CHAP. VIII. ¶ Of Soueraigntie. M Aiestie or Soueraigntie is the most high,
 absolute, and perpetuall The definition of Maiesty or
 Soueraigntie. power over the citisens and subiects in a Commonweale:
 which the Latines cal Maiestatem, the Greeks , & , and ; the Italians Segnoria, and the Hebrewes , that is to say, The greatest power to
 commaund. For maiestie (as Festus saith) is so called of
 mightinesse. For so here it behoueth first
 to define what maiestie or Soueraigntie is, which neither lawyer nor politicall
 philosopher hath yet defined: although it be the principall and most necessarie
 point for the understanding of the nature of a Commonweale. And forasmuch as
 wee have before defined a Commonweale to be the right government of many
 families, and of things common amongst them, with a most high & perpetuall
 power: it resteth to be declared, what is to be vnderstood by the name of a
 most high and perpetuall power. We That Soueraigntie
 consisteth in a perpetuall power. have said that this power ought to
 be perpetuall, for that it may bee, that that absolute power over the subiects
 may be giuen to one or many, for a short or certaine time, which expired, they
 are no more than subiects themselves: so that whilest they are in their puissant authoritie, they cannot call themselves
 Soueraigne princes, seeing that they are but men put in trust, and keepers of
 this soueraigne power, vntill it shall please the people or the prince that
 gaue it them to recall it; who alwaies remained seased thereof. For as they
 which lend or pawne unto another man their goods, remaine still the lords and
 owners thereof: so it is also with them, who giue unto others power and
 authoritie to iudge and commaund, be it for a certaine time limitted, or so
 great and long time as shall please them; they themselves neuerthelesse
 continuing still seased of the power and iurisdiction, which the other exercise
 but by way of loane or borrowing. And that is it for
 which the law saith, That the gouernour of a countrey, or lieutenant of a prince, his time once expired, giueth up his
 power, as but one put in trust, and therein defended by the power of another.
 And in that respect there is no difference betwixt the great officer and the
 lesser: for otherwise if the high and absolute power graunted by a prince to
 his lieutenant, should of right be called Soueraigntie, he might vse the same
 against his prince, to whome nothing was left but the bare name of a prince,
 standing but for a cipher: so should the subiect commaund his Soueraigne, the
 seruant his maister, than which nothing could be more absurd: considering that
 in all power graunted unto magistrats, or priuat men, the person of the prince
 is alwaies to be excepted; who neuer giueth so much power unto another, but
 that hee alwayes keepeth more unto himselfe; neither is euer to be thought so
 depriued of his soueraigne power, but that he
 may take unto himself the examination and deciding of such things as he hath
 committed unto his magistrats or officers, whether it be by the way of
 preuention, concurrence, or euocation: from whome he may also take the power
 giuen them by vertue of their commission or institution, or suffer them to hold
 it so long as shall please him. These grounds thus laid, as the foundations of
 Soueraigntie, wee conclude, that neither the Roman Dictator, nor the Harmoste
 of Lacedemonia, nor the Esmynaet of Salonick, nor he whom they cal the Archus
 of Malta, nor the antient Baily of Florence, (when it was gouerned by a popular
 state) neither the Regents or Viceroyes of kingdoms, nor any other officers or
 magistrats whatsoeuer, unto whom the highest, but yet not the perpetual power,
 is by the princes or peoples grant committed, 
 can be accounted to have the same in Soueraignty. And albeit that the antient
 Dictators had all power giuen them in best sort that might be (which the
 antient Latines called Optima Lege ) so that from them it
 was not lawfull to appeale▪ and upon whose creation all offices were suspended;
 vntill such time as that the Tribunes were ordayned as keepers of the peoples
 libertie, who continued in their charge notwithstanding the creation of the
 Dictator, who had free power to oppose themselves against him; so that if
 appeale were made from the Dictatour, the Tribunes might assemble the people,
 appointing the parties to bring forth the causes of their appeale, & the
 Dictator to stay his iudgement; as when Papirius Cursor 
 the Dictator, condemned Fabius Max the first, to death;
 and Fabius Max the second had in like manner condemned
 M nutius, 

 both Colonels of the horsemen, for that they
 had fought with the enemie contrarie to the commaund of the Dictator; they were
 yet both by appeale and iudgement of the people acquited. For so saith Liuie, Then the father of Fabius said,
 I call 

 * Liui. lib 7. 

 upon the Tribunes, and appeale unto the people, which can do
 more than thy Dictatorship▪ 

 The dictator of Rome, neither soueraigne prince nor
 magistrat. 

 whereunto king Tullus Hostilius gaue
 place. Wherby it appeareth that the Dictator was neither soueraigne
 prince, nor magistrat, as many have supposed; neither had any thing more than a
 simple commission for the making of wa e▪ the
 repressing of sedition, the reforming of the state▪ on instituting of new
 officers. So that Soueraigntie is not limited either in power, charge, or time
 certaine. And namely the ten commissioners established for the reforming of
 customes and lawes; albeit than they had absolute power, from which there was no appeale to be made, and that
 all offices were suspended, during the time of their commission; yet had they
 not for all that any Soueraigntie; for their commission being fulfilled, their
 power also expired; as did that of the Dictators. So hauing vanquished the enemie, forth with discharged himselfe of the
 Dictatorship, which he had not had but fifteene dayes, Seruilius in eight dayes, Mamercus in one day.
 And the Dictator was also named, not by the Senat, or the people, neither by
 the magistrats, or request made unto the people; nor by any laws which were
 alwayes necessarie to the creating of officers, but by an interrex, or a king
 created for a time, borne of honourable blood: for
 why, it was not enough for him to be a noble
 Senator onely, that should name the Dictator. Now if one should say, that Sylla was by the law Valeria made Dictator for threescore
 yeares: I will aunswere as Cicero did, That it was
 neither Dictatorship nor law, but a most cruell tyrannie; whereof for all that
 he discharged himselfe the fourth yere after he was made Dictator, when as he
 with the blood of the citisens had quenched the flames of the civill warres;
 hauing yet still in the meane time reserued unto the Tribunes their free power
 to oppose themselves against his authoritie. And although Caesar fortie yeares after had inuaded the perpetuall Dictatorship
 together with the libertie of the people, yet left hee unto the Tribunes of the
 people, their power to oppose themselves against his proceedings: but when as
 before, Pompeius being Consull, the verie name of the
 Dictatorship was taken out of the Commonweale,
 and Caesar, contrarie to the law of Pompeius, had procured himselfe by the law Seruia, to be created
 Dictator, hee was by the conspiracie of the Senators slaine in the middest of
 the Senat. But let vs graunt an absolute power without appeale or controlement,
 to be graunted by the people to one or many to mannage their estate and entire
 government: shall wee therefore say him or them to Who is to
 be called an absolute soueraigne. have the state of Soueraigntie,
 when as hee onely is to bee called absolute soueraigne, who next unto God
 acknowledgeth none greaterthan himself? wherefore I say no soueraigntie to be
 in them, but in the people, of whom they have a borrowed power, or power for a
 certaine time, which once expired; they are bound to yeeld up their authoritie.
 Neither is the people to be thought to have depriued it selfe of the power
 thereof▪ although it have giuen an absolute
 power to one or moe for a certaine time: and much more if the power (be it
 giuen) be reuocable at the pleasure of the people, without any limitation of
 time: For both the one and the other hold nothing of themselves, but are to
 giue account of their doings unto the prince, or the people of whome they had
 the power so to commaund: whereas the prince or people themselves, in whome the
 Soueraigntie resteth, are to giue account unto none, but to the immortall God
 alone. But what if such absolute power as we have spoken of, be giuen to one or moe
 for nine or ten yeares? as in auntient time in Athens the people made one of
 the citisens The great Archon of Athens no soueraigne. 
 their soueraigne, whome they called Archon. I say neuerthelesse that hee was no
 prince, neither that the Soueraigntie of
 the state rested in him: albeit that hee was a soueraigne magistrat, but yet
 countable of his actions unto the people, his time beeing expired. Yet might
 one say, What if that high & absolute power which we have spoken of, were
 giuen to one or moe▪ for a yere, with condition not to giue any account at The Amymones soueraigne magistrats, and es not simple soueraignes. all for their
 doings▪ For to the Cnidiens every yeare chose of their
 cirisens, whome they called Amymones, that is to say, Men without imputation,
 with such soueraignty of power, as that they might not be called to account for
 any thing that they had done, neither during the of
 their charge, nor after that the same was expired: I say yet for althat, that
 the soueraigntie of the state was not in them▪ seeing that they were bound at
 the yeares end to restore againe unto the people, the authoritie they were put
 in trust withall; the Soueraigntie still
 remaining with the people, and the execution thereof with the Amymones, whome a
 man might well call soueraigne magistrats, but not simple Soueraignes: For the
 one was the prince, the other the subiect; the one the lord, the other the
 seruant; the one the proprietarie and seised of the Soueraigntie, the other
 neither proprietarie nor possessed thereof, neither holding any thing thereof,
 but as a feoffer or keeper in trust. The same we may say of the Regents of Fraunce, created for the infancie, furie,
 or The Regents of Fraunce▪ absence of the king,
 whether the edicts, mandats, and letters pattents, be signed and sealed with the signe and seale of the Regents, and in their
 name (as they did before the law of Charles the fift the French king) or els that it be done
 in the name of the king, and the mandats sealed with his seale: for in that
 there is little or no difference at all: seeing that whatsoeuer is done by the
 atturney, the lord allowing the same, may well be thought to be done by the
 lord himselfe. Now the Regent is the true protectour of the king and of his
 kingdome: for so the good countie Theobald called
 himself Procuratorem regni Francorum, that is to say,
 Protectour of the kingdome of Fraunce. So when a prince giueth absolute power
 to a Regent, or to a Senat, in his presence, or in his absence, to gouerne in
 his name; albeit that the edicts or letters of commaund go in his or their
 name, yet is it alwaies the king that speaketh or commaundeth. So we see The Senat of Millan, or Naples, what power it hath in the
 absence of the king of Spaine. that the Senat of Milan or Naples, in
 the absence of the king of Spaine hath absolute power to dispatch all mandates in his name: As a man may see by the decree
 of the emperour Charles the fift in these words. Senatus Mediolanensis potestatem habeat constitutiones
 principis confirmandi, infirmandi, tollendi, dispensandi, contra statuta,
 habilitationes, prerogationes, restitutiones faciendi, &c. A Senatu ne
 prouocari possit, &c. Et quicquid faciet, parem vim habeat vt si à
 principe factum ac decretum esset: Non tamen possit delictorum veniam
 tribuere, aut liter as salui conductus reis criminum dare. That is to
 say, The Senat of Milan hath power to confirme the constitutions of the prince,
 as also to infirme the same, to disanull them, to dispense with them contrarie
 to the statutes, to make enablements, prerogatives, and restitutions, &c.
 No appeale shall be made from the Senat, &c. And whatsoeuer it shall doe,
 shall have like force as if it were done or 
 decreed by the prince: yet may it not graunt pardon for offences committed, or
 giue letters of safe conduct unto parties conuicted. This power almost infinit,
 is not giuen unto the Senat of Milan and Naples, in any thing to diminish the
 maiestie of the king of Spaine, but altogether to the contrarie, to ease him of
 his care and paines: ioyne hereunto also, that this power how great soeuer it
 be, is to be reuoked at the pleasure of him that gaue it. But suppose that such great power be giuen to a kings lieutenant, or the
 gouernour Princes, lieutenants or gouernours of coun tries
 for tearme of life, yes no soueraignes. of a countrey for tearme of
 his life, is not that a soueraigne and perpetuall power? For otherwise if we
 should interpret that onely to be a perpetuall power which shall neuer haue
 end, there should be at all no soueraigntie, but in the Aristocraticall and
 popular state, which neuer dieth except it
 be vtterly rooted out. Or if we vnderstand the word, Perpetuall, in a monarch
 for him and his heires, there should be few perpetuall soueraigne monarches,
 seeing there bee but few that be hereditarie; so that they which come to the
 crowne by way of election, should not be soueraignes: wherefore we must
 vnderstand the word Perpetuall, for the tearme of the life of him that hath the
 power. Now if the soueraigne and annuall onely, or which hath a certaine
 prefixed and limited time to rule, chance to continue his government so giuen
 him, beyond the appointed time; that must either be by the good liking of him
 that gaue the power, or els by force: if by force, it is called tyrannie; and
 yet neuerthelesse the tyrant is a soueraigne: as the violent possession of an
 intruder is in nature a possession, although it be contrarie to the law, and they which had the possession before are so
 thereof disseised: but if such a magistrat continue his soueraigne power by the
 good liking of the superiour that gaue it him, wee will not therefore say that
 hee is a soueraigne prince, seeing that he holdeth nothing but by sufferance;
 and that a great deale the lesse, if the time be not limited, for in that he
 hath nothing but by commission during pleasure: and he that so holdeth his
 power, is neither lord nor possessor therof. Men know right well, that there
 was neuer greater power giuen to magistrat next unto his prince, than Henrie duke of Aniou. that which was of late yeares
 graunted to Henrie of Fraunce, duke of Aniou, by king
 

 Charles the ninth his brother, for it was most great and
 perpetuall, without any exception of the
 regall power: yet for all that one cannot say that it was soueraigne, inasmuch
 as he was called Leiutenant General for the king, So long as
 it shall stand with our good pleasure, ioyned unto it in his letters
 patents: which wel declareth a power but during pleasure. Which power of
 lieutenancie (as of all other magistracies) ceaseth in the presence of the
 prince. But what shall we then say of him to whom the people have giuen absolute
 power How the people may create a soueraigne
 Monarch. so long as he liveth? in this case we must distinguish: If
 such absolute power bee giuen him purely and simply without the name of a
 magistrat, gouernour, or lieutenant, or other forme of deputation; it is
 certaine that such an one is, and may call himselfe a Soueraigne Monarch: for
 so the people hath voluntarily disseised and dispoyled it selfe of the soueraigne power, to sease and inuest another
 therein; hauing on him, and uppon him transported all the power, authoritie,
 prerogatives, and soueraignties thereof: as if a man should by pure gift
 deliver unto another man the proprietie and possession that unto him belongeth:
 in which case such a perfect donation admitteth no conditions. In which sort
 the regall law is by the lawyer said to have bene made in these words, The regall, or royall law. 

