On Moral Virtue (10-12)

Now if, by positing[*] that all errors and faults are equal, they are in some other way overlooking the truth, this present discourse is not the proper occasion to confute them; but in the case of the

emotions they certainly appear to be in opposition to reason and contrary to plain evidence. For, according to them, every emotion is an error, and every one who grieves or fears or desires is guilty of error. Yet there are seen to be great differences in the emotions according to their greater or lesser intensity. For who would declare that Dolon’s[*] fear was no greater than that of Ajax,[*] who often faced about and departed slowly from the midst of his enemies, scarcely changing knee for knee? Or that the grief of Alexander,[*] who attempted to kill himself because of Cleitus, was equal to Plato’s grief for the death of Socrates? For griefs are increased immoderately by unpredictable circumstances,[*] and an unexpected occurrence is more painful than one quite likely to happen; if, for instance, one should expect to see someone in prosperity and honour and then should learn that he had been cruelly tortured, as Parmenion[*] did of Philotas. And who would affirm that the rage of Nicocreon against Anaxarchus[*] was equal to that of Magas[*] against Philemon, though they had both been reviled by their opponents? For Nicocreon with iron pestles ground Anaxarchus to powder, but Magas merely ordered the public executioner to place his naked blade on Philemon’s neck and then to let him go. That is the reason why Plato[*] also called anger sinews of the soul on the ground that it is intensified by harshness and relaxed by gentleness.

So to elude these and similar difficulties my opponents[*] deny that these intensities and violences of the emotions come into existence in accordance with the judgement, in which lies the liability to error; but maintain that the irritations, contractions, and diffusions admit of increase and diminution through the operations of the irrational element. Yet there obviously are differences in judgements also; for some adjudge poverty not to be an evil, others to be a great evil, still others to be the greatest evil, so that they even hurl themselves down from precipices[*] or throw themselves into the sea. Some think death to be an evil merely because it deprives them of the good things of life, others because there are eternal torments and horrible punishments beneath the earth. By some the health of the body is cherished because it is in accordance with Nature and useful, to others it appears the greatest good in the world; for neither do they value

Joy in wealth or children,

nor

In that kingly rule that makes man like to gods[*]

in comparison therewith; and finally they think even virtue to be useless and unprofitable if health be not present. Hence it plainly appears that some make a greater, some a lesser, error in their judgements also.

This doctrine, however, need not be confuted at present, but that other point maybe assumed from this discussion: that my opponents themselves also concede that the irrational part is essentially different from judgement, the irrational, in accordance with which they say that emotion becomes greater and more violent; their contention is concerning the name and the expression, but they really surrender the point at issue to those who assert that the passionate and irrational element is different from the reasoning and judging. In his book On the Failure to Lead a Consistent Life Chrysippus [*] has said, Anger is a blind thing: often it prevents our seeing obvious matters, and often it obscures matters which are already apprehended; and, proceeding a little further, he says, For the passions, when once raised, drive out the processes of reasoning and all things that appear otherwise than they would have them be, and push forward with violence to actions contrary to reason. He then uses as evidence the words of Menander[*]:

Ah woe, alas for me! Where ever were

My wits awandering in my body then

When I made choice to do not this, but that?

And again, Chrysippus proceeds to say that every rational creature is so disposed by nature as to use reason in all things and to be governed by it; yet often reason is rejected when we are under the impulse of some other more violent force. Thus in this passage he plainly acknowledges what conclusion is to be drawn from the difference which exists between passion and reason.

Why, it would be ridiculous, as Plato[*] says, for a man to say that he is now better than himself and again worse than himself, and sometimes master of himself and sometimes not.

For how is it possible for the same man to be both better and worse than himself, or to be master of himself and at the same time be mastered, if in some way or other each man were not by nature double and had not both the worse and the better within himself? This being the case, he who holds the worse in subjection to the better is Iself-controlled and better than himself, but he who permits the better part to follow and be in subjection to the intemperate and irrational part of his soul is called worse than himself and incontinent and in a state contrary to Nature.

For, in accordance with Nature, it is proper that reason, which is divine, should lead and rule the irrational, which derives its origin directly from the body to which Nature has designed that it should bear a resemblance and share in the body’s passions and be contaminated by it, since it has entered into the body and has become merged with it; that this is so is shown by our impulses,[*] which arise and are set in motion toward corporeal objects and become violent or relax in keeping with the changes of the body. For this reason young men are swift and impetuous and fiery in their appetites, and stung by madness, as it were, through the abundance and heat of their blood; but in old men the source of desire, which is seated about the liver,[*] is in the process of being extinguished and becoming small and weak, whereas

reason increases more and more in vigour as the passionate element fades away together with the body. And this, of course, is what determines the natures of wild beasts also as regards the passions. For it is not, I presume, by the rightness or wrongness of their opinions that some of them oppose apparent dangers with valour and impetuousness whereas others have helpless flutterings and fears in their souls; but the faculties which control the blood, the breath, and the body in general cause the difference in their affections, since the emotional part springs up from the flesh as from a root and carries with it its quality and composition. But that in man his body is affected and moved together with the impulses of his passions is proved by his paleness[*] and blushing, his trembling and palpitations of the heart, and again by his cheerful and relaxed expression when in hope and expectation of pleasures. But whenever the intellect acts, not accompanied by emotion but by itself alone, the body remains in repose and at rest, neither sharing nor partaking in the activity of the mind, so long as the body does not have to deal with the emotional element or include the irrational in such activity. Consequently, this fact also makes it plain that there are two parts within us which differ from each other in their faculties.

