How To Profit By One's Enemies (5-9)

As often as Plato [*] found himself in the company of persons whose conduct was unseemly, he was wont to say to himself, Is it possible that I am like them ? But if the man who reviles another’s [*]

life will at once carefully inspect his own, and readjust it by directing and turning it aside into the opposite course, he will have gained something useful from this reviling, which, otherwise, not only gives the impression of being useless and inane, but is so in fact.

Now most people laugh if a man who is bald or hump-backed reviles and jeers at others for being in such case; for it is altogether ridiculous to indulge in reviling and jeering at anything that affords to another the opportunity for a caustic retort. For example, Leo [*] of Byzantium, being reviled by a humpback for the weakness of his eyes, said, You reproach me with that which can happen to any man, while you bear on your back the mark of God’s wrath! Do not therefore ever revile an adulterer when you yourself are given to unnatural lust, nor a profligate when you yourself are stingy.

Own kin are you of her who slew her spouse

are the words of Alcmeon to Adrastus. What then does Adrastus say ? He reproaches the speaker with a shameful deed which is not another’s but all his own:

But you yourself slew her who gave you birth.[*]

Domitius remarked to Crassus, Did you not weep at the death of a lamprey [*] which was being kept for you in a fish-pond ? And the other replied, Did you not bury three wives and not shed a tear ? The man who is going to indulge in reviling need not be smart and loud-voiced and aggressive, but he must be irreproachable and unimpeachable. For upon nobody does the divine power seem so to enjoin the precept, Know thyself, as upon him who purposes to censure another, so that such persons may not, by saying what they want to say, have to hear what they do not want to hear. For a person of this type, as Sophocles [*] puts it,

By babbling thoughtless talk is wont to hear Against his will the words he willing speaks.

There may be, then, so much that is profitable and useful in reviling one’s enemy; but no less profit lies in the alternative of being reviled oneself and ill spoken of by one’s enemies. Hence Antisthenes [*] was quite right in saying that, as a matter of self-preservation, men have need of true friends or else of ardent enemies; for the first by admonition, and the second by reviling, turn them from error. But since friendship’s voice has nowadays become thin and weak when it comes to frank speaking, while its flattery is voluble and its admonition mute, we have to depend upon our enemies to hear the truth. For as Telephus,[*] unable to find a suitable physician, subjected his wound to his enemy’s spear, so those who are cut off from benevolent admonition must submit with patience to the remarks of a malevolent enemy if he exposes and reprehends their vice, and they must give consideration to the facts only, and not to what is in the mind of the detractor. Another parallel is the case of the man who, with intent to kill the Thessalian Prometheus, [*] smote with his sword a tumour which Prometheus had, and opened it so that the man’s life

was saved, and he obtained relief from his tumour through its bursting; so oftentimes reviling launched upon a man by the prompting of anger or enmity cures some evil in his soul which either was not recognized or was disregarded by him. But most persons on being reviled do not stop to think whether the reproach is applicable to themselves, but they try to think what other form of reproach is applicable to the reviler, and, just as wrestlers do not wipe the dust from off their own bodies, so these persons do not wipe off the revilings from themselves, but they besmear one another, and in consequence get besmirched and begrimed by each other as they grapple together. But it is more imperative that the man who is ill spoken of by an enemy should rid himself of the attribute in question, than that he should get rid of a stain on his clothes to which his attention has been called; and if anybody mentions things which are not really attributes of ours, we should nevertheless seek to learn the cause which has given rise to such slanderous assertions, and we must exercise vigilance, for fear that we unwittingly commit some error either approximating or resembling the one mentioned. For example, an unwarranted suspicion of unmanliness was aroused against Lacydes, king of the Argives, by a certain arrangement of his hair and a mincing gait, and Pompey [*] suffered in the same way on account of his habit of scratching his head with one finger, although he was very far removed from effeminacy and licentiousness. Crassus [*] incurred the charge of being too intimate with one of the Vestal virgins, when he only wanted to buy from her a piece of good land, and for this reason had many private interviews with her and paid her much attention. Again, Postumia’s [*] ready laughter and overbold talk in men’s company put her under unjust suspicion, so that she was tried for unchastity. She was found innocent of the charge, but in dismissing her the Poritifex Maximus, Spurius Minucius, reminded her that the language she used should have no less dignity than her life. And again Pausanias inflicted on Themistocles, [*] who was doing nothing wrong, the suspicion of treason by treating him as a friend, and by writing and sending messages to him continually.

Whenever, then, anything untrue has been said, you must not despise and disregard it just because it is false, but rather consider what word or act of yours, which of your pursuits or associations, has given colour to the calumny, and then be studiously careful to avoid it. For if others by becoming involved in undesired situations thereby learn a useful lesson—just as Merope says that

Inconstant Fortune took from me, To pay her fee, the dearest that I had, But she for that hath made me wise—[*]

what is to hinder a man from taking his enemy as his teacher without fee, and profiting thereby, and thus learning, to some extent, the things of which he was unaware ? For there are many things which an enemy is quicker to perceive than a friend (for Love is blind regarding the loved one, as Plato [*] says), and inherent in hatred, along with curiosity, is the inability to hold one’s tongue. Hiero [*] was reviled by [*] one of his enemies for his offensive breath; so when he went home he said to his wife, What do you mean ? Even you never told me of this. But she being virtuous and innocent said, I supposed that all men smelt so. Thus it is that things which are perceptible, material, and evident to all the world, may sooner be learned from our enemies than from our friends and close associates.