 Cum populus ei & in eum omnem potestatem contulit: 
 when as the people conferred unto him, and on him all their power. But if the
 people shall giue all their power unto any one so long as he liveth, by the
 name of a magistrat, lieutenant, or gouernour, or onely to discharge themselves
 of the exercise of their power: in this case he is not to be accounted any
 soueraigne, but a plaine officer, or leiutenant, regent, gouernour, or
 guerdon and keeper of another mans power.
 For as the magistrat, although hee make a perpetuall lieutenant, and hath no
 care of his own iurisdiction, leauing the entire exercise thereof unto his
 lieutenant, yet for all that, it is not in the person of the lieutenant that
 the power lyeth to commaund, or iudge, neither the exercise and force of the
 law: but if he passe beyond the power unto him giuen, it is to none effect; if
 his doings bee not ratified, liked, and approued by him that hath giuen the
 power. And for this cause king Iohn of Fraunce, led
 prisoner into England, after his returne thence, solemnly ratified all the acts
 of Charles the Dolphin, his eldest sonne, made regent in
 his absence, to strengthen and confirme the same, so farre as should be
 convenient and needfull. Be it then that a man either by commission, or
 institution, or by delegation, for a certaine 
 time, or for euer, exercise the power of another man: he that so exerciseth
 this power, is not therefore a soueraigne, although that by his letters of
 commission or deputation he be not called a protector, lieutenant, regent, or
 gouernour: no not, albeit that such power be giuen him by the customs and lawes
 of the countrey, which should be much Hector Boet. in hist.
 Scot. stronger than election. As by an auntient law amongst the
 Scots, the entire government of the kingdome was committed unto him that was
 neerest of blood unto the king in his minoritie, or under the age of xxv
 yeares, yet with charge that all things should be done in the kings name: which
 law was long ago abrogated, for the danger might grow unto the young king, by
 his nigh kinsmen affecting the kingdome: for which, Caesar thought it lawfull for a man to become villanous. 

 Now let vs prosecute the other part of our propounded definition, and show what
 these words, Absolute power, signifie. For we said that
 unto Maiestie, or Soueraigntie unto soueraigntie belongeth
 absolute power, and what that absolute power is. belongeth an
 absolute power, not subiect to any law. For the people or the lords of a
 Commonweale, may purely & simply giue the soueraigne and perpetuall power
 to any one, to dispose of the goods and lives, and of all the state at his
 pleasure: and so afterward to leaue it to whome he list: like as the
 proprietarie or owner may purely and simply giue his owne goods, without any
 other cause to be expressed, than of his owne meere bountie; which is indeed
 the true donation, which no more receiueth condition, 
 being once accomplished and perfected: as for the other donations, which carrie
 with them charge and condition, are not indeed
 true donations. So also the chiefe power giuen unto a prince with charge and
 condition, is not properly soueraigntie, nor power absolute; except that such
 charge or condition annexed unto the soueraigntie at the creation of a prince,
 be directly comprehended within the lawes of God and nature. As it is at the
 inuesting of the Tartar king. For the great king of Tartarie beeing dead, the
 prince and the people to whome the right of the election belongeth, make
 choice The forme of chusing the great king of
 Tartarie. of one of the kinsmen of the dead king, which they thinke
 best of (prouided that he be either his sonne or his nephew) and hauing placed
 him in a throne of gold, the bishop (after a solemne song sung according to the
 manner of their auncestours) turning his speech unto the king, in the name of
 the people, saith thus, Wee pray thee, and charge thee to raigne over vs: to whom the king aunswereth, If you
 will have me so to doe, you must be readie to performe whatsoeuer I commaund;
 whomsoeuer I appoint to be slaine, you shall slay him presently, and into my
 hand you shall commit the whole estate of the kingdome: whereunto the people
 aunswere, Bee it so: after which the king continuing his speech, saith, My word
 shall be my sword: whereunto the people giueth a great applause. This done, he
 is taken out of his high throne, and set upon the ground upon a bare boord,
 unto whome the bishop againe turning his speech, saith, Looke
 up unto heauen and acknowledge almightie God, the king of the whole world:
 and behold also this table whereon thou sittest below: if thou rule well,
 thou shalt have althings according to thy harts desire; but if thou forget
 thy dutie and calling, thou shalt be cast headlong 

 

 downe from thy high seat, and dispotled of thy regall power
 and wealth, bee brought so low, as that thou shalt not have so much as this
 boord left thee to sit upon. This said, hee is lifted up on high, and
 by all the people proclaimed king of the Tartars. This so great a power giuen
 by the people unto the king, may wel be called absolute and soueraigne, for
 that it hath no condition annexed thereunto, other than is by the law of God
 and nature commaunded. The same or like forme of inuesting we may also see to have bene sometimes vsed
 in The forme of inuesting the duke of Carinthia. 
 realmes and principalities, descending by succession. But the like is not to
 that of Carinthia, where yet at this present neere unto the citie of St. Vitus, in a meddow is to be seene a marble stone,
 whereunto a countrey pesant unto whom that office of right belonged, stept up, hauing upon his right hand a blacke cow, and
 on his left a leane euill fauored mare, and all the people about him; towards
 whome he that is to be created duke commeth marching, with a great number of
 lords, all apparelled in red, and his ensignes displayed before him; all in
 good and seemely order, except the new duke himselfe, who is apparrelled like a
 poore shepheard, with a sheephooke in his hand: whome the clowne upon the stone
 seeing comming, crieth alowd in the Sclauonian tongue, Who is
 that (saith he) that commeth marching so
 proudly? whereunto the people aunswere, That it is their prince: then
 demaundeth he, Is he a iust iudge? seeketh hee the good of
 his countrey? is he free borne? is he worthie of that honour? and withall
 religious? Hee is, saith the people, and so shall hereafter be. Then
 the peasant giuing the duke a little blow on
 the eare, goeth downe from the stone, and is for euer after free from all
 publique charges: so the duke mounting the stone, and brandishing his sword,
 promiseth unto the people, To be a good and a iust man: and in that habit goeth
 to heare masse; which in solemne manner done, he putting off his shepheards
 apparrell, and attired like a prince, goeth up to the stone againe, and there
 receiueth the homage and oath of fidelitie of his vassals and subiects. True it
 is, that in auntient Anno. 133 . time the duke of Carinthia was the emperours greatest Huntsman:
 but since that the empire fell into the house of Austria, wherunto that
 dukedome belonged, both the name of the Great Huntsman,
 and the old maner of inuesting the duke grew out of vse, and the duchies
 of Carinthia, Stiria, and Croatia, with the
 counties of Cilia, and Tirol, remaine annexed unto the dukedome of Austria. As for those things which are reported concerning the inuesting of the king of
 Arragon, The manner of crowning of the kings of
 Arragon. they are long since growne out of vse; but this wee haue
 heard them to have wont to bee done: The great magistrat of Arragon, whome they
 call the Chief Iustice, thus said unto the king: We which are
 unto thee in vertue nothing inferiour, and in power greater than thy self,
 create thee our king; yet with this condition, that one amongst vs shall
 still have more power and commaund than thy selfe. Wherein he is
 deceiued that so writeth, the king to have bene then chosen of the people; a
 thing that neuer was there done. For Sanctius the Great
 by force of armes draue the Moores out of the
 kingdome of Arragon, after they had seuen hundred yeares possessed the same:
 after which time his posteritie of both Sexes, held that kingdome by
 inheritance. And also Peter Belluga, who most exactly
 writ of the kingdome of Arragon, denieth the people to have any right in
 chusing the king; but when the line of the king vtterly saileth. That were also
 a new and more absurd thing, that the king of Arragon should have lesse power
 than the states of Arragon, seeing that the same author Belluga saith, That the states might not assemble themselves without
 the kings expresse commaundement; neither being assembled, might depart without
 leaue giuen them from the king. That were also more absurd and ridiculous, that
 such speech should bee used by the magistrat, unto him that was now crowned,
 sacred, and receiued a king by right of
 succession, who also placed and displaced the same great magistrat whensoeuer
 hee list. For the same author writeth, Martin Didato the
 greatest magistrat, to have beene placed in that office by the queen of Aragon,
 in the absence of Alphonsus her husband, king of Arragon
 and Sicilia; and also by her againe discharged of the same office. And albeit
 that by sufference of the king, that great magistrat or justice of Arragon,
 determineth of the processe and controuersies betwixt the king and his people:
 as it is also in England sometime by the high court of Parliament, and sometime
 by the magistrat, whome they call the Lord Chiefe Iustice of
 England, and by all the judges of this viz.
 Fraunce. 

 realme, and in all places: yet neuerthelesse so it is, that the great
 justice of Arragon, and all the estates remaine in full subiection to the king,
 who is no wayes bound to follow their aduice,
 neither to consent to their requests, (as saith the same doctor) which is
 generall to all estates of a monarchie, as saith Oldard, 
 speaking of the kings of Fraunce and Spaine, Who have (saith he) absolute
 power. Yet true it is, that none of these doctours tell vs, what absolute power
 is. For if wee shall say, that hee onely hath absolute power, which is subiect
 unto no law; there should then bee no soueraigne prince in the world, seeing
 that all princes of the earth are subiect unto the lawes of God, of nature, and
 of nations. So to the contrarie it may be, that some one subiect may be dispensed withall,
 and That a subiect may be dispenced withall from all the
 lawes and customes of his Commonweale, yet be neither prince nor
 soueraigne. absolued from all the laws, ordinances, and customes of
 his Commonweale, and commaundement of the magistrat; and yet be neither prince,
 nor soueraigne. Example we have of Pompey the great, who was dispensed withall from the
 lawes for five yeres, by expresse decree of the people, published at the
 request of of Gabinius the Tribune, at such time as
 extraordinarie power was giuen him to make warre against the pirats: neither is
 it any new thing or straunge thing to dispence with a subiect for his obedience
 to the lawes, seeing that the Senat sometimes so dispenced without the consent
 of the people: vntill the law Cornelia published at the request of a Tribune,
 whereby it was ordained, That no person should be exempted out of the power of
 the laws, nor dispenced withall by the Senat, if he had not at the least the
 consent of two hundred Senators. For by the law of the
 twelue tables, it was forbidden upon paine of death to graunt any priueledge but by the great assemblies of the
 people; but that law was euill executed, being still infringed by the Senat.
 Yet he that is so exempted from one law, or moe, or all lawes, is for all that
 alwaies in the subiection and obeysance of them which have the soueraigntie:
 yea although he bee for euer absolued from all the lawes of his countrey. As
 Augustus, who although he was the prince of the
 people of Rome, that is to say, the chiefe in that Commonweale, yet faigning
 himselfe to be inferiour to the people in generall, he oftentimes propounded
 questions unto the people, as if the people, and not Augustus, should make the lawes: and at the chusing of magistrats,
 would shake the citisens by the hands, that so hee might commend them that
 stood for the offices unto the people. But it behoueth him that is a soueraigne
 not to be in any sort subiect to the commaund
 of another: which thing Tiberius wisely meaning in these
 words, reasoned in the Senat concerning the right of soueraigntie, saying that
 The reason of his doings were no otherwise to be
 manifested, than in that it was to be giuen 

 A soueraigne prince is not bound to giue a reason of his
 doings. 

 to none: whose office it is to giue laws unto his
 subiects, to abrogat laws vnprofitable, and in their stead to establish other:
 which hee cannot do that is himselfe subiect unto lawes, or to others which
 have commaund over him. And that is it for which the law saith, That the prince
 is acquitted from the power of the lawes: and this word the Law, in the Latine
 importeth the commaundement of him which hath the soueraigntie. Wee also see
 that unto all edicts and decrees there is annexed this clause, Notwithstanding all edicts and ordinances whereunto we haue
 derogated, and do derogat 

 

 by these presents: a clause which hath alwaies bene
 ioyned unto the antient lawes, were the law published by the present prince, or
 by his predecessours. For it is certaine, that That the
 lawes, letters pattents, priueleges, grants of princes have no force, but
 during the life of the princes that granted them. the lawes,
 ordinances, letters pattents, priueleges, and grants of princes, have no force,
 but during their life, if they be not rati by the
 expresse consent, or at least by sufferance of the prince following, who had
 knowledge there of, and especially of the priueleges. As when Bartolus was sent ambassadour unto Charles the
 fourth, the German emperour, for the confirmation of the priueleges of the
 citie of Perouze, hee obtained the same, yet with condition, That they should
 so long have force, vntill they were reuoked by the succeeding emperours: vnto
 whom for all that, no preiudice could have bene done, although that clause had
 not bene put to: which was the cause that Michael 

