On the Control of Anger (16)

FUNDANUS. However, those of whom it is true that righteous indignation causes them frequently to be overwhelmed by anger should get rid of its excessive and violent form, together with their extreme confidence in those with whom they live.[*] For such confidence more than any other cause increases the spirit of wrath, when, for example, one who has been accounted honourable proves to be base,[*] or one whom we have supposed a true friend quarrels and finds fault with us. As for my own temperament, you doubtless know how strong are the impulses which incline it to be of goodwill toward my fellowmen and to trust them. Consequently, like men who attempt to walk on empty air, the more I give myself up to loving a person the more I go astray, and when I stumble and fall, the greater my distress; and although I may no longer be able to reduce my too great propensity and eagerness to love, yet I may perhaps be able to use Plato’s[*] caution as a curb against excessive trust. For Plato says that he praises Helicon the mathematician in such terms as he uses[*] because man is by nature an animal readily subject to change; and that he does well to fear those who have been educated in the city lest, being men and the seeds of men,[*] they may reveal somewhere the weakness inherent in their nature. But when Sophocles[*] says

Search out most human traits; you’ll find them base,

he seems to go too far in trampling upon and belittling us. This peevish and censorious judgement does, however, tend to make us more considerate in our outbursts of temper; for it is the sudden and the unexpected that throw men off their bearings.[*] But we should, as Panaetius also has somewhere remarked, make use of the precept of Anaxagoras,[*] and just as he, at the death of his son, said, I knew that I had begotten a mortal; so on each occasion we should remark with reference to the faults which exasperate us: I knew that I had not bought a philosopher for a slave, I knew that the friend I had made was not incapable of error, I knew that my wife was a woman. And if we keep repeating to ourselves Plato’s question, Can it be that I am like that? [*] and turn our reason inward instead of to external things, and substitute caution for censoriousness, we shall no longer make much use of righteous indignation toward others when we observe that we ourselves stand in need of much indulgence. But as it is, everyone of us, when we are angry and inflicting punishment, brings out the injunctions of an Aristeides or a Cato: Do not steal! Do not lie! Why are you so lazy?; and - what is most disgraceful of all - while angry we chide others for being angry and punish by rage faults which have been committed in a rage, not like physicians, who

With bitter drugs can purge the bitter bile[*];

but rather make more intense the malady and aggravate it.

FUNDANUS. Whenever, therefore, I have become engaged in these reflections, at the same time I try to do away with some part of my inquisitiveness. For to search I out with great precision and detect and drag into the light every little concern of a slave, every action of a friend, every pastime of a son, every whisper of a wife, produces frequent, or rather continual and daily, fits of anger, of which the sum total is a morose and intractable disposition. It may be, as Euripides[*] says, that God

Will intervene in matters grown too great,

But small things he lets pass and leaves to Fate;

but I am of the opinion that a man of sense should commit nothing to Fate, nor overlook anything at all, but should trust and use for some things his wife, for others servants, for others friends, as a ruler makes use of overseers and accountants and administrators, but himself keeps under his own control the most important and weighty matters by the use of reason. For as small writing strains the eyes, so do trifling matters, by causing a greater strain, prick and stir up anger,[*] which becomes a bad habit that affects more important matters.

FUNDANUS. Accordingly, in addition to all these considerations,[*] I have been wont to regard as great and divine that saying of Empedocles,[*] Fast from evil, and to applaud also those other vows made in prayer as being neither ungracious nor inappropriate to a philosopher: to abstain from love and wine for a year, honouring God by continence; or again to refrain from lying for a stated time, paying close heed to ourselves that we shall be truthful always whether In jest or earnest. Then with these I compared my own vow, thinking it no less sacred and pleasant in the sight of God: first, to pass a few days without anger, sober and wineless days, as it were, as though I were offering a sacrifice of honey unmixed with wine[*]; then I would do so for a month or two, and so, making trial of myself little by little, in time I made some progress in my forbearance, continently observing and keeping myself courteous in speech, placid, and free from anger, and pure of the taint of evil words and offensive actions and of passion which, at the price of a little unsatisfying pleasure, brings great perturbations of spirit and the most shameful repentance. By such means, I think - and God also gave me help - experience has shown the truth of that judgement: this placid and gentle and humane spirit is not so agreeable and pleasant and free from sorrow to any of those brought in contact with it as it is to those who themselves possess it.