And in general, both as my opponents[*] themselves admit and as is quite obvious, in this world some things are governed by an acquired disposition, others by a natural one, some by an irrational soul, others by a rational and intellectual one; and in practically

all these things man participates and he is subject to all the differences I have mentioned. For he is controlled by his acquired disposition, nurtured by his natural disposition, and makes use of reason and intellect. He has, therefore, some portion of the irrational also and has innate within him the mainspring of emotion, not as an adventitious accessory, but as a necessary part of his being, which should never be done away with entirely, but must needs have careful tending and education. Therefore the work of reason is not Thracian, not like that of Lycurgus[*] - to cut down[*] and destroy the helpful elements of emotion together with the harmful, but to do as the god[*] who watches over crops and the god [*] who guards the vine do - to lop off the wild growth and to clip away excessive luxuriance, and then to cultivate and to dispose for use the serviceable remainder. For neither do those who fear drunkenness pour out their wine upon the ground,[*] nor do those who fear passion eradicate the disturbing element, but both temper[*] what they fear. It is, in fact, the rebellious kicking and plunging of oxen and horses that men do away with, not their movements and activities; even so reason makes use of the emotions when they have been subdued and are tame, and does not hamstring[*] nor altogether excise that part of the soul which should be its servant. For

The horse is meet for the chariot,

as Pindar[*] says,

the ox for the plough;

But if you think to slay a boar, you must find a stout-hearted hound.

Yet much more useful than these beasts are the whole brood of passions when they are present in the service of reason and help to intensify the virtues: anger, if it be moderate, will assist courage, and hatred of evil will aid justice, and righteous indignation[*] will oppose those who are prosperous beyond their deserts when their souls are inflamed with folly and insolence[*] and they need to be checked. For who, even if he so wished, could separate or sever from friendship a natural propensity toward affection, from humaneness pity, and from true benevolence the mutual participation in joy and grief? And if those err who discard love entirely because love may bring madness, neither are they right who blame commerce because it may beget covetousness; on the contrary, what they do is somewhat like the action of those who would abolish running because one may chance to stumble, or shooting[*] because one may overshoot the mark, and dislike any singing at all because some sing off key. For as in the realm of sound musical art produces consonance, not by doing away with the deep low and the shrill high notes[*]; and in the case of the body, medical art produces health, not by the removal of heat and coldness, but by the proportionately quantitative admixture of the two; so in the soul moral virtue is produced when equity and moderation are engendered by reason in the emotional faculties and activities. For a soul possessed of excessive pain or joy or fear is like a swollen and feverish body; it is not so, however, if the joy or pain or fear be moderate. And Homer[*] in his admirable words,

A valiant man will never change his hue,

Nor will his fear be over-great,

does not abolish fear, but excessive fear, in order that the valiant man may have not foolhardiness but courage, not audacity but daring. In his pleasures, therefore, a man must rid himself of excessive desire, and in punishing wrong, of excessive hatred of evil: for in this way he will be, in the former case, not insensible but temperate, and in the latter case, just, not savage nor cruel. But if the passions could in reality be entirely done away with,[*] in many persons reason would be too inactive and dulled, like a pilot when the wind dies down. It is surely this truth that the legislators also have perceived when they try to put into their constitutions the emotions of ambition and emulation as regards the citizens’ relations to each other, but in relation to the enemy try to rouse and increase their spirited and fighting qualities with trumpets and pipes.[*] For it is not in poetry only that, as Plato[*] says, he who is inspired and possessed by the Muses renders ridiculous the man who is an artist equipped with exact knowledge of technique, but in battles also the passionate and inspired is irresistible and invincible. This quality it is that Homer says the gods instil into men:

So did he speak and breathed great might

Into the shepherd of the people[*];

and

Not without some god does he

These deeds of madness[*];

as though the gods were adding passion as an incitement or a vehicle to reason.

Indeed we may see these very opponents of mine often inciting young men with praise and often chastising them with admonitions; and of these, in the first case pleasure is the consequence, in the second pain (in fact, admonition and rebuke engender repentance and shame, of which the first is a kind of pain, the second a kind of fear[*]); and of these methods they make particular use to improve their charges. As Diogenes[*] also remarked, when Plato was being praised, What is there so august about one who has spent so much time talking philosophy, yet has never caused anyone pain? For surely studies could not so properly be called, to use Xenocrates’[*] words, the grips of philosophy, as could the emotions of young men: shame, desire, repentance, pleasure, pain, ambition. On these if reason and law obtain a suitable and salutary grip, they efficaciously set the young man upon the path that he should take. Therefore the

Spartan[*] tutor was not wide of the mark when he said that he intended to make a boy entrusted to him delight in honourable and be vexed at dishonourable things. Than this saying there can be shown no greater nor fairer end of such education as befits a free-born child.