 

 Del Hospital chauncelour of Fraunce, constantly refused,
 yea euen at the request of the queene, to seale the priuileges by Charles the ix. graunted unto St. Maur des Fossez, for
 that they carried with them a perpetuall enfranchisment and immunitie from
 taxes, which is contrarie to the nature of personall priueledges, and tended to
 the diminishing of the power of his successours, and could not be giuen vnto
 corporations or colleges, which live for euer, but for the life of the prince
 that graunted them onely, although the word (perpetuall) were thereunto
 adioyned. Which for all that if they were graunted unto corporations or
 colleges, by a popular or Aristocraticall state, must needs bee for euer, or at
 leastwise so long as that popular or Aristocraticall state should continue. And
 for this cause Tiberius the emperour, successour to Augustus, 

 would not that the priueledges graunted by the
 dead emperours, should bee of any effect, if their successors had not confirmed
 them: when as before the priueleges granted by princes, if they were not
 limited unto a time certaine, were accounted as giuen for euer. Wee also see in
 this viz. Fraunce. 

 realme, that at the comming of new kings, colleges and corporations
 require to have their priueleges, power, and iurisdiction confirmed; yea the
 verie parliaments and soueraigne courts, as well as other particular
 officers. If then the soueraigne prince be exempted from the lawes of his predecessors,
 much lesse should he be bound unto the lawes and ordinances he maketh himselfe:
 for a man may well receiue a law from another man, but
 impossible it is in nature for to giue 

 A soueraigne prince is not subiect unto the lawes and
 ordinances that he himselfe maketh a law unto himselfe, no more than
 it is to commaund a mans selfe in a matter depending of his owne will: For as
 the law saith, Nulla obligatio consistere potest, quae a
 voluntate promittentis statum capit, There can be no obligation, which
 taketh state from the meere will of him that promiseth the same: which is a
 necessarie reason to proue euidently that a king or soueraigne prince cannot be
 subiect to his owne lawes. And as the Pope can neuer bind his owne hands (as
 the Canonists say;) so neither can a soueraigne prince bind his owne hands,
 albeit that he would. Wee see also in the end of all edicts and lawes, these
 words, Quia sic nobis placuit, Because it hath so
 pleased vs: to giue vs to vnderstand, that the lawes of a soueraigne prince,
 although they be grounded upon good and lively reasons, depend neuerthelesse
 upon nothing but his meere and franke good
 will. But as for the lawes of God and nature, all princes and people All princes and people are subiect unto the lawes of God and
 nature. of the world are unto them subiect: neither is it in their
 power to impugne them, if will not be guiltie of high treason to the diuine
 maiestie, making warte against God; under the greatnesse of whome all monarches
 of the world ought to beare the yoke, and to bow their heads in all feare and
 reuerence. Wherefore in that wee said the soueraigne power in a Commonweale to
 be free from all lawes, concerneth nothing the lawes of God and nature. For
 amongst the Popes, Innocentius Quartus. hee
 that of all others best knew the lawes of maiestie or soueraigntie, and had
 almost brought under him the power of all the Christian emperours and princes,
 said him to be indeed a soueraigne that was able to derogat from the ordinary
 right (which is as I vnderstand it, from the laws of his countrey) but not from the lawes of God or nature. But further question maybe, Whether a prince bee a subiect to the lawes of
 his Whether prince be subiict
 unto the lawes of his coūtrey that he hath sworne to keepe, or not. 
 countrey, that he hath sworne to keepe, or not? wherein wee must distinguish.
 If the prince sweare unto himselfe, That he will keepe his law: hee is no more
 bound to his law, than by the oath made unto himselfe: For the subiects
 themselves are not any way bound by oath, which they make in their mutuall
 conuentions, if the couenants be such as from which they may by law shrinke,
 although they be both honest and reasonable. But if a soueraigne prince promise
 by oath to keep the lawes which he or his predecessours have made, he is bound
 to keepe them, if the prince unto whome hee hath so giuen his word have therein
 any intrest; yea although he have not sworne at al: But if the prince to whom the promise was made have therin no intrest,
 neither the promise nor the oath can bind him that made the promise. The like
 we say, if promise be made by a soueraigne prince unto his subiects, or before
 hee bee chosen; for in that case there is no difference, as many thinke: not
 for that the prince is bound to his laws, or by his predecessours; but to the
 iust conuentions and promises that hee hath made, be it by oath, or without any
 oath at all; as should a priuat man bee: and for the same causes that a priuat
 man may be releeued from his vniust and vnreasonable promise, as for that it
 was too grieuous, or for that he was by deceit or fraud circumuented; or
 induced thereinto by errour, or force, or iust feare; or by some great hurt:
 euen for the same causes the prince may be restored in that which toucheth the
 diminishing of his maiesty, if he be a
 soueraigne prince. And so our maxime resteth, That the prince is not subiect to
 his lawes, nor to the lawes of his predecessours: but well to his owne iust and
 reasonable conuentions, and in the obseruation whereof the subiects in generall
 or particular have intrest. Wherein we see many to be deceiued, which make a
 confusion of lawes, and of a princes contracts, which they call also lawes: as
 well as he which calleth a princes contracts pactionarie lawes; as they tearme
 them in the state of Arragon, when the king maketh any law at the request of
 the people, and receiueth therefore any money or subsidie; then the Arragonians
 say that the king is unto that law bound, but not so
 unto other lawes: and yet neuerthelesse they confesse that the prince
 may derogat from the same, the cause of the
 law ceasing: which to bee true, as it may by reason and authoritie be
 confirmed, so was there no need of money, or of oath, to bind the soueraigne
 prince, if it concerned his subiects (to whome he had promised) to The word of a prince ought to be as an Oracle. have the
 law kept. For the word of a prince ought to bee as an Oracle; which looseth his
 dignitie, if his subiects have so euill an opinion of him, as not to beleeue
 him except he sweare; or else to be so couetous, as not to regard his promise
 except therefore he receiue money. And yet neuerthelesse the maxime of right
 still standeth in force, That the soueraigne prince may derogat unto the lawes
 that hee hath promised and sworne to keepe, if the equitie thereof ceased, and
 that of himself without consent The reason of the law
 ceasing, the law it selfe ought also to cease. of his subiects: yet
 true it is, that a generall obscure or doubtfull derogation, in this case
 sufficeth not, but that there must bee a
 derogation in words speciall. But if there bee no probable cause of abrogating
 the law he hath promised to keepe, he shall do against the dutie of a good
 prince, if he shall go about to abrogat such a law: and yet for al that is he
 not bound unto the couenants and oathes of his predecessours, further than
 standeth with his profit, except he be their heire. And for this cause the
 states of Arragon complained to king Alphonsus, for that
 he for gaine had altered and chaunged the money of Arragon, to the great
 preiudice of the subiects, and marchants straungers, contrarie to the promise
 made by Iames the first, king of Arragon, in the yeare
 1265, in the moneth of August, and confirmed by king Peter, in the yeare 1336, who swore unto the estates neuer to chaunge
 the money; in recompence wherof the people had 
 promised every one of them every seuen yeares to pay unto him a maruedie, if
 they were in goods worth fifteene maruadies. Now the kingdome of Arragon
 discendeth by inheritance unto the heires, both males and females; but the
 effect of the contract betwixt the prince and the people ceasing, as the
 subsidie for which the kings of Arragon had made that order which I have said,
 the king was no more bound to keepe his promise: then were the people to pay
 the subsidie upon them imposed. We must not then confound the lawes and the contracts of soueraigne princes,
 for Soueraigne prin ces no bound
 unto their laws▪ may yet by their contracts bind themselves unto their
 subiects. that the law dependeth of the will and pleasure of him that
 hath the soueraigntie, who may bind all his subiects, but cannot bind himselfe:
 but the contract betwixt the prince and his subiects is mutual, which
 reciprocally bindeth both parties, so that the one partie may not start therefrom, to the preiudice, or without the
 consent of the other. In which case the prince hath nothing aboue the subiect,
 but that the equitie of the law which he hath sworne to keepe, ceasing, he is
 no more bound to the keeping thereof, by his oath or promise, as we have before
 said: which the subiects cannot do among themselves, if they bee not by the
 prince releeued. The soueraigne princes also wel aduised, Whether Soueraigne princes well aduised, ought to bind themselves by oath
 to keepe the lawes of their predecessors. will neuer take oath to
 keepe the lawes of their predecessours; for otherwise they are not soueraignes.
 But then might some man say, Why doth the German emperour, who hath a
 preheminence aboue all other Christian kings, before he be crowned sweare
 betwixt the hands of the archbishop of Cullen, to keepe the laws of the empire,
 the golden Bul, to establish iustice, to revenge the pope, to keepe the
 catholike faith, to defend the widdowes, the
 fatherlesse, and poore? Which forme of oath, wherewith the emperour Charles the fift bound himselfe when he was crowned,
 cardinall Caietan is said to have sent unto the pope,
 whose legat he then was in Germanie. Whereunto I aunswere, that the emperour is
 subiect unto the states of the empire; neither taketh upon him the soueraigntie
 over the princes electours, nor over the estates; as we shall in due place
 declare. And if a man say, That the kings of the Epirots in auntient time
 swore, that they should raigne well and orderly according to the lawes and
 customs of the countrey, and the subiects also on their part swore to defend
 and maintaine their king, according to the lawes and
 customes of their countrey: I say yet notwithstanding all these oathes, that the soueraigne prince might derogat
 from the lawes, or frustrat and disanull the same, the reason and equitie of
 them ceasing. The oath also of our kings, which is the fairest and shortest
 that can be, containeth nothing in it concerning the keeping of the lawes and
 customes of the countrey or predecessours. The words I will set downe, as they
 be taken word for word out of the librarie of Rheims, out of an auntient booke,
 which thus beginneth Iuliani ad Erigium Regem Anno 1058
 Henrico Regnante 32 iiij. Calend.
 Iunij. Ego Philippus Deo propiciante mox futurus Rex 

 The oath of Phi lip the first, son to Henry the first, king
 of Fraunce, at the time of his Coronation. 

 Francorum, in die ordinationis meae promitto coram Deo &
 sanctis eius, quod vnicuique de nobis commissis canonicum priuilegium, &
 debitam legem atque iustitiam conseruabo, & defensionem adi uante Domino quantum potero exhibebo: sicut Rex in
 suo regno vnicuique 

 

 Episcopo & Ecclesiae sibi commisse per rectum exhibere
 debet: populo quoque nobis credito, me dispensationem legum in suo iure
 consistentem, nostra auctoritate concessurum. viz. The booke of Iulian Erigius, Anno 1058, in the xxxij. yeare of the
 raigne of Henrie the first, the fourth of the calends of
 Iune. I Philip, by the grace of God forthwith to become
 king of Fraunce, on the day of my inuesting, doe promise before God and his
 Saints, that I will keepe canonicall priueledge, with due administration of law
 and iustice, to euerie one committed to our charge: and by the help of God to
 the vttermost of my power defend them, in such manner as a king in his kingdome
 ought of right to giue unto euerie bishop & church committed unto him:
 & by our authoritie to grant unto the people committed unto vs, the
 execution of the lawes remaining in force. I 
 know that which is found in the librarie of the Beauuais is like unto this, and
 the oath of the same Philip the first: but I have seene
 another in a little auntient booke in the Abbay of S. Allier in Auergne, in
 these words; Ie iure au nom de Deiu tout puissant, &
 promets de gouuerner bien et deuement les subiects commis en ma garde, &
 faire de tout mon pouuoir iudgement, iustice, et misericorde: I sweare
 by the name of the Almighty God, and promise well and duly to gouerne my
 subiects committed to my charge: and with all my power to doe them iudgement,
 iustice, and mercie. Which seemeth to have bene taken from the prophet Hieremie, where he saith, I am the
 great eternall 

 Chap. 9. 

