Why the Oracles Cease to Give Answers (19-20)

Thus then spake Cleombrotus: I could, says he, relate several such stories as these; but it is sufficient that what has been said as yet does not contradict the opinion of any one here. And we all know, the Stoics believe the same as we do concerning the Daemons, and that amongst

the great company of Gods which are commonly believed, there is but one who is eternal and immortal; all the rest, having been born in time, shall end by death. As to the flouts and scoffing of the Epicureans, they are not to be regarded, seeing they have the boldness to treat divine providence with as little reverence, calling it by no better a name than a mere whimsy and old wives’ fable. Whereas we, on the contrary, assert that their Infinity is fabulous and ridiculous, seeing among such endless numbers of worlds there is not one governed by reason or divine providence, they having been all made and upheld by chance. If we cannot forbear drolling even in matters of philosophy, they are most to be ridiculed who bring into their disputes of natural questions certain blind, dumb, and lifeless images, which appear they know not where nor when, which, they say, proceed from bodies, some of which are still living, and others long since dead and rotten. Now, such people’s opinions as these must needs be exploded and derided by all rational men; yet these very people shall be offended and angry at a man’s saying there be Daemons, and that they subsist both by reason and by Nature, and continue a long time.

Here Ammonius began to speak, saying: In my opinion, Theophrastus was in the right, and spoke like a philosopher and a divine; for whoever shall deny what he alleges must also reject many things which may happen, though we understand not the reasons why they do so. And granting what he offers to be true, it carries with it many things called impossible and unreal. But as to what I have heard the Epicureans allege against the Daemons which Empedocles brings in,—as, that it is impossible they can be happy and long-lived if they be bad and viciously affected, because vice in its own nature is blind and naturally precipitates itself into such mischiefs as destroy life, —that, I must tell you, is vain and idle. For if this

reasoning be good, it will then follow that Epicurus was a worse man than Gorgias the sophister, and Metrodorus than Alexis the comic actor; for Alexis lived twice as long as Metrodorus, and Gorgias a third longer than Epicurus. For it is in another regard we say virtue is strong and vice weak. not in reference to the continuance or dissolution of the body; for we know there are many animals which are dull, slow, and heavy, and many disorderly and lustful, which live longer than those that are more sagacious and quicker of sense. And therefore they are much in the wrong in saying the divine nature is immortal because it avoideth the things which are ill and mischievous; for they should have supposed the divine nature free from all possibility of falling into corruption and alteration. But perhaps it will be thought not fair to dispute against those that are absent; I would have therefore Cleombrotus to resume his discourse touching the vanishing and transmigration of Daemons from one place to another.