On the Fortunes of the Romans (intro-1)

Plutarch’s essay on the Fortune of the Romans, like the following essays, is very plainly an epideictic oration. Where and when it was delivered, or whether it was ever delivered at all, we have no means of ascertaining. Hartman feels very sure that it was delivered to a Roman audience in the early days of Plutarch’s sojourn at Rome, and was intended to commend the speaker to other Romans besides his personal friends there.

The thesis that Fortune was responsible for the great Roman empire would hardly be pleasing to Romans, but Plutarch is careful to point out that the high character of many individual Romans also contributed to the Roman success. In fact the essay might well bear the double title of Fortune or Virtues,[*] as does the essay on Alexander. Plutarch was thoroughly familiar with the interpretations of Roman history then fashionable, and in this essay he gives a colourful sketch of as much as will serve his purpose. Much that is here may also be found elsewhere in Plutarch’s writings.

The essay comes to a somewhat abrupt conclusion, and many have thought it unfinished; the same is true of the essays immediately following. One may

wonder whether a time limit was set for these orations, as in the courts at Athens where the time allowed was measured by the water-clock or clepsydra. We may note, however, that these orations are of quite unequal length.

The text is fairly good, and the majority of the ms. mistakes have been corrected by the various editors and commentators. The essay is No. 175 in Lamprias’s list of Plutarch’s works.

Virtue and Fortune, who have often engaged in many great contests, are now engaging each other in the present contest, which is the greatest of all; for in this they are striving for a decision regarding the hegemony of Rome, to determine whose work it is and which of them created such a mighty power. For to her who is victorious this will be no slight testimonial, but rather a defence against accusation. For Virtue is accused of being a fair thing, but unprofitable; Fortune of being a thing inconstant, but good. Virtue’s labours, they say, are fruitless. Fortune’s gifts untrustworthy. Who, then, will not declare, when Rome shall have been added to the achievements of one of the contestants, either that Virtue is a most profitable thing if she has done such good to good men, or that Good Fortune is a thing most steadfast if she has already preserved for so long a time that which she has bestowed?

The poet Ion[*] in his prose works observes that Fortune is a thing very dissimilar to Wisdom, and yet she becomes the creator of things very similar: they both bring increase and added honours to men, they lead them on to high repute, to power, to dominion. What need to be tedious by enumerating the many examples? Even Nature herself, who creates and

produces all things for us, some think to be Fortune, others Wisdom. Wherefore our present discourse does, in a measure, bestow a fair and enviable dignity upon Rome, if we raise the question over her, even as we do over earth and sea, heaven and stars, whether she has come to her present state by Fortune or by Forethought.[*]