 God, which do iudgement, iustice, and mercie; and in which
 things I take singular pleasure. Which formes of oathes shew plainely
 unto the eye, that the oathes contained in the 
 booke lately printed and published by the title of Sacre Du
 Roy, are much changed and altred from the auntient forme. But both in
 the one and the other oath, a man may see that there is not any bond for the
 soueraigne prince to keepe the lawes, more than so farre as right and iustice
 requireth. Neither is it to be found that the auntient kings of the Hebrewes
 tooke any oath: no not they which were anointed by Samuel,
 Helias and others. But some take a more precise oath, such as is the
 oath of Henry the 3 king of Fraunce, and of Polonia. Ego Henricus Rex Poloniae, &c. Iuro Deo omnipotenti, quòd
 omnia iura, libertates, priuilegia publica & priuata iuri communi non
 contraria, Ecclesijs, 

 The auntient Hebrew kings not sworne when they were
 annointed by the Prophet . 

 principibus, Baronibus, nobilibus, ciuibus, incolis, per meos
 praedecessores Reges, & quoscumque principes Dominos, Regni Poloniae
 iustè concessa, & quae in interregno decreta 

 

 sunt seruabo, iusque omnibus incolis more maiorum reddam. Ac
 si quidem (quod absit) Sacramentum meum violauero nullam nobis incolae Regni
 obedientiam praestare tenebuntur, &c. sic Deus adiuuet. viz. I Henrie king of Polonia, &c. Sweare unto almightie
 God, that I will keepe all the lawes, liberties, publick and priuat priueleges,
 not contrarie to the common law, iustly graunted unto churches, princes,
 barrons, noble men▪ citisens, or inhabitants, by the kings my predecessours, or
 whatsoeuer other princes, lords of the kingdome of Polonia: as also all such
 things as were decreed in the time of the vacancie of the kingdome: and that I
 will administer iustice unto all the inhabitants of this
 kingdome, after the manner of our auneestours: And if I shall violat this mine
 oath (which God forbid) then the
 inhabitants of this kingdom shall be bound to yeeld unto vs no obedience,
 &c. And so God helpe vs. But this forme of oath sauoureth not of royall
 maiestie, but the condition of a meaner prince, such an one as (amongst others)
 is chiefe in a Commonweale. But touching the lawes which concerne the state of the realme, and the
 establishing thereof; forasmuch as they are annexed & vnited to the crowne,
 the prince cannot derogat Lawes royall which concerne the
 state of the realme not to be infringed by a
 soueraign prince. from them, such as is the law Salique: & albeit
 that he so do, the successor may alwaies disanull that which hath bene done
 unto the preiudice of the laws royall; upon which the soueraigne maiestie is
 stayed & grounded. Yet might one say, That Henry the
 5, king of England & France, marying Katherine of
 France, sister to Charles the 7, took an oath to keep the high court of parliament in the
 liberties & soueraigntie therof; and to cause iustice to be administred in
 the realme, according unto the customes and lawes thereof. See the words of the
 decree agreed upon for to make him successour unto the crowne of Fraunce, the
 xxj of May, in the yeare 1420. I say they caused him to take such an oath, for
 that he was a straunger come to a new kingdome; from which the lawfull
 inheritour was excluded by a decree of the Parliament of Paris, giuen for
 default and conrumacie; for the murther committed uppon the person of Iohn duke of Burgoigne, which was by sound of trumpet
 pronounced at the marble table in the presence of the princes. But as for
 generall and particular lawes and customs, which concerne not the establishing
 of the state of the realme, but the right of men in priuat, they have not used to have bene with vs otherwise
 chaunged, but after generall assemblie of the three estates of Fraunce well and
 duly made; or of every bailiwike in particular: not for that it is necessarie
 for the king to rest on their aduice, or that hee Parliaments
 impaire not, but most of all show the maiestie and greatnesse of a soueraign
 prince may not do the contrarie to that they demaund, if naturall
 reason and iustice so require. And in that the greatnesse and maiestie of a
 true soueraigne prince, is to bee knowne; when the estates of all the people
 assembled together, in all humilitie present their requests and supplications
 to their prince., without hauing any power in any thing to commaund or
 determine, or to giue voice, but that that which it pleaseth the king to like
 or dislike of, to commaund or forbid, is holden for law, for an edict and
 ordinance. Wherein they which have written of the dutie of magistrats, &
 other such like books, have deceiued
 themselves, in maintaining that the power of the people is greater than the
 prince; a thing which oft times causeth the true subiects to reuolt from the
 obedience which they owe unto their soueraigne prince, & ministreth matter
 of great troubles in Commonweals. Of which their opinion, there is neither
 reason nor ground, except the king be captiue, furious, or in his infancie, and
 so needeth to have a protector or lieutenant appointed him by the suffrages of
 the people. For otherwise if the king should be subiect unto the assemblies and
 decrees of the people, hee should neither bee king nor soueraigne; and the
 Commonwealth neither realme not monarchie, but a mee 
 Aristocratie of many lords in power equall, where the greater part commaundeth
 the lesse in generall, and every one in
 particular: and wherein the edicts and lawes are not to be published in the
 name of him that ruleth, but in the name and authoritie of the states, as in an
 Aristocraticall Seignorie, where hee that is chiefe hath no power, but oweth
 obeysance unto the commaundements of the seignorie: unto who me yet they all
 and euerie one of them faigne themselves to owe their faith and obedience:
 which are al things so absurd, as hard it is to say which is furthest from
 reason. So when Charles the eight, the French king,
 being then but about xiiij. yeres old, held a parliament at Tours, although the
 power of the parliament was neuer before The parlements of
 Fraunce. no after so great as in those
 times, yet Relli, then speaker for the people, turning
 himselfe unto the king, thus beginneth his oration,
 which is yet in print extant. Most▪ 

 

 high, most mightie, and most Christian king, our naturall and
 onely lord, we your humble and obedient subiects, &c. Which are come
 hither by your commaund, in all humilitie reuerence and subiection present
 our selues before you, &c. And have giuen mee in charge from all this
 noble assemblie, to declare unto you the good will and hartie desire they
 have with a most firme resolution and purpose to serue, obey, and aid you in
 all your affaires, commaundements and pleasures. In briefe, all that
 his oration and speech is nothing els but a declaration of all their good wils
 towards the king, and of their humble obedience and loialtie. The like speech
 almost we see was also used in the parliament at Orleans▪ unto king Charles the ninth, when he was yet but scarce eleuen
 yeares old. Neither are the parliaments of Spaine otherwise holden, but that
 euen a greater obedience & a greater
 loialtie of all the people in generall, is giuen unto the king, as is to bee
 seene in the acts of the parliament holden at Toledo by king Philip, in the yeare 1552, when he was yet scarce full xxv▪ yeares
 old. The aunswers also of the king of Spaine unto the The
 parliament of Spaine. requests and humble supplications of his
 people, are giuen in these words, We will; or else, We decree and ordaine; and such other like aunsweres,
 importing the refusall or consent of the prince: yea the subsidie that the
 subiects pay unto the king of Spaine, they call seruice. Wherby it appeareth
 them to be deceiued, which say that the kings of Arragon cannot derogat from
 the priueledges of the states, by reason of the priueleges giuen them by king
 Iames, in the yeare 1260, and confirmed in the yeare
 1320. For as the priueleges was of no force after the death of the king,
 without the confirmation of his successours:
 so also the same confirmation of the rest of the kings following was
 necessarie, for that by the law no man can raigne over his equals. And albeit
 that in the parliaments of England, which have commonly bene holden euerie
 third yeare; there the states seeme to have a verie great libertie (as the
 Northerne people almost all breath thereafter) yet so it is, that in effect
 they proceed not, but by way of supplications and requests unto the king. As in
 the parliament of England, holden in October, The parliaments
 of England. 1566, when the estates by a common consent had resolued
 (as they gaue the queene to vnderstand) not to entreat of any thing, vntill she
 had first appointed who should succeed he in the
 crowne: She gaue them no other aunswere, But that they were not to make her
 graue before she were dead. All whose resolutions were to no purpose without
 her good liking: neither did she in that
 any thing that they required. Now also the estates of England are neuer
 otherwise assembled (no more than they are in this realme of Fraunce, or
 Spaine) than by parliament writs, and expresse commandements proceeding from
 the king. Which showeth verie well that the estates have no power of themselves
 to determine, commaund, or decree any thing; seeing that they cannot so much as
 assemble themselves; neither beeing assembled, depar, without expresse
 commaundement from the king. Yet this may seeme one speciall thing▪ that the
 laws made by the king of England, at the request of the states, cannot bee
 againe repealed, but by calling a parliament of the estates: Which is much vsed
 and ordinarily done, as I have vnderstood by M. Dale, 
 the English ambassadour, an honourable gentleman 

 D. Dale. and a man of good understanding, who yet
 assured me, that the king receiued or reiected the law as seemed best vnto
 himself: and stucke not to dispose therof at his pleasure, and contrarie to the
 will of the estates: as wee see Henry the eight to haue
 alwaies used his soueraigne power, and with his onely word to have disanulled
 the decrees of parliament▪ albeit that the kings of England are not otherwise
 crowned, but that they must sweare inuiolatly to keepe the lawes and customes
 of the land: which how that oath is to be vnderstood, I referre you to that
 which wee have before reported. But here might some obiect and say▪ That the
 estates of England suffer not any extraordinary charges
 and subsidies to be laid upon them, if it be not first agreed upon and
 consented unto in the high court of
 parliament: for so it is prouided by an auntient law of Edward the first, king of England, wherewith the people as with a
 buckler hath bene oftentimes seene to defend it selfe against the prince.
 Whereunto mine aunswere is, That other kings have in this point no more power
 than the kings of England: for that it is not in the power of any prince in the
 world, at his pleasure to rayse taxes upon the people, no more than to take
 another mans goods from him; as Philip Commines wisely
 shewed in the parliament holden at Tours, as weread in his Comentaries: and yet
 neuerthelesse if the necessitie of the Commonweale be such as cannot stay for
 the calling of a parliament, in that case the prince ought not to expect the
 assemblie of the states, neither the consent of the people; of whose good
 foresiight and wisedome, next unto God, the
 health & welfare of the whole state dependeth: but concerning all sorts of
 taxes and tributes, more shall be said in place convenient. True it is, that
 the kings of England, since the time of Henrie the first
 (as we read in Polidore ) have as it were alwaies
 accustomed every third yeare to demaund of the people an extraordinarie
 subsidie, which is for the most part graunted. As in the parliament holden in
 Aprill, in the yeare 1570, the queene of England by the consent of the estates,
 drew from them five hundred thousand crownes (as the like whereof is sometime
 also used to bee done in Spaine) from which manner of tribute she had now many
 yeares before abstained. Now here might some obiect also, That the estates of
 England have power to condemne, Polydor. in hist. Anglor . as king Henrie the
 sixt was condemned by the estates, to be kept prisoner in the Towre of London. I say that that was done by the ordinarie
 judges of England, the lords spirituall and temporall of the upper house, at
 the request of them of the neather house; who presented also a bill of request
 to the upper house, in the yeare 1571, tending to the end, that the earles of
 Northumberland, and Westmerland, & other conspiratours, might be declared
 to have incurred the paines contained in the lawes of the land, made against
 them that were guiltie of treason. Which showeth well that the estates in bodie
 together have neither power nor iurisdiction, but that the power is with the
 judges of the upper house, as should be, if the parliament of Paris assisted by
 the prince and peers, should be from the estates in bodie together seperated,
 to iudge of themselves of great matters. 

 But yet there remaineth another difficultie to resolue upon, concerning the
 aforesaid estates of England, who seemed to have power to commaund, resolue,
 and decide of the affaires of state. For queene Marie 
 hauing assembled them for the passing of the articles of agreement concerning
 the mar iage with king Philip: 
 after many disputes and difficulties proposed, in fine, the conclusion of the
 treatie was made the second day of Aprill in the yeare 1554, in forme of a
 decree conceiued in the name of the estates, in these words: The articles
 aforesaid, and that which dependeth thereof, seene and considered of, by the
 estates assembled in parliament, holden at the palace of Westminster, it hath
 bene said, That concerning the disposition and collation of all benefices and
 offices, they are reserued unto the queene; as also of all the fruits,
 profits, rents, reuenews of her countries,
 lands, and seignories, the queene, as sole and alone shall enioy the royaltie
 and soueraignetie of her said realmes, countries, lands, and subiects,
 absolute, after the consummation of the mariage; so that the said prince shall
 not pretend by the way of the courtesie of England, any claime to the crowne or
 soueraigntie of the realme, nor to any other rights, preheminences, or
 authorities: That all mandats and letters pattents shal passe under the name of
 the said prince and queene iointly: which letters signed with the hand of the
 queene alone, and sealed with the great seale, shall be auailable: but being
 not signed by the said queene, shall be void and to none
 effect. I have willingly set downe the ratification at large, to show that the
 soueraigntie wholly without diuision
 belonged unto the kings of England, and that the estates had but the view
 thereof: For the ratification of the estates, no more than of a court, a
 parliament, a corporation, or colledge, sufficeth not to show the power to
 commaund, but rather their consent to strengthen the acts, which gtherwise
 might have bene called into some doubt, after the death of the queene: or in
 her life time by the magistrats and officers of the realme, opposing themselves
 against her. Wherfore we conclude the maiestie of a prince to be in nothing
 altered or diminished by the calling together or presence of the states: but to
 the contrarie his maiestie thereby to bee much the greater, & the more
 honorable, seeing all his people to acknowledge him for their soueraigne:
 albeit that in such assemblies, princes not willing to reiect their
 subiects, graunt, and passe many things,
 whereunto they would not otherwise yeeld their consent, if they were not
 ouercome by the requests, prayers, and iust grieuances of the people,
 anfflicted and vexed oftentimes without the knowledge of the prince, who
 yeeldeth many things unto them all, which he would deny unto them in
 particular; or at leastwise not so easily graunt them: either for that the
 voyces of euerie one in particular, are lesse heard, than of al together: or
 for that the prince at other times commonly vseth to see but by other mens
 eyes▪ and to heare but by other mens eares and reports: whereas in parliament
 hee seeth and heareth his people himselfe, and so enforced with shame, the
 feare of religion, or his owne good disposition, admitteth their iust
 requests. 