But, quite apart from this, control over the tongue, which is no small part of virtue, is something which it is impossible to keep always in subjection and obedience to the reasoning faculties, unless a man by training, practice, and industry has mastered the worst of his emotions, such as anger, for example. For the voice that slips out unintended, [*] and the

Word that has ’scaped the lips’ prison,[*]

and

Some of the sayings that flit forth of themselves,[*]

are all incident to temperaments that are quite untrained, and are unsteady and fluctuating, so to speak, owing to weakness of will, headstrong opinions, and a reckless way of living. Just for a word, the lightest thing in the world, is ordained, according to the divine Plato,[*] heaviest punishment, coming from both gods and men. But silence cannot under any circumstances be called to an accounting (it is more than a preventive of thirst, as Hippocrates [*] says of it), and in the midst of reviling it is [*] dignified and Socratic, or rather Heraclean, if it be true that Heracles

Not so much as to a fly gave heed to words of hatred.[*]

Indeed, there is nothing more dignified and noble than to maintain a calm demeanour when an enemy reviles one,

Passing by a man’s scoffs Just as swimmers swim past a precipitous rock,[*]

but far more important is the practice. If you once acquire the habit of bearing an enemy’s abuse in silence, you will very easily bear up under a wife’s attack when she rails at you, and without discomposure will patiently hear the most bitter utterances of a friend or a brother; and when you meet with blows or missiles at the hands of a father or mother, you will show no sign of passion or wrath. For instance, Socrates bore with Xanthippe,[*] who was irascible and acrimonious, for he thought that he should have no difficulty in getting along with other people if he accustomed himself to bear patiently with her; but it is much better to secure this training from the scurrilous, angry, scoffing, and abusive attacks of enemies and outsiders, and thus accustom the temper to be unruffled and not even impatient in the midst of reviling.

In this manner, then, it is possible for us to display the qualities of gentleness and forbearance in connexion with our enmities, and also straightforwardness, magnanimity, and goodness better than in our friendships. For it is not so honourable to do a good turn to a friend as it is disgraceful not to do it when he is in need; but even to forgo taking [*]

vengeance on an enemy when he offers a good opportunity is a handsome thing to do. But in case a man shows compassion for an enemy in affliction, and gives a helping hand to him when he has come to be in need, and displays some concern and zeal in behalf of his children and his household affairs when they come to want, I say that whosoever does not feel affection for such a man because of his kindliness, or does not commend his goodness,

Hath a black heart Forged from adamant or else from steel.[*]

When Caesar gave orders that the statues in honour of Pompey, which had been thrown down, should be restored, Cicero [*] said to him, You have restored Pompey’s statues, but you have made your own secure. Wherefore there must be no scanting of commendation or due honour in the case of an enemy who has justly gained a fair repute. For such an attitude wins greater commendation for those who bestow it, and inspires confidence, when later a man makes a complaint that he does so, not because he hates the person, but because he disapproves of the action. But best of all, and most advantageous, is the fact that a man is farthest removed from envying the good fortune of his friends or the success of his relatives, if he has acquired the habit of commending his enemies, and feeling no pang and cherishing no grudge when they prosper. And yet what other process of training produces greater benefit to our souls or a better disposition, than does that which takes from us all our jealousy and our proneness to envy ? Just as many of the things which are necessary in war, but bad under other conditions, when they once acquire the sanction of custom and law,

cannot easily be abolished by the people even though the people are being injured by them, so enmity introduces envy along with hatred, and leaves as a residue jealousy, joy over others’ misfortunes, and vindictiveness. Moreover, knavery, deceit, and intrigue, which seem not bad or unjust when employed against an enemy, if once they find a lodgement, acquire a permanent tenure, and are hard to eject. The next thing is that men of themselves employ these against their friends through force of habit, unless they are on their guard against using them against their enemies. If then Pythagoras [*] was right when, in trying to accustom men to refrain from cruelty and rapacity in connexion with dumb animals, he used to intercede with fowlers, and buy up catches of fish and direct that they be released, and forbid the killing of any domesticated animal, it is surely a grander achievement by far, in disagreements and contentions with human beings, for a man to be a noble, honest, and ingenuous enemy, and to repress and put down his base, ignoble, and knavish propensities, so that in his dealings with his friends he may be always steadfast and may keep himself from wrongdoing. Scaurus was an enemy of Domitius and his accuser before the law. [*]Now a servant of Domitius came to Scaurus before the trial, claiming to have information on some matters that had escaped Scaurus’s knowledge, but Scaurus would not let him speak, and caused the man to be arrested and taken back to his master. When Cato was prosecuting Murena for corrupt political practices and was getting together his evidence, there followed him, in accordance with the usage of the time,[*] men who watched what was being done. Very often they would ask him if he was intending that day to gather evidence or to do any work on the case, and if he said No, they believed him and went away. In these facts may be found the greatest proof of Cato’s repute; but it is a greater thing, and indeed the noblest, that, if we acquire the habit of practising honesty in dealing even with our enemies, we shall never deal dishonestly and knavishly with our intimate associates and friends.