Precepts of Statecraft (12-14)

But anyone who is entering upon a public career should choose as his leader a man who is not merely of established reputation and powerful, but one who is all this on account of real worth. For just as not every tree will accept and support the grape-vine which entwines itself about it, but some trees stifle and ruin its growth, so in States, the men who are not lovers of what is noble, but merely lovers of honours and of office, do not afford young men opportunities for public activities, but through

envy repress them and, to speak figuratively, wither them up by depriving them of glory, their natural nourishment. So Marius, after having achieved many successes in Libya and again in Gaul with the help of Sulla, ceased to employ him and cast him off, being angered by his growth in power, but using the incident of the seal as a pretext. For Sulla, when Marius was general and he was quaestor[*] in Libya, was sent by Marius to Bocchus and took Jugurtha prisoner; and being a young man who had just had his first taste of glory, he did not bear his good fortune with moderation, but had a seal engraved with a representation of his deed - Jugurtha surrendering to him - and wore it.[*] Marius threw this up against him and cast him off. And Sulla, transferring his allegiance to Catulus and Metellus, worthy men and opposed to Marius, quickly drove Marius out and broke his power in the civil war after he had almost overthrown Rome. Sulla, however, exalted Pompey from the time of his youth, rising up and uncovering his head when he came near; and also by giving the other young men opportunities for acts of leadership and even by urging some on against their will, he filled his armies with ambition and eagerness; and he gained power over them all by wishing to be, not the only great man, but first and greatest among many great ones. Such, then, are the men to whom young statesmen should attach themselves and cling closely, not snatching glory away from them, like Aesop’s wren who was carried up on the eagle’s shoulders, then suddenly flew out and got ahead of him, but receiving it from them in goodwill and friendship, knowing that no one can ever command well who has not first learned rightly to obey, as Plato says.[*]

Next after this comes the decision to be made concerning friends, and here we approve neither the idea of Themistocles nor that of Cleon. For Cleon, when he first decided to take up political life, brought his friends together and renounced his friendship with them as something which ofter weakens and perverts the right and just choice of policy in political life. But he would have done better if he had cast out from his soul avarice and love of strife and had cleansed himself of envy and malice; for the State needs, not men who have no friends or comrades, but good and self-controlled men. As it was, he drove away his friends,

But a hundred heads of cursed flatterers circling fawned[*]

about him, as the comic poets say; and being rough and harsh to the better classes he in turn subjected himself to the multitude in order to win its favour,

Its old age tending, dosing it with pay,[*]

and making the basest and most unsound element of the people his associates against;he best. But Themistocles on the other hand, when someone said that he would govern well if he showed himself equally impartial to all, replied: May I never take my seat on such a throne that my friends shall not have more from me than those who are not my friends! He also was wrong; for he put the government under pledge to his friendship, subordinating the affairs of the community and the public to private favours and interests. And yet when Simonides asked for something that was not just, he said to him: Neither is he a good poet who sings contrary to metre, nor is he an equitable ruler who grants favours contrary to law. For truly it is an outrageous and abominable thing if a pilot selects sailors and a ship-captain selects a pilot

Well knowing how at the stern to hold steady the tiller and also

How to stretch taut the yard ropes when rises the onrushing tempest,[*]

and an architect chooses subordinates and handicraftsmen who will not spoil his work but will co-operate to perfect it, whereas the statesman, who is, as Pindar says,[*] the best of craftsmen and the maker of lawfulness and justice, does not immediately choose friends whose convictions are I ke his own, who will aid him and share his enthusiasm for what is noble, but rather those who are always wrongfully and by violent means trying to divert him to various other uses. Such a statesman will be found to be no better than a builder or a carpenter who through ignorance and error makes use of such squares and rulers and levels as are sure to make his work crooked. For friends are the living and thinking tools of the statesman, and he ought not to slip with them when they go wrong, but he must be on the watch that they do not err even through ignorance. In fact, it was this that disgraced Solon and brought him into disrepute among the citizens; for when he made up his mind to lighten debts and to introduce the Seisachtheia[*] (that was the nickname for the cancellation of debts), he told his friends about it, and they did a very wrong thing; they secretly borrowed a great deal of money before the law was published, and a little later, after its publication, they were found to have bought splendid houses and much land with the money they had borrowed, and Solon, who was wronged, was accused of sharing in their wrongdoing. Agesilaüs, too, showed himself very weak and poor-spirited in dealing with his friends’ solicitations and, like Pegasus in Euripides’ drama,