 So wee see the principall point of soueraigne maiestie, and absolute power, to
 consist The principall point of soueraigntie. 
 principally in giuing laws unto the subiects in generall, without their
 consent. And not to speake of straunge countries, we have oftentimes seene in
 this realme of Fraunce Laws in Fraunce altred by the prince,
 without the assembling or consent of the . 
 certaine generall customs abolished by the edicts of our kings, without the
 assembling or consent of the estates: when the iniustice of the same is
 plainely to be seene; as the custome of this realme, commonly used in every
 place, concerning the succession of mothers unto the goods of their children,
 hath bene chaunged without assembling of the estates, either in generall or
 particular. Which chaunging of customes is no new thing, for since the time of
 Philip the faire, the custome generall in this
 realme, which suffered not him that was ouerthrowne in sute, to be condemned in
 charges also, was disanulled by edict, without
 assembling the estates. And the generall custome which forbad to receiue the
 testimonie of women in civill causes; was abolished by the edict of Charles the sixt, without calling together of the
 estates. For it behoueth that the soueraigne prince should have the lawes in
 his power, to chaunge and amend them, according as the case shall require; as
 saith the lawyer Sextus Cecilius: euen as the master
 pilot ought to have the helme alwaies in his hand, at discretion to turne it as
 the wether or occsion requireth: for otherwise the ship might oftentimes perish
 before hee could take aduice of them whome he did carrie. Which is a thing
 necessarie, not onely unto a soueraigne prince, but sometimes unto a magistrat
 also, the necessitie of the Commonweale so requiring, as we have said of Pompee, and of the Decemuiri. And for that cause Augustus after he had
 ouerthrowne Marcus Antonius at Actium, was by the Senat
 absolued from the power of the lawes, albeit that he as then was but chiefe of
 the Commonweale, and no soueraigne prince, as we shall in due place declare.
 And after that Vespatian the emperour was also exempted
 from the power of the lawes, not by the Senat onely, but onely by the expresse
 law of the people as many thinke, and as yet it is to be found engrauen in
 marble in Rome: which the lawyer calleth the law Royall, howbeit that it hath
 no great probabilitie, that the people which long time before had lost al their
 power, should giue it to him that was stronger than themselves. Now if it be profitable that the soueraigne prince, for
 the good government of an estate, should haue
 the power of the laws under him; then it is more expedient for the gouernour in
 an Aristocraticall estate; and necessarie for the people in their popular
 estate: for the monarch is divided from the people; and in the Aristocraticall
 state, the lords or gouernours are divided from the commonaltie and vulgar
 people; in such sort as that in both the one & other Commonweal, there are
 two parties, that is to wit, he or they that hold the soueraigntie on the one
 part, and the people on the other; which causeth the difficulties which are
 betwixt them for the rights of soueraigntie, which cease in the popular estate.
 For if the prince or lords which hold the estate be bound to obserue the laws,
 as many think they are, and that they cannot make any law without the consent
 of the people, or of the Senat; it cannot also bee againe by law
 repealed, without the consent of the one or
 of the other: which can take no place in a popular estate, seeing that the
 people make but one bodie, and cannot bind it selfe unto it selfe. But, Why
 then (will some say) did the people of Rome sweare to keepe the lawes? That was
 first begun by Saturnius the Tribune of the people, that
 so hee might the more straitly bind the Senators to the lawes by him made:
 which Dio Nicaeus writeth to have bene afterward done in
 all lawes. But it is one thing to bind all together, and to bind euerie one in
 particular: for so al the citisens particularly swore to the obseruation of the
 lawes, but not all together; for that every one of them in particular was bound
 unto the power of them all in generall. But an oath could not be giuen by them
 all: for why, the people in generall is a certaine vniuersall bodie, in power
 and nature divided from every man in
 particular. Then againe to say truly, an oath cannot bee An
 oath cannot be made but by the lesser to the greater. made but by the
 lesser to the greater, but in a popular estate nothing can bee greater than the
 whole body of the people themselves. But in a monarchie it is otherwise, where
 euerie one in particular, and all the people in generall, and (as it were) in
 one bodie, must sweare to the obseruation of the lawes, and their faithfull
 alleageance to one soueraigne monarch; who next unto God (of whome he holdeth
 his scepter & power) is bound to no man. For an oath carrieth alwaies with
 it reuerence unto whom, or in whose name it is made, as still giuen unto a
 superiour: and therefore the vassall giueth his oath unto his lord, but
 receiueth none from him againe, although that they be mutually bound the one of
 them unto the other. 

 But if it be so, that a soueraigne prince next under God, is not by oath bound
 unto any, why did Traian the emperor standing upright,
 before the Consul sitting, solemnly sweare to the keeping of the lawes? That
 seemeth to have beene so done by him for two causes, the one, for that hauing
 gotten the Consulship, together with his principalitie, he swore as the Consuls
 did at their entrance into their Consulship; as also al the new magistrats did
 the first of Ianuarie, after they had sacrificed in the Capitoll: The other
 reason was, for that the Roman emperours at the first had not any soueraigne
 power, but were onely called princes, that is to say, the chiefe men in the
 Commonweale; which fo me of a Commonweale, is called
 a principalitie, and not a monarchy: A principalitie no
 Monarch. but a principalitie is called a certaine forme of an
 Aristocratie, wherein one is in honor dignitie
 and place, aboue the rest: as amongst the Venetians: For the Roman emperour or
 prince, at the first was in honour aboue the rest, but not in power: howbeit
 that in truth the greatest part of the Roman emperors were indeed tyrants.
 Which is well to be vnderstood, for that which happened in the raigne of Caligula the cruell tyrant, The Roman
 emperours for most part tyrants. who hauing bid certaine forten kings
 and allies of the people of Rome to supper, and question there at the table
 arising about their honour and greatnesse; hee to stay their strife, rapt out
 this verse, taken out of Homers Iliades; 

 . Good it is not to be ruled by many, One king, one lord, if there be any. And it missed but a little (as saith Suetonius ) but that
 hee had euen then chaunged Sueton. in Caligula. his
 principalitie into a monarchie, and set a crowne upon his owne head. For in a
 principalitie the prince or chiefe magistrat, who is aboue the rest, is yet no
 soueraigne; as we shall hereafter show in the Commonweals of the Venetians, and
 of the Germans. And albeit that many of the Roman emperors, had taken upon them
 the soueraigntie, and by diuers sleights wrested from the people their
 libertie; yet neuerthelesse it was no Why Traian & some
 other good princes have sworne to obserue and keepe the lawes. 
 maruell if Traian, one of the best princes that euer
 lived in the world, swore (as is aforesaid) to
 keep the laws, although he in the name of a soueraigne prince were exempted; to
 the end by his own example to moue his subiects to the more carefull obseruing
 of them: but neuer one of the emperours before him so swore to the obseruing of
 the lawes. And therefore Plinie the younger, who in a
 pannegiricall oration, set forth the praises of that most worthy prince,
 speaking of the oath of Traian, crieth out in this sort,
 A great noueltie (saith he) and
 neuer before heard of, hee sweareth by whome wee sweare. And after that
 in the declination of the empire, Theodoric desirous to
 gaine the favour of the Senat and people of Rome, followed the example of Traian, as wee read in Cassiodore, Ecce
 Traiani nostri clarum seculis reparamus exemplum; iurat vobis per quem
 iuratis, Behold (saith he) we renew the example of our Traian, famous through 
 all ages; he sweareth unto you, by whome you your selues sweare. And like it
 is, that other princes have used the same custome, of taking the like oath at
 their coronation, although they have the soueraigntie by the right of
 succession. True it is, that the kings of the Northerne people take such oathes
 as derogat from their soueraigntie: As for example, the nobilitie of Denmarke
 withstood the coronation of Frederick, in the moneth of
 August, in the yeare 1559, vntil that he had solemnly sworne that he should not
 put any noble man to death, or confiscat his goods, vntill he were iudged by
 the Senat; and that all noble men should have iurisdiction & power of life
 & death over their subiects, without appeale; and that the king should haue
 no part in their fines or confiscation of their goods; and also that the king
 should not giue any office without consent of
 the counsell: which are all arguments, that the king of Denmarke is no absolute
 soueraigne. But this oath was first drawne out of the mouth of Frederick this mans grandfather, at such time as he made
 warre against Christierne king of Denmark (who was
 driuen out of his kingdome, and after long banishment returning, at length died
 in prison, wherein he had lived twentie five yeares) and was afterward
 confirmed by Christierne father of Frederick, who tooke the same oath. And to the end hee should not
 violat, or breake the same, the nobility to that purpose treated a league with
 the towne of Lubec, and Sigismundus Augustus king of
 Polonia, who also himselfe seemes not to have much more power over his owne
 subiects than hath the king of Denmarke over his. 

 But of two things the one must be: that is to wit, the prince that sweareth to
 keepe Two great inconueniences ensu ing unto soueraigne
 princes by swearing to obserue the laws. the lawes of his countrey,
 must either not have the soueraigntie; or els become a periured man, if he
 shall abrogat but one law, contrarie unto his oath: whereas it is not only
 profitable that a soueraigne prince should sometimes abrogat some such lawes,
 but also necessarie for him to alter or correct them, as the infinit varietie
 of places, times, and persons shall require. Or if wee shall say the prince to
 be still a soueraigne, and yet neuerthelesse with such condition, as that he
 can make no law without the aduice of his counsell or people; he must also be
 dispensed with by his subiects, for the oath that he
 hath made for the inuiolat obseruation of the laws; & the subiects againe
 which are obliged & bound unto the lawes,
 be it in particular, or in generall, have also need to be dispensed withall by
 their prince, for feare they should bee periured: so shall it come to passe
 that the maiestie of the Commonweale▪ enclining now to this side, now to that
 side, sometimes the prince, sometimes the people bearing sway; shall have no
 certaintie to rest upon: which are notable absurdities, & altogether
 incompatible with the maiestie of absolute soueraigntie, & contrarie both
 to law & reason. And yet we see many, euen them that thinke themselves to
 see more in the matter than others, which maintaine it to be most necessarie,
 that princes should be bound by oath to keep the laws & customs of their
 country. In which doing they weaken & ouerthrow all the rights of soueraign
 maiesty, which ought to be most sacred & holy, & confound the
 soueraigntie of one soueraigne monarch, with
 an Aristocratie, or Democratie: whereby it commeth to passe, that many princes,
 seeing that power to be taken from them, which properly belongeth unto them,
 & that men would make them subiect to the laws of their country, dispense
 in the end, not only with those their country laws, but euen with the laws of
 God & nature, making account of them all alike, as if they were bound to
 neither, but of both discharged. But to make all this matter more plaine to be
 vnderstood, Examples to proue that lawes once made and
 established, may not by them that have the soueraigntie be againe
 chaunged. we will by examples make manifest that before said. Wee
 read it thrice repeated in Dan. that by the customs of
 the Medes & Persians, the laws by their kings made, were immutable &
 irreuocable; & albeit that the king of the Medes would have exempted the
 Prophet Daniel, from the punishment of death, which by
 the edict which hee had broken was to haue
 bene inflicted upon him; yet was he by the princes forbidden so to doe, who
 shewed him, that the edict by him made could not by the law of their countrey
 be reuoked: wherunto when the king euen against his will (as should seeme) had
 assented, Daniel was accordingly condemned unto the
 beasts, and so cast unto the hungrie lions. If then the greatest monarch upon
 earth could not derogat from the lawes by himselfe made; the grounds of
 maiestie and soueraigntie by vs before laid, must needs faile: and that not
 onely in a monarchie, but in a popular state also: as was that of Athens,
 whereof Thucydides speaking, showeth that the warre of
 Peloponesus 

