On Moral Virtue (2)

In the first place, Menedemus of Eretria deprived the virtues of both plurality and differences by asserting that virtue is but one, though it goes under

many names: the same thing is meant by temperance and courage and justice, as is the case with mortal and man. And Ariston of Chios [*] himself also made virtue but one in its essential nature and called it health; but in its relative aspect he made certain distinctions and multiplied virtues, just as though one should wish to call our sight white-sight when it is applied to white objects, or black-sightwhen applied to black objects, or anything else of the sort. For instance virtue, when it considers what we must do or avoid, is called prudence[*]; when it controls our desires and lays down for them the limitations of moderation and seasonableness in our pleasures, it is called temperance; when it has to do with men’s relations to one another and their commercial dealings, it is called justice - just as a knife is one and the same knife, though it cuts now one thing, now another, or as a fire retains its single nature though it operates upon different substances. Moreover it appears likely that Zeno[*] of Citium also inclines in some measure to this opinion, for he defines prudence as justice when it is concerned with what must be rendered to others as their due, as temperance when concerned with what must be chosen or avoided, as fortitude when concerned with what must be endured; and those who defend Zeno postulate that in these definitions he uses the word prudence in the sense of knowledge. Chrysippus,[*] however, by his opinion that corresponding to each several quality a virtue is formed by its own distinctive attribute of quality, unwittingly stirred up a swarm of virtues, as Plato[*] has it, which were not familiar nor even known; for as from the adjective brave he derived bravery, from mild mildness, and justice from just, so from charming he derived charmingnesses, from virtuous virtuousnesses, from great greatnesses, from honourable honourablenesses, postulating also the other qualities of the same sort, dexterousnesses, approachablenesses, adroitnesses, as virtues, and thus filled philosophy, which needed nothing of the sort, with many uncouth names.