On Moral Virtue (10)

Now if, by positing[*] that all errors and faults are equal, they are in some other way overlooking the truth, this present discourse is not the proper occasion to confute them; but in the case of the

emotions they certainly appear to be in opposition to reason and contrary to plain evidence. For, according to them, every emotion is an error, and every one who grieves or fears or desires is guilty of error. Yet there are seen to be great differences in the emotions according to their greater or lesser intensity. For who would declare that Dolon’s[*] fear was no greater than that of Ajax,[*] who often faced about and departed slowly from the midst of his enemies, scarcely changing knee for knee? Or that the grief of Alexander,[*] who attempted to kill himself because of Cleitus, was equal to Plato’s grief for the death of Socrates? For griefs are increased immoderately by unpredictable circumstances,[*] and an unexpected occurrence is more painful than one quite likely to happen; if, for instance, one should expect to see someone in prosperity and honour and then should learn that he had been cruelly tortured, as Parmenion[*] did of Philotas. And who would affirm that the rage of Nicocreon against Anaxarchus[*] was equal to that of Magas[*] against Philemon, though they had both been reviled by their opponents? For Nicocreon with iron pestles ground Anaxarchus to powder, but Magas merely ordered the public executioner to place his naked blade on Philemon’s neck and then to let him go. That is the reason why Plato[*] also called anger sinews of the soul on the ground that it is intensified by harshness and relaxed by gentleness.

So to elude these and similar difficulties my opponents[*] deny that these intensities and violences of the emotions come into existence in accordance with the judgement, in which lies the liability to error; but maintain that the irritations, contractions, and diffusions admit of increase and diminution through the operations of the irrational element. Yet there obviously are differences in judgements also; for some adjudge poverty not to be an evil, others to be a great evil, still others to be the greatest evil, so that they even hurl themselves down from precipices[*] or throw themselves into the sea. Some think death to be an evil merely because it deprives them of the good things of life, others because there are eternal torments and horrible punishments beneath the earth. By some the health of the body is cherished because it is in accordance with Nature and useful, to others it appears the greatest good in the world; for neither do they value

Joy in wealth or children,

nor

In that kingly rule that makes man like to gods[*]

in comparison therewith; and finally they think even virtue to be useless and unprofitable if health be not present. Hence it plainly appears that some make a greater, some a lesser, error in their judgements also.

This doctrine, however, need not be confuted at present, but that other point maybe assumed from this discussion: that my opponents themselves also concede that the irrational part is essentially different from judgement, the irrational, in accordance with which they say that emotion becomes greater and more violent; their contention is concerning the name and the expression, but they really surrender the point at issue to those who assert that the passionate and irrational element is different from the reasoning and judging. In his book On the Failure to Lead a Consistent Life Chrysippus [*] has said, Anger is a blind thing: often it prevents our seeing obvious matters, and often it obscures matters which are already apprehended; and, proceeding a little further, he says, For the passions, when once raised, drive out the processes of reasoning and all things that appear otherwise than they would have them be, and push forward with violence to actions contrary to reason. He then uses as evidence the words of Menander[*]:

Ah woe, alas for me! Where ever were

My wits awandering in my body then

When I made choice to do not this, but that?

And again, Chrysippus proceeds to say that every rational creature is so disposed by nature as to use reason in all things and to be governed by it; yet often reason is rejected when we are under the impulse of some other more violent force. Thus in this passage he plainly acknowledges what conclusion is to be drawn from the difference which exists between passion and reason.

Why, it would be ridiculous, as Plato[*] says, for a man to say that he is now better than himself and again worse than himself, and sometimes master of himself and sometimes not.