 The lawes of the Athenians to be chaunged. began for
 a law made by the Athenians, whereby the Megariens were forbidden to come into
 the port of Athens; wherein the Megariens complained unto their allies
 and friends themselves to be wronged and
 the lawes of nations violated: whereupon the Lacedemonians sent their
 ambassadours to Athens, to request the Athenians, that that law might be againe
 repealed. Wherunto Pericles then in greatest grace &
 authoritie with the people, aunswered the ambassodours, That by the expresse
 lawes of their auncestours, the lawes once made and confirmed by the people,
 and so hanged up uppon the common pillar, might neuer be taken away. Which if
 it were so▪ the people was bound not to their owne lawes onely, but euen to the
 lawes of their predecessours also. And that more is, Theodosius the emperour would not that the lawes by himself made,
 should be of any force, except they were confirmed by the generall decree of
 the whole Senat. In like maner also by the decree of Lewes the eleuenth, the French king, 
 concerning the institution of knights of the order, in the eight article, it is
 expresly said, That the king shall vndertake no warre, nor other thing
 whatsoeuer of great importance, concerning the high estate of the commonweale,
 without knowledge thereof giuen unto the knights of the order, so to have and
 vse their aduice and counsell. And for that cause, as I suppose, the edicts of
 our kings are of none effect, vntill they be read, published, verified, and
 registred in parliament, with the consent of the great Atturney generall, and
 the approbation of the court. And in England it is by Polydore. auntient custome receiued, that lawes concerning the state
 of the Commonweale should take no place, except they
 were authorised by the Estates assembled in the high court of Parliament. These reasons, although they seeme probable, yet are they not sufficient to
 proue the rule concerning Soueraignetie, before by vs set downe, not to be
 true: For, as for The former reasons aunswered. that
 which was obiected concerning the law of the Medes, and authoritie of the king
 in abrogating of the lawes; it is manifest that it was false, and by the
 courtiers his enemies deuised against the life of Daniel: who grieuing to see a man for his wisdome and royall discent
 honourable, and yet a stranger, to be in greater grace and favour with the king
 than themselves, and exalted in their countrey in degree next unto the king,
 made that false allegation of the strength of their lawes against him, with
 whose accusation the king deceiued, or els to proue if Daniels God could saue him from death, caused him to be cast unto the hungrie lyons. But hauing in him
 seene the wonderfull power and mercie of God towards his seruants, he gaue Daniels enemies to bee deuoured of the same lyons:
 wherein the end well shewed, the king to have beene aboue the lawes of his
 countrey. In like sort Darius Memnon at the request of a
 young Iewish ladie reuoked Ahashuerosh Hester. the
 decree whereby he had appointed all the nation of the Iewes to be vtterly
 rooted out. As for that which Pericles answered unto the
 ambassadours of the Lacedemonians, he therein respected not so much the truth,
 as the shew thereof, that so taking occasion of warre, which he sought after,
 he might frustrate the accusations of his aduersaries, and danger of the law,
 as Timaeus and Theopompus haue
 truly written, and Plutarch hath not denied. And that
 was it for which hee said to the Lacedemonian 
 ambassadours, That the edicts once hanged upon the pillars, might not be taken
 away: which his sophistication the ambassadours returned unto him againe, with
 a Lacedemonian quip, saying, That they desired not to have the edict taken away
 from the pillar, but onely the table turned. For if the lawes of the Athenians
 had bene immutable, why had they such varietie, and infinit multitude of lawes,
 which they were wont to establish at the continuall motion of their magistrats,
 & to abrogat the old, that so the new might take place? But that Pericles therin abused the Lacedemonian ambassadors, it
 is manifest by the oration of Demosthenes against Leptines, who had preferred a request unto the people, to
 the end that by a perpetuall and irreuocable edict it might from that time
 forward bee forbidden upon paine of death, to present any request vnto
 the people for the obtaining of any
 priueledge or exemption, and the like paine to bee inflicted upon him that
 should so much as speake for repealing that edict. Wherein Demosthenes hardly withstood Leptines, & so
 wrought the matter, that his request was receiued, hauing manifestly showed the
 people by consenting to this law, to be dispoiled not onely of the prerogative
 that it had to graunt exemptions and priueledges to such as should well deserue
 of them, but also of the power to abrogat lawes by them made, if the necessitie
 of the Commonweale should so require. They had also a popular action,
 concerning the breaking of lawes, which was commenced against them that would
 have the people to passe any edict contrarie to the lawes before receiued; as
 one may see in all the orations of Demosthenes: but yet
 that neuer letted, but that the new and
 profitable lawes were still preferred before the old vniust lawes. And in like
 case the generall edict, wherein it was decred, That the offendors fine once
 adiudged and set downe by the people, might not in any wise bee forgiuen or
 abated; was yet many times reuoked, and that once in favour of Pericles himselfe, and another time in favour of Cleomides and Demosthenes, who by
 di ers iudgements of the people, had bene euerie
 one of them condemned in a fine of Plut▪ in
 Peri. thirtie thousand crownes. They say also in this realme of
 Fraunce, the fine once being paid, be it right or be it wrong, is neuer Demetri. Demost. againe to be restored: and yet we see
 oftentimes the contrarie, and the same to bee againe
 recouered. It is then a formalitie which is and hath alwaies beene in euerie
 Commonweale, that the law makers to giue
 unto their lawes the greater weight and authoritie, ioyne thereunto these words
 of course, Edicto perpetuo & irreuocabili sancimus,
 &c. By a perpetuall and irreuocable decree we ordaine. And with vs
 in the beginning The clause of perpetuitie why annexed vnto
 lawes, and yet n lawes perpetuall. of every
 law, Vniuersis praesentibus & futuris: which words
 are added to the eternall memorie of posteritie, least the law should by any be
 infringed. And the more to shew the difference of the lawes, such as be made
 for perpetuitie, are with vs sealed with greene waxe, and strings of greene and
 purple silke: whereas unto the temporary Edicts are put neither strings of
 silke, nor greene waxe, but yellow onely. And yet for all this, there is no law
 which is perpetuall, no more than were those of the Greekes and Romanes, who in
 making their lawes, commonly used to ioyne thereunto this clause, Vt nec per Senatum, nec per
 populum, lex infirmari possit: That the law might not either by the
 Senate or the people bee weakened: which wordes if they imported a perpetuitie,
 why did the people almost in the same moment that it had established a law,
 againe abrogate the same. Concerning which matter, Cicero writing unto his friend Atticus: Thou
 knowest (sayth he) the Tribune Claudius to haue
 decreed that his law should hardly, or not at all, by the Senate or the
 people be infringed. But it is sufficiently knowne that regard was neuer had
 unto this clause: Vt nec per Senatum nec per populum lex infirmari possit:
 for otherwise (sayth he) one should neuer see law
 repealed, seeing that there is no law which carieth not this clause with it:
 from which men yet doe ordinarily derogate. Thus much he. Which is yet
 more plainely to be vnderstood out of the Oration of Fabius Ambustus against the
 intercession of the Tribunes of the people, who maintained, that the people
 could not chuse both the Consuls of the nobilitie, for that by a law before
 made it was ordained, That one of the Consuls should be still chosen out of the
 people: Fabius alledged the law of the twelue Tables in
 these words, Quod postremum iussit populus id ratum
 esto, What the people shall last decree, let that stand for good. So we see the Medes, the Persians, the Greeks, the Latines, to have used the
 same forme and cautions, for the establishing of their edicts and lawes, that
 our kings doe: who unto the lawes by them made, oftentimes ioyne this clause:
 Without that therefrom can by vs, or our successors be
 derogated. Or els, without regard hauing unto any
 derogation, 

 

 which from this present we have declared to be of none
 effect. And yet no man can so make a law unto himselfe, but that he may
 depart therefrom, as we have before said. Wherefore the repeales and
 derogations of the former edicts and lawes, are almost alwaie subiect unto the
 latter edicts and derogations. And therefore Solon did
 wisely, who would not bind the Athenians to keep his lawes for euer, but
 contented himselfe to have them kept for an hundred yeares: and yet
 neuerthelesse hee yet liuing, * Plut. in Sol. and
 present, suffered (though against his will) the greatest part of them to bee
 chaunged. But that publication or approbation of lawes in the assembly of the Estates or
 parliament, is with vs of great power and importance for the keeping of the
 lawes; not that the Soueraigne prince is bound
 to any such approbation, or cannot of himselfe make a law without the
 authoritie or consent of the States or the people: but yet it is a courteous
 part to do it by the good liking of the Senat, as saith Theodosius, which The soueraigne prince more of
 curtesie than of neces itie bound to obserue the
 lawes. 

 Baldus enterpreted not to be a thing so much of
 necessitie, as of courtesie: as that is also a speech well beseeming soueraigne
 maiestie, for a prince to professe himself bound unto the lawes of himselfe
 that raigneth. And certainely there is nothing better, or more beseeming a
 prince, than by his deeds and life to confirme those lawes which hee himselfe
 hath made: for that is of greatest force, for the honour and obedience of the
 subiects towards their prince: as contrariwise
 nothing is more daungerous for the contempt
 both of the prince and of the lawes▪ than without iust cause to breake or
 infringe that which thou hast commaunded: as an auntient Roman Senatour said,
 Leuius est, & vanius, sua decreta tollere quam
 aliorum, It is more lightnesse and vanitie Liuius
 lib. 3. to take away a mans owne decrees, than the decrees of other
 men. But it is one thing for a man so to doe willingly and of his owne accord,
 and another thing to bee bound by bond or oath so to do it. But what if a prince by law forbid to kill or to steale, is hee not bound to
 obay his All princes bound and subiect unto the lawes of God
 and nature, and to their owne iust conuentions. owne lawes? I say
 that this law is not his, but the law of God and nature, whereunto all princes
 are more straitly bound than their subiects: in such sort as that they cannot
 be from the same exempted, either by the Senat, or the people, but that they
 must bee enforced to make their appearance
 before the tribunall seat of almightie God: For God taketh a straiter account
 of princes than of others, as the maister of wisdome Salomon himselfe a king, hath most truly written. Whereunto well
 agreeth that saying of Marcus Aurelius, who for his
 desire of knowledge, was called the Philosopher: The
 magistrats are iudges over priuat men, princes iudge the magistrats, and God
 the princes. This is the opinion of 2 great princes, esteemed of all
 other the wisest; unto whom we wil ioine the third, Antigonus king of Asia, who hearing a flatterer say, that al things
 were lawfull for kings: Yea, said he, forbarbarous kings and tyrants. The first
 that used this kind of flatrerie, was Anaxarchus towards
 Alexander the Great, whome hee made to beleeue, That
 the goddesse Iustice, was still at the right hand of Iupiter, to shew that 
 princes could do nothing but that was right and iust: Of which their iustice he
 shortly after made proofe, for being fallen into the hands of the king of
 Cyprus, he was by h s commaundement with hammers
 beaten to death uppon an anuill. But how much more truely did Seneca say to the contrarie, Caesaricum omnia
 licent, propter hoc minus licet, When all things are unto Caesar lawfull, euen for that are they lesse lawfull. And
 therefore they that generally say, that princes are not subiect unto lawes, nor
 to their owne conuentions, if they except not the lawes of God and nature, and
 the iust contracts and conuentions made with them, they do great wrong both
 unto God and nature, in that they make not the speciall exemption to appeare;
 as men say in matters of priueleges. So Dionisius the
 tyrant of Sicilie, said to his mother, That he could dispence with the lawes and customes of Syracusa, but not with the
 lawes of nature. For as the contracts and testaments of priuat men, cannnot
 derogat from the decrees of the magistrats, nor the decrees of the magistrats
 from the auntient customes, nor the auntient customes from the generall lawes
 of a soueraigne prince: no more also can the lawes of soueraigne princes alter
 or chaunge the lawes of God and nature. Wherefore the Roman magistrats did
 notably, who unto the end of all their requests & laws which they
 propounded unto the good liking of the people, commonly annexed this clause,
 Si quid ius non esset E. E. L. N. R. eius ea lege nihilem
 rogaretur, that is to say, That if any thing were therein contained
 that was not iust and reasonable, they by that law requested nothing. But of
 all others they are most absurd, which say, That a soueraigne prince can decree nothing against the lawes of
 God and nature, without most apparant reason. For what apparant reason can
 there be diuised, for which wee ought to breake the lawes of God? And hereof
 proceed such paradoxes as this, That he whome the Pope hath dispensed withall
 for the lawes of God, is sufficiently assured before God: which how true it is
 let others iudge. There resteth yet another obiection, by them obiected which with more
 reason An obiection that princes are bound to the civill
 lawes. examine matters. If princes (say they) be bound unto the lawss
 of nature, that is to say, of upright reason: and that civill lawes be (in all
 things) agreeable unto right and reason, it must needs
 thereof follow, that the prince is also bound unto the ciuil laws. And
 to that end they alleage that saying of Pacutius unto Theodosius the
 emperour, Tantum tibi licet quantum per leges licebit, 
 So much is lawfull for thee to do, as thou maiest by law doe. For the plainer
 aunswering of which doubt, we must thus distinguish: That The
 answere, declaring to what lawes a prince is bound, and to what lawes
 not. the lawes of a soueraigne prince, whereof question is made,
 concerne either that which is publick, or priuat, or common to both: and
 generally when question is, it is either of that which is profitable and not
 honest, or of that which is honest and not profitable, or is both profitable
 and honest; or els of that which is neither of both. And that I call honest,
 which is agreeing unto the equitie of nature; unto which naturall equitie it is
 manifest all princes to be bound, seeing that which nature teacheth, is
 altogether comprehended in the law of nature, whereunto every prince is bound
 to obey: neither is such a law to bee called a
 ciuile law, albeit that the prince cause it to bee published, but rather the
 law of nature. And with so much the more reason, when the law is both honest
 and profitable. But if that which is by law commaunded, bee neither honest nor
 profitable, although of such things there ought to be no law; yet may the
 prince bind his subiects unto those lawes, whereunto he is not himselfe bound,
 if they have no dishonour or dishonestie ioyned with them. For there bee some
 things honest, some things dishonest, and some in a meane betwixt both. But if
 profit repugne against honestie, it is good reason that honestie should take
 place. As Aristides the iust, to whom Themistocles was commanded to communicat his deuice, aunswered, That
 the counsell of Themistocles was profitable to the
 Commonweale; but yet in his iudgement
 dishonest: the Athenians hearing so much, enquired no farther after the matter,
 but decreed that his profitable counsell to be reiected. But here when we
 reason of a Commonweale, we must speake according to the common manner; which
 our speech is not to be examined according to the subtiltie of Philosophers:
 for they set downe, nothing to be profitable which is not honest, neither
 anything to bee honest which is not iust: but that old custome is growne out of
 vse, so that of necessitie we must make a difference betwixt things honest, and
 things profitable. But if that which the prince by his law commaundeth, be not
 honourable, but profitable, he himselfe is not by that law bound, although his
 subiects be, so that nothing bee therein contained contrarie to the lawes of
 God and nature: and such lawes the prince may 
 at his pleasure abrogat, or from them derogat, and instead of them make others,
 either more or lesse profitable: for things honest, iust, and profitable, haue
 their degrees of more and lesse. If then it be lawfull for a prince amongst
 lawes profitable, to make choice of them that be more profitable; so also
 amongst lawes iust and honest, he may chuse out them that be most upright and
 honest, albeit that some therby receiue profit, and some others losse; prouided
 that the profit be publicke, and the losse particular: and yet if the prince
 shall otherwise decree, it is not lawfull for the subiect to breake the laws of
 his prince, under the colour of honestie, or iustice: as if the prince in time
 of famine, forbid the carrying out of victuals (a thing not only profitable to
 the Commonweale, but oft times also iust and reasonable) he ought not to giue
 leaue to some few to carry thē out, to the
 preiudice of the common state, & of other marchants in particular; for
 under the colour of profit that these flatterers and scrapers carrie things,
 many good marchants suffer losse, and all the subiects in generall are
 famished: and yet neuerthelesse the famine and dearth ceasing, it is not yet
 lawfull for the subiect to transgresse the edicts of his prince, and to carrie
 out victuals, vntill the law forbidding the same, be by the prince abrogated,
 no not though there seeme neuer so great occasions for the transgressing of the
 law: as that now the citie is full of victuall, and all other things
 necessarie; and that the law of nature persuadeth vs to giue reliefe vnto
 distressed strangers, in letting them have part of such
 good things as it hath pleased God to send
 encrease of more in one countrey than in another: for as much as the power of
 the law that forbiddeth, is greater than the apparant equitie, the show whereof
 euerie man might pretend to his desires, except the prohibition in the law be
 directly against the lawes of God and nature. But so sometimes things fall out, as that the law may be good, iust, and
 reasonable, A law may be good, iust, and reasonable, and
 yet the prince no way subiect or bound thereunto. and yet the prince
 to be no way subiect or bound thereunto: as if he should forbid all his
 subiects, except his guard and garrison souldiors, upon paine of death to
 carrie weapon, so to take away the feares of murders and seditions; he in this
 case ought not to be subiect to his owne law, but to the contrarie, to be well
 armed for the defence of the good, and punishment of the euill. The same we may
 say of other edicts and lawes also, which
 concerne but some part of the subiects; which edicts and lawes are called
 priueleges, and are iust in respect of certaine persons, or for a certaine
 time, or place; or for the varietie of punishments which depend alwaies of the
 lawes; albeit that the forbidding of offences is proceeding from the lawes of
 God and nature. unto which edicts and lawes the princes are not any way bound,
 further than the naturall iustice of the same hath place; which ceasing, the
 prince is no more therunto bound, vntill the prince have abrogated the same.
 For it is not onely a law of nature, but also oftentimes repeated amongst the
 lawes of God, That we should be obedient unto the lawes and ordinances of such
 princes as it hath pleased God to set to rule and raigne over vs, if their
 lawes and decrees be not directly repugnant unto the lawes of God and
 nature, whereunto all princes are as well
 bound as their subiects. For as the vassall oweth his oath of fidelitie vnto
 his lord towards & against al men, except his soueraigne prince; so the
 subiect oweth his obedience to his soueraigne prince, towards and against all,
 the maiestie of God excepted, who is the absolute soueraigne of all the princes
 in the world. Out of this resolution we may draw another rule of estate, that is to wit, that
 the soueraigne That a soue▪ prince is bound to his owne
 contracts, aswell as other men be. prince is bound unto the contracts
 by him made, bee it with his subiect, or with a straunger: for seeing he is the
 warrant to his subiects of the mutuall conuentions and obligations that they
 have one of them against another: of how much more reason is he the debter of
 iustice in his owne fact, and so bound to keepe the faith and promises by himselfe giuen and made to others? As the court
 of parliament at Paris writ backe unto king Charles the
 ix, in the moneth of March, in the yeare 1563, That his maiestie alone could
 not breake the contract made betwixt him and the clergie, without the consent
 of the clergie; and that for this reason, For that he was himselfe the debtor
 of iustice, and so bound to giue euerie man his right. Which putteth mee in
 remembrance of a resolution concerning the upright dealing of princes, worthy
 to be engrauen in letters of gold, in their lodgings and pallaces; which is,
 That it ought to bee accounted amongst things which by
 chaunce seldome happen, if a prince fayle of his promise; 