Crouched down and yielded more if more he wished,[*]

and by too great eagerness in aiding them when in misfortunes he made himself seem like them in wrongdoing; for example, when Phoebidas was on trial for seizing the Cadmeia without orders, he got him off by saying that such things were bound to happen of their own accord; and when Sphodrias was being tried for an illegal and frightful act (for he had invaded Attica when the Athenians were friends and allies), he brought about his acquittal, being softened by the amorous pleadings of his son. And a note of his to a certain ruler is quoted as follows: If Nicias is innocent, let him go; if he is guilty, let him go for my sake; anyway, let him go.[*] But Phocion did not even appear in support of his son-in-law Charicles when he was accused in connexion with the Harpalus affair; he merely said: I made you my son-in-law for nothing but what is right and went away. And Timoleon of Corinth,[*] when he was unable either by instruction or by entreaty to make his brother give up his tyranny, joined with those who destroyed him. For a statesman ought, by stopping short of being a party to perjury, not to be a friend as far as the altar,[*] as Pericles once said, but only so far as conforms to any law, equity, or advantage the neglect of which leads to great public injury, as did the failure to punish Sphodrias and Phoebidas, for they did a great deal to make Sparta enter into the Leuctrian war. For the principles that govern a statesman’s conduct do not force him to act with severity against the moderate errors of his friends; on the contrary, they make it possible for him, after he has once made the chief public interests safe, out of his abundant resources to assist his friends, take his stand beside them, and help them out of their troubles. And there are also favours which arouse no ill-will, such as aiding a friend to gain an office, putting into his hands some honourable administrative function or some friendly foreign mission, for example one which includes honours to a ruler or negotiations with a State concerning friendship and concord; and if some public activity be laborious, but conspicuous and important, the statesman can first appoint himself to the post and then choose his friend as assistant, just as Diomedes did:

So if you tell me myself to choose another as comrade,

How in that case could I e’er be forgetful of godlike Odysseus?[*]

And Odysseus again fittingly returns the compliment:

Now these horses, old sir, these new ones, of which thou inquirest,

Thracian they are, but their master was slain by the brave Diomedes,

Slain and beside him his comrades, twelve comrades and all of the noblest.[*]

For such concession to one’s friends adorns those who give praise no less than those who receive it; but self-conceit, says Plato,[*] dwells with loneliness. Then, besides, a man ought to ascribe to his friends a share in his own good and kindly acts of favour; he should tell those who have been benefited to praise and show them affection as the originators and advisers of the favours. But base and absurd requests he should reject, not harshly but gently, informing the askers by way of consolation that the requests are not in accord with their own excellence and reputation. Epameinondas exemplifies this most admirably: after refusing to let the pedlar out of prison at Pelopidas’s request and then letting him out a little later when his mistress asked it, he said, Favours of that sort, Pelopidas, are fit for courtesans to receive, but not for generals. But Cato acted harshly and arbitrarily when he was quaestor, and Catulus the censor, one of his most intimate friends, asked for the acquittal of a man who was being tried, by saying: It is a disgrace that you, whose duty it is to train us young men to honourable conduct, have to be thrown out by our servants. For he might, while refusing the favour in fact, have avoided harshness and bitterness of speech, by producing the impression that the offensive quality of his action was not due to his own will, but was forced upon him by law and justice. There ai’e also in public life ways which are not dishonourable of helping friends who need money to acquire it; as, for example, when after the battle Themistocles saw a corpse wearing a golden bracelet and necklace, he himself passed it by, but turned to his friend and said, Take these things, for you are not, as I am, Themistocles. For the administration of affairs frequently gives the man in public life this sort of chance to help his friends; for not every man is a Menemachus.[*] Hand over to one friend a case at law which will bring in a good fee as advocate in a just cause, to another introduce a rich man who needs legal oversight and protection, and help another to get some profitable contract or lease. Epameinondas even told a friend to go to a certain rich man and ask for a talent, saying that it was he who bade him give it; and when the man who had been asked for it came and asked him the reason, he replied: Because this man is a good man and poor, but you are rich since you have appropriated much of the State’s wealth. And Xenophon[*] says that Agesilaiis delighted in enriching his friends, he being himself above money.

But since, to quote Simonides,[*] all larks must grow a crest, and every public career bears its crop of enmities and disagreements, the public man must give especial consideration to these matters. So most people commend Themistocles and Aristeides who, whenever they went on an embassy or in command

of an army, laid down their private enmity at the frontier, then took it up again later. And some people also are immensely pleased by the conduct of Cretinas of Magnesia. He was a political opponent of Hermeias, a man who was not powerful but was of ambitious spirit and brilliant mind, and when the Mithridatic war broke out, seeing that the State was in danger, he told Hermeias to take over the command and manage affairs, while he himself withdrew; or, if Hermeias wished him to be general, then Hermeias should remove himself, that they might not by ambitious strife with one another destroy the State. The challenge pleased Hermeias, and saying that Cretinas was more versed in war than himself, he went away with his wife and children. And as he was departing Cretinas escorted him, first giving him out of his own means such things as were more useful to exiles than to people besieged in a city, after which by his excellent military leadership he saved the State unexpectedly when it was on the brink of destruction. For if it is a noble thing and the mark of an exalted spirit to exclaim

