threats he will oppose to the bitter end desires of that sort, by nourishing and increasing which Cleon and his partizans produced in the State, as Plato says,[*] a swarm of drones with stings. But if the people, taking an ancestral festival or the worship of some god as a pretext, are bent upon some public spectacle or a slight distribution of funds, or a gift for the general good or some lavish show prompted by private ambition, for such purposes let them reap the benefit both of their generosity and of their prosperity. Why, among the public acts of Pericles and of Demetrius are many of that sort, and Cimon beautified the market-place by planting plane-trees and laying out walks. And Cato, seeing that the people was being greatly stirred up by Caesar in the affair of Catiline and was dangerously inclined towards a revolution, persuaded the senate to vote a dole to the poor, and the giving of this halted the disturbance and ended the uprising. For just as a physician, after drawing off a great deal of infected blood, supplies a little harmless nourishment, so the statesman, after doing away with something big which was discreditable or harmful, appeases the spirit of discontent and fault-finding by some slight and kindly act of favour.

It is also expedient to divert the people’s interest to other useful things, as Demades did when he had the revenues of the State in his charge; for when the people were eager to send out triremes to aid those who were in revolt against Alexander,[*] and were urging him to furnish funds, You have, he said, funds available, for I have made preparations

for the Pitcher Festival[*] so that each of you is to receive a half-mina, but if you had rather apply the funds to this other purpose, use your own money for the festival. And in this way, since they gave up the expedition in order not to lose the distribution of money, he removed any ground of complaint on Alexander’s part against the people of Athens. For there are many unprofitable measures which the statesman cannot avert by direct means, but he must use some sort of roundabout and circuitous methods, such as Phocion employed when ordered at an inopportune time to invade Boeotia. He immediately issued a proclamation[*] calling all those from the age of military service up to sixty years to join the ranks, and when the older men made a violent protest, he said: What is there terrible about it? For I, your general, who am eighty years old, shall be with you. So in this way we should prevent inopportune embassies by listing among the envoys many who are not qualified to go, and useless construction by calling for contributions, and improper lawsuits and missions abroad by ordering the parties to appear in court together and together to go abroad on the missions. And those who propose such measures and incite the people to adopt them should be the first to be haled into court and made to take the responsibility for putting them into effect; for so they will either draw back and appear to be themselves nullifying the measure or they will stick to it and share its unpleasant features.

When, however, something important and useful but requiring much conflict and serious effort is to be accomplished, then try to select from among your friends those who are most powerful, or from

among the most powerful those who are easiest to get along with; for they are least likely to act against you and most likely to work with you, since they possess wisdom without contentiousness. And, moreover, you should know your own nature and choose for any purpose for which you are naturally less fitted than others, men who are more able rather than men like yourself, as Diomedes chose to go with him on the scouting expedition the man of prudence and passed over the men of courage.[*] For actions are thus more equally balanced, and contention does not arise among men whose ambitions proceed from different virtues and abilities. So, if you are not a good speaker, take an orator as your assistant in a lawsuit or your colleague in an embassy, as Pelopidas took Epameinondas; and if, like Callicratidas, you are too lofty of speech and not persuasive in addressing the masses, choose a man who is winning in his speech and conciliatory; and if you are physically weak and incapable of hard work, choose a man who is fond of labour and strong, as Nicias chose Lamachus. For on this principle Geryon would have been enviable for having many legs, arms, and eyes, if he had directed them all by one mind. But statesmen, by uniting for one purpose not only men’s persons and funds, but also their fortunes, abilities, and virtues, if they are in agreement, can gain greater reputation in connexion with the same action than by other means, not behaving like the Argonauts, who left Heracles behind and then were forced to work through the women’s quarters[*] and use magic and drugs to save themselves and steal the golden fleece.

When entering some sanctuaries men leave their gold outside; but iron, one may say, they do not at all carry into any sanctuary. And since the orators’ platform is a sanctuary common to Zeus the Counsellor and the Protector of Cities, to Themis and to Justice, do you strip off all love of wealth and of money, as you would iron full of rust[*] and a disease of the soul, cast them straightway at the beginning into the market-place of hucksters and money-lenders,

and turning your back depart from them,[*]

believing that a man who makes money out of public funds is stealing from sanctuaries, from tombs, from his friends, through treason and by false testimony, that he is an untrustworthy adviser, a perjured judge, a venal magistrate, in brief not free from any kind of iniquity. And therefore there is no need of saying much about these evils.