 A notable saying. 

 and that it is not otherwise to be presumed. For that of
 his promise there is a double bond; the one for the naturall equitie thereof:
 for what can be more agreeing unto naturall
 equitie, than to have iust promise kept? The other, for the honour of the
 prince himselfe, who is bound to keepe his promise, although it be unto his
 losse; for that he is the formall warrant to all his subiects, of the faith
 that they have amongst A soueraigne prince lesse in iustice
 to be respected or releeued, than his subiects, when question is of his
 promise. them; as also for that there is no more detestable crime in
 a prince, than to bee false of his oath and promise. And that is it for which
 the soueraigne prince ought alwaies in iustice to bee lesse respected or
 releeued than his subiects, when question is of his promise. For if a prince
 have once bestowed an honour or an office upon a man, it is deemed, that he may
 not without iust cause take it againe away from him; but a particular subiect may: and so it is ordinarily iudged. And wheras
 by the law the patron might without cause take
 his fee from his vestall; yet was it not lawfull for the prince so to doe.
 Whereby it is well to be perceiued, the doctors of the Canon law to erre, and
 to be deceiued, who deny a prince to be bound to his owne conuentions or
 agreements, otherwise than with a naturall bond: for that say they, every bond
 is proper unto the civill law; which their errour is to be remoued: For who can
 doubt, but that the bond is of the same nature with the couenant? Wherefore if
 the couenant be naturall, and common to all nations, the bonds and actions
 arising thereof must needs consequently be of the same nature also. But no
 couenant almost, neither any obligation or bond can be deuised, which is not
 common both unto the law of nature and nations. But let vs graunt some
 couenants to proceed from the meere civill law; yet 

 That soue▪ raigne prince is bound
 to his own ciuil couenants. who dare to deny a prince to be more
 straitly bound euen unto such civill couenants, and promises, than are the
 priuat subiects themselves? yea and that in so strait a maner as that he cannot
 with all the absolute power he hath derogat from the same? For so almost all
 the learned lawyers are of opinion and accord. And what maruell? seeing God
 himself is bound unto his promises. For so he plainly protesteth with the
 prophet Hieremie, Call together unto me (saith he) all the people of the earth, that they may iudge betwixt me
 and my people, if there be any thing that I ought to have done, which I haue
 not done. Let vs noth therefore call into question those things wherof
 many doctors have doubted. As whether a prince be bound unto the couenants
 which he hath made with his subiects? whereat we need not to maruell, seeing
 that out of the same fountaine is sprung, that
 no lesse straunge position: that a prince may of right, without any iust cause
 enrich himselfe with another mans losse: an opinion repugnant unto the lawes
 both of God and nature. But how much more uprightly was it of late iudged in
 the court of Paris, that the prince might giue his intrest unto the partie
 condemned; but not the intrest of another man. And that in confiscations
 creditours are by right first to be preferred, The same court also by another
 decree determined, That the prince might derogat from the civill lawes, so that
 it were done without preiudice to any particular mens right: which is to
 confirme the resolutions which wee before have set downe, concerning the
 absolute soueraignetie. And Philip of Valois, by two
 testaments which he made in the yeare 1347, and 1350, (which are in the
 treasurie of France in a coffer, intituled The
 testaments of kings, number 289) ioyneth a clause derogatorie unto the lawes of
 his countrey, from which he protested himselfe to be discharged, as not vnto
 them bound. The like protestations he also vsed, when hee gaue unto the queene
 his wife certaine treasure, and priuat lands, contrarie unto the lawes: with
 aswel his prodigall gift, as also that his derogation from the lawes of his
 countrey, are yet extant in the publick records. Howbeit that Augustus the emperor thought it not good for himselfe in like case to
 vse the like libertie in his Commonweale, but being willing to giue unto his
 wife Liuia, that which he could not by reason of the law
 Voconia, hee requested to be dispensed with all from that law by the Senat
 (although that it was not needfull for him so to have done, considering that he
 was long time before in all other things
 dispensed with from the lawes) to the intent the better to assure his gift, for
 that he was not a soueraigne prince, as we have before showed. For otherwise
 hee had not bene any way bound so to doe; as it was in most strong tearmes
 iudged by a decree in the court of Paris, in the case of Philip the second, the French king, That he was not bound unto the
 customes of the ciuil law, at such time as they which were next of kindred
 would have redeemed of him the countie of Guynes: howbeit that many both thinke
 and write, the prince to be bound to that law: for that they thinke that law to
 be common to all nations, and not proper to any citie: and yet then the which
 law the Romans themselves (in some cases) thought
 nothing more vnreasonable. But our ancestours 