I love my children, but I love my country more,[*]

would it not have been easier for each of them to say, I hate so-and-so and wish to do him harm, but I love my country more? For to be unwilling to make peace with a personal enemy for the sake of those things for which we ought even to give up a friend is shockingly uncivilized and as low as the beasts. Certamly Phoeion and Cato and their like acted much better, for they would allow no personal enmity to have any bearing whatsoever upon political differences, but were stern and inexorable only in public contests against sacrificing what was for the common good; yet in private matters they treated kindly and without anger their political opponents. For the statesman should not regard any fellow-citizen as an enemy, unless some man, such as Aristion, Nabis, or Catiline, should appear who is a pest and a running sore to the State. Those who are in other ways out of harmony he should, like a skilful musician, bring into unison by gently tightening or relaxing the strings of his control, not attacking angrily and insultingly those who err, but making an appeal designed rather to make a moral impression, as Homer does:

Truly, my friend, I did think you surpassed other men in your wisdom[*];

and

Knowledge thou hast to devise other speech that is better than this was.[*]

But if they say or do anything good, he should not be vexed by their honours, nor should he be sparing of complimentary words for their good actions; for if we act in this way our blame, where it is needed, will be thought justified, and we shall make them dislike evil by exalting virtue and showing through comparison that good actions are more worthy and fitting than the other kind. And I think also that the statesman should give testimony in just causes even for his opponents, should aid them in court against the malicious prosecutors, and should discredit calumnies about them if such accusations are alien to the principles they profess; just as the infamous Nero, a little before he put Thrasea to death, whom he hated and feared intensely, nevertheless when someone accused him of a bad and unjust decision in court, said: I wish Thrasea were as good a friend to me as he is a most excellent judge.

And it is not a bad method for confounding persons of a different kind, men who are naturally vicious and prone to evil conduct, to mention to them some enemy of theirs who is of finer character and to say: He would not have said that or done that. And some men, too, when they do wrong, should be reminded of their excellent fathers, as Homer says:

Truly not much like his sire is the son who was gotten by Tydeus[*];

And Appius, when competing with Scipio Africanus[*] in the elections, said: O Paulus, how you would groan in the lower world if you saw that when your son was standing for the censorship Philonicus the publican acted as his bodyguard! Such sayings serve at once to rebuke wrongdoers and to add lustre to those who administer the rebuke. And the Nestor of Sophocles, too, made a statesmanlike reply when reviled by Ajax:

I blame thee not; for good thy acts, though ill thy speech.[*]

And Cato, although he had opposed Pompey in the violent measures which he and Caesar applied to the State, when war broke out between them advised handing over the leadership to Pompey, saying: The men who can bring about great evils can also end them. For blame wThich is mingled with praise and contains nothing insulting but merely frankness of speech, and arouses not anger but a pricking of the conscience and repentance, appears both kindly and healing; but abusive speech is not at all fitting for statesmen. Observe the things that were said by Demosthenes against Aeschines and by Aeschines against him and again those which Hypereides wrote against Demades, and ask yourself if a Solon or a Pericles or Lycurgus the Lacedaemonian or Pittacus the Lesbian would have said them. And yet even Demosthenes employs abuse only in his speeches before a court of law; the Philippics are free from all jeering and scurrility. For such things bring disgrace upon the speakers rather than upon those spoken of, and moreover they bring confusion into the conduct of affairs and they disturb councils and assemblies. Therefore Phocion did well when he stopped speaking and yielded the floor to a man who was reviling him, and then, when the fellow had at last become silent, came forward again saying: Well, then, about the cavalry and the heavy infantry you have heard already; it remains for me to discuss the light infantry and the targeteers. But since many men find it hard to endure that sort of thing quietly, and abusive speakers are often, and not without general benefit, made to shut their mouths by the retorts they evoke, let the reply be brief in wording, showing no temper and no extreme rancour, but urbanity mingled with playfulness and grace which somehow or other has a sting in it. Retorts which turn his own words back upon the speaker are especially good in this way. For just as things which are thrown and return to the thrower seem to do this because they are driven back by some force and firmness of that against which they are thrown, so that which is spoken seems through the force and intellect of him who has been abused to turn back upon those who uttered the abuse. For example, the retort of Epameinondas to Callistratus, who reproached the Thebans and the Argives because Oedipus killed his f ither and Orestes killed his mother: When we had driven out the doers of those deeds, you took them in, and that of Antalcidas the Spartan to the Athenian who said We have often chased you away from the Cephissus, Yes, but we have never had to chase you from the Eurotas. And Phocion also made a witty retort, when, after Demades had screamed The Athenians will put you to death, he replied, Yes, if they are crazy; but you are the one whom t ley will execute, if they are sane. And Crassus the orator, when Domitius said to him, It was you. was it not, who wept when a lamprey died that you kept in a tank? retorted with the question, It was you, was it not, who buried three wives without shedding a tear? Apt replies of this sort, however,;ire of some use also in life in general.