 What account was made of the Roman civill lawes in
 France. would not have euen their subiects bound unto the Roman
 lawes; as we see in the auntient records, that Philip 
 the faire, erecting the parliament of Paris and Monpellier declared, That they
 should not be bound unto the Roman laws. And in the erection of Vniuersities,
 the kings have alwaies declared, That their purpose was to have the civill and
 canon laws in them publickly professed and taught, to make vse therof at their
 discretion, but not that the subiects should be any way bound therunto, least
 they should seeme to derogat from the lawes of their owne country by aduancing
 the laws of straungers. And for the same cause Alaricus 
 king of the Gothes, forbad upon pain of death, any man to allege the Roman
 lawes contrarie to his decrees and ordinances. Which M.
 Charles du Moulin (my companion, and ornament of all lawyers)
 mistaking, is therefore with him verie
 angrie, and in reproach calleth him therefore barbarous: howbeit that nothing
 was therein by Alaricus decreed or done, but that which
 euerie wise prince would of good right have decreed and done: for subiects will
 so long both remember, and hope for the government of strangers, as they are
 gouerned by their lawes. The like edict there is of king Charles the faire, and an old decree of the court of Paris, whereby we
 are expresly forbidden to alleage the laws of the Romans, against the lawes and
 customes of our auncestours. Yea the kings of Spaine also have upon capitall
 paine forbidden any man to alleage the Roman laws, in confirmation of their
 owne laws, (as Oldrad writeth.) And albeit that there
 were nothing in the lawes and customes of their countrey which differed from
 the Roman lawes, yet such is the force of that
 edict, that all men may vnderstand that the judges in deciding of the subiects
 causes, were not bound unto the Roman lawes: & therfore much lesse the
 prince himselfe, who thought it a thing daungerous to have his judges bound
 unto straunge lawes. And worthy he is to be accounted a traitor, that dare to
 oppose straunge lawes and straunge decrees against the lawes of his owne
 prince. In which doings when the The Roman lawes forbidden to
 be aught in Spaine. Spaniards did too much
 offend, Stephen king of Spaine forbad the Roman lawes to
 be at all taught in Spaine▪ as Polycrates writeth: which
 was more straitly prouided for by king Alphonsus the
 tenth, who commaunded the magistrats and judges to come unto the prince
 himselfe, as often as there was nothing written in the lawes of their countrey
 concerning the matter in question. Wherein Baldus is
 mistaken, when hee writeth the Italians to bee
 bound to the Roman lawes; but the French no otherwise than so farre as they
 should seeme unto them to agree with equitie and reason. For the one are as
 little bound as the other; howbeit that Italie, Spaine, the countries of
 Prouince, Sauoy, Languedoc, and Lyonnois, vse the Roman lawes more than other
 people: and that Frederike Barbarussa the emperour,
 caused the books of the Roman laws to be published and taught: the greatest
 part whereof have yet no place in Italie, and much lesse in Germanie. But there
 is much difference betwixt a right, and a law: for a right still without
 commaund respecteth nothing but that which is good and upright; but a law
 importeth a commaundement. For the law is nothing els but the commaundement of
 a soueraigne, vsing of his soueraigne power. Wherefore then as a soueraigne is not bound unto the laws of the Greeks, nor
 of any other stranger whatsoeuer he be, no more is he bound unto the Roman
 laws, more than that they are conformable Neither pope nor
 emperour exempted from the law of nature. unto the law of nature;
 which is the law whereunto (saith Pindarus ) all kings
 and princes are subiect. From which we are not to excepteither the pope or the
 emperour (as some pernitious flatterers do) saying, That those two viz. the pope and the emperour, may of right without
 cause take unto themselves the goods of their subiects. A
 dangerous opinion, and not to be taught to princes. Which opinion the
 Canonists themselves, the interpretors of the popes law detest, as contrarie to
 the law of God: whereunto for all that they ioine this euill limitation, in saying, That they may yet do it of their most high and
 absolute power and authority, as they tearme
 it: which is as much as if they should say it to bee lawfull for them to rob
 and spoyle their subiects, oppressed by force of armes: which law, the more
 mightie vse against them that be weaker than themselves, which the Germans most
 rightly call, The law of theeves and robbers. But pope Innocent the iiij himself, most skilfull in both the lawes, saith that
 most high and absolute power, to bee able but to derogat from the ordinarie
 law▪ whereas they would have such absolute and soueraigne power to extend to
 the abrogating of the lawes of God and nature. For what is more religiously by
 Gods lawes forbidden, than to rob and spoyle other men of their goods? what
 thing do we read more often repeated, than to keepe our hands from other mens
 things? yea we are by the most holy Decalogue commaunded, not so much as
 to desire that which is another mans. Now
 certainly it is a greater offence to infect princes with this doctrine, than it
 is to rob and steale. For pouertie commonly causeth theeves to seeke after
 other mens goods: but they that maintaine such opinions, show the lion his
 clawes, and arme the prince so instructed, to pretend unto his outrages, this
 goodly show of Law and Iustice: who by nature naught, & made worse by
 instruction: so prouing to be a tyrant, maketh no question most shamefully to
 confound and breake all the lawes both of God and man: and afterward enflamed
 with corrupt desires and affections, which altogether weaken the more noble
 parts of the mind, hee quickly breaketh out from couetousnesse to vniust
 confiscations, from lust to adulterie, from wrath to murder. So that as thunder
 is indeed before the lightning, although it be
 latter heard: so also an euill prince, corrupted with these pernitious &
 pestilent opinions, peruetting iustice, causeth the fine to runne before the
 accusation, and the condemnation before the iudgement. Howbeit it is an in
 congruitie in law, to say that That a prince power ought alwaies to be measured with the foot of
 iustice. a prince can do any thing which is not agreeing with
 honestie; seeing that his power ought alwaies to be measured with the foot of
 iustice. For so said Plinie the younger unto Traian the emperour, Vt enim
 foelicitatis est posse quantum velis: sic magnitudinis velle quantum
 possis, As it is (saith he) in thy happinesse to be able to doe what
 thou wilt; so beseemeth it thy greatnesse, to will what thou maist. Whereof may
 be gathered, that a prince can do nothing that is fowle or vniust. It is also
 euill done, to say, that a soueraigne prince hath power by violence to take
 away another mans goods, to rob, to commit
 adulterie, or to do euill, seeing that so to doe, is rather an impotencie, or
 feeblenes, proceeding from a weake mind ouercome with impotent lust and desire,
 rather than any soueraignty. Now then if a soueraigne prince may not remoue the
 bounds which almightie God (of whom he is the liuing & breathing image)
 hath prefined unto the euerlasting lawes of nature: neither may he take from
 another man that Priuat mens losses by princes sometimes to
 bee sufferd, for the greater benef of the
 Commonweale. which is his, without iust cause, whether it be by
 buying, by exchaunge, by confiscation, by league with friends, or peace made
 with enemies, if it cannot otherwise bee concluded than by priuat mens losse;
 whose goods princes oftentimes permit the enemies to enioy, for the generall
 welfare of the subiects and of the Commonweale: howbeit that many be not of
 this opinion, but would that euerie man should keepe his owne; and that no publick diminution should be made of any priuat
 mans goods, or that if publicke necessitie so required, it were againe to bee
 made goodby the whole state: which opinion I like well of, if conveniently it
 might so be done. But forasmuch as the welfare of priuat men, and all the goods
 of the subiects are contained in the health of our country, it beseemeth priuat
 men without grudging to forgiue unto the Commonwealth, not onely their priuat
 displeasures, and iniuries receiued from their enemies, but to yeeld also for
 the health of the Commonweale, their goods. For peace hath for the most part
 some hard measure in it, which is againe recompenced with the publique profit: and this law doth all people vse, that in
 conclusions of peace, not only publick things
 are recompensed with publike, and priuat things with priuat; but both with the
 mutuall profits and detriments of both. And yet I see many great maisters of
 both lawes, both to be, & to have bene of opinion, that in those leagues
 wherein it is excepted, that no question should be made of the losse on both
 sides receiued, such exception should be void, neither to be any thing
 preiudiciall unto priuat men: howbeit that we vse it otherwise; for in the
 peace of Peronne, made for the deliverance of Lewes the
 xj the French king, prisoner unto Charles earle of
 Burgundie, it was in one article prouided, That Seigneur de
 Torci should not execute the sentence of the The law
 of forgetfulnes necessarie for the ending of ciuile warres, and composing of
 controuersies betwixt princes. court of Paris against the lord of
 Saneuses. And therefore is Thrasibulus (and that not
 vnworthily) commended, that hauing ouerthrowne and driuen thirtie tyrants out
 of the citie of Athens, he caused the law of
 forgetfulnesse to be proclaimed. Wherein was contained the forgetting of all
 priuat iniuries and losses receiued in the late civill warre: which was also
 afterwards proclaimed in Rome, after that Caesar was
 s aine in the Senat, at the treatie made betwixt
 the conspirators on the one side, and Caesars partakers
 on the other. Yet is it by all meanes to be enduoured, that mens harmes
 receiued, should be recompensed with other mens profits, and so as neere as may
 bee every man to have his owne, which if it cannot be done without tumult and
 civill warres, we must defend the possessors of other mens things, although
 they hold them wrongfully, vntill the right honours may be satisfied out of the
 common treasure: or if the common treasure be exhausted, to borrow money to
 content them. As did Aratus, who hauing restored his countrey to liberrie, after it had for
 the space of fiftie yeares bene oppressed with tyranny, restored also sixe
 hundred banished men, whose lands & goods had bene by the tyrant
 confiscated. Yet would hee not the possessors of those lands, which the tyrants
 had vniustly taken from those citisens, to be spoyled therof: for that much
 thereof was lawfully bought and sold, and much of it holden in dowrie, so that
 it could not be done without a most daungerous turmoile in the state. Wherefore
 he bound all the citisens by oath, That they should keep peace and amitie
 vntill such time as he returning out of Aegypt, should then take order for all
 things. For hauing there borrowed threescore thousand crownes of K. Ptolemaeus Philadelphus, he returned into his countrey,
 and pri ing the land, so wrought the matter, that some
 made choice to take money and leaue the land;
 and other some thought it better to take mony themselves, than to recouer
 againe that which had beene before their owne. Wherefore these causes that I
 have said ceasing, the prince cannot take nor giue another mans goods, without
 the consent of the owner. And in all gifts, grants, immunities, and
 priueledges, this clause is still annexed, Sauing alwaies our
 owne right: and the right of other men: Which clause added unto the
 inuestiture of the dutchie of Milan, which Maximilian 
 the emperour made to king Lewes the xij, was the
 occasion of new warres, for the right which the Sforces 
 pretended to the dutchie, which the emperour could not nor would not giue away.
 And this clause although it be left out, is yet supposed to be still put in:
 for that euen the emperour would he neuer so faine, can no otherwise giue
 or graunt any other thing to any bodie. For
 that which the common people commonly saith, All to be the
 princes, is to be vnderstood concerning power and soueraigntie, How it is to bee vnderstood, All to be the princes. the
 proprietie and possession of euerie mans things yet reserued to himselfe. For
 so saith Seneca, Ad reges potestas omnium pertinet, ad
 singulos proprietas, unto kings belongeth the power of all things, and
 unto particular men the proprietie. And a little after, Omnia
 rex imperio possidet singuli dominio, The king in power possesseth
 all The king in some cases lesse priuiledged than the
 subiect. things: and priuat men as owners. And for this cause our
 kings by the lawes and decrees of Court, are bound to void their hands of such
 lands as are fallen unto them by way of confiscation
 (if they be not simplie and without meane holden of the crowne) to the end that the patrons of them that were proscribed,
 should loose nothing of their right in the lands confiscated. And if the king
 be debtor to any priuat man his subiect, he is therefore oft times sued,
 condemned, and enforced to pay the debt. But that straungers aswell as
 subiects, and all posteritie may know of what integritie our kings have bene,
 and with what moderation they have borne themselves towards their subiects, let
 this be for example, That the king himselfe in the yere 1266, was by the
 iudgement of the court of Paris, condemned to pay unto the curat, the tyth of
 the fruits euen of his garden of pleasure. So when another of our kings had by
 the negligence of his aduocat, made default of appearence at his day; hee by
 ordinarie course requested to have that negligent ouersight pardoned: which the
 kings request the court of Paris denied, as
 appeareth by the decree of the court, in the yeare 1419. But no such strict
 proceeding is used against priuat men, who alwaies in such case are againe
 restored into the state they before were. And albeit that subiects under xxv
 yeares old, almost in all priuat iudgements vse to be againe restored into the
 state they were, by the priuelege of their age; yet our kings although but
 children, are neuer so restored by the benefit of their age, but in all
 iudgements are deemed to bee of full age. And yet the Commonweale neuerthelesse
 is alwaies reputed to be in minoritie: which is to aunswere them which are of
 opinion, That the Commonweale ought not to be restored; in that they confound
 the patrimonie of the prince, with the Commonweale, which is alwaies in a
 monarchie divided: but all one in a popular or an Aristocraticall
 state. With this stoutnesse of courage the
 magistrats bare themselves towards our kings, & with this moderation also
 did our kings reuerence iustice, preferring still in all sutes the Commonweale
 before priuat men, and priuat men before princes. There is also extant in the
 records of the court of Paris, a iudgement giuen against king Charls the seuenth, wherein he was condemned to suffer a wood of his
 to bee cut downe which hee had neere unto the citie of Paris, for the publike
 vse in generall, and the vse of euerie one of the citisens in particular: and
 that more was, the price thereof was set downe for him in the decree, whereunto
 a priuat subiect could hardly have bene driuen. Then was it plainely to be
 seene how much a king differed from a tyrant: for when this Charls the vij had driuen the English forces out of the hart of
 Fraunce, and easily taken the citie of Paris
 (which confederated with the English, had wrested the scepter out of this kings
 hand) he was so farre from reuenging of his receiued iniuries, that hee vsed
 the citisens most curteously, and showed himselfe more obedient unto the judges
 than priuat men have used to be. When at the same time Philip
 Maria, duke of Milan, hauing oppressed the Commonweale with taxes and
 tributes, embarred also his ports and riuers, in such sort as that none of the
 citisens without his leaue could passe or trauell thereby, but that first they
 must therefore pay money. Thus we have hitherto showed in what sort a soueraigne is subiect unto the
 lawes Whether a soueraigne prince be bound to the promises
 or conuentions of the kings his predecessours or not. and conuentions
 by him made with his subiects: Now it resteth for vs to see whether he be
 subiect unto the contracts and promises of the kings his predecessours; and
 whether such his obliging be compatible with
 soueraigne maiestie or not. Which in few words to discusse, passing over a
 multitude of nice questions which might bee made in this matter: I say that a
 prince is bound unto the couenants of his auncestors as well as other priuat
 heirs, if his kingdome come unto him by inheritance, or bee giuen him by
 testament being not next of kinne: as Ptolemee king of
 Cyrene, Nicomedes king of Bithynia, Attalus king of Asia, and Eumenes king of
 Pergame, by their wils appointed the people of Rome to inherit their kingdomes.
 But what if a kingdome be by will giuen unto the next of kinne? as Henry the eight by his will left the kingdome of England
 to his son Edward the sixt:
 and substituted unto him his sister Mary, and unto her
 

 Elizabeth her sister, who all successiuely enioyed the
 kingdome. In this case wee must distinguish, whether the appointed heire will
 accept the state in the qualitie of an heire by testament appointed; or
 renouncing the succession of the testator, demaundeth the crowne by vertue of
 the custome and law of his countrey. For in the former case the successour is
 bound unto all the hereditary obligations and actions of his predecessors, as
 if he were a priuat inheritour: but in the second case, he is not bound vnto
 the dome of his predecessour, albeit that his predecessour were thereto sworne.
 For neither the oath nor the obligation of the dead predecessour, bindeth the
 successour in the law, more than so farre as the obligation made by the
 testatour tendeth to the good of the Commonweale, and so farre he is bound. And
 therefore king Lewes the xij, when he was demaunded the artillerie lent unto Charles the eight, answered, That he was none of Charles his heire. So of late king Francis the
 second, to like effect writ his letters unto the lords of the Swissers,
 demaunding of him his fathers debts, the copie whereof taken out of the
 records, bearing date the xix of Ianuarie 1559, I have here set downe as
 followeth, viz. Although that we be not bound to pay the
 debts of our most honourable 

 The letters of the French king unto the Swissers 

 Lord, and dead father: for that we have not taken upon vs
 this crowne by right of inheritance as his heire, but by the royall law and
 custome generally obserued euen from the first institution thereof, which
 bindeth vs not, but onely to the obseruing of such confederations and
 treaties, passed and made by the kings our predecessors, with other forren
 princes and Commonweales, for the good and profit of this crowne.
 Neuerthelesse desiring to discharge 

 

 the credit and conscience of the said our dead lord and
 father, wee are resolued to discharge his lawfull debts, &c. Onely this
 requesting you, to moderat the interest, in such sort as you have vsed,
 according to the lawes and customes of your countrey, and that no greater be
 of vs exacted. Which his request the Swissers by their common decree
 approued, so that whereas before they had taken of our people so deepe intrest,
 as every sixt yeare came almost to as much as the principall, (which is twice
 so much as they doe in Fraunce) they brought it downe to a third part, which
 commeth to so much as the principal but in twentie yeares. But that our kings
 were not bound unto the bonds of their predecessours, the court of Paris
 determined, viz. In the yeare 1256. Wherefore they are
 greatly deceiued, which receiue as from an oracle the formall and conceiued
 words of the oath which the bishops of Rheims
 have at their pleasure not long since deuised, which our kings at their
 coronation now vse. For after that the archbishop of Rheims hath set the crowne
 upon the kings head, the twelue peers of Fraunce putting to their hands, he
 saith unto him these words, Stay you here (saith he) and the kingdome which you have before vntill now holden by
 succession from your father, now from henceforth hold as the true heyre
 thereof, put into your hands by the power of almightie God, and by the iust
 deliverie thereof, which we the bishops and other the seruants of God here
 presently make unto you. An honest speech if it were true. But I thinke
 no man doubteth, but that the king euen before his consecration enioyeth both
 the possession and proprietie of the kingdome, not by inheritance or his
 fathers right, and much lesse by the bountie of the bishops or peers, but by the royall law and custome of the realme, as
 was long since decreed by Anno. 1463 a decree
 of the French men, That no man should thinke the power of the king to depend of
 the pleasure of the bishops: not for that the Senat euer doubted of the power
 of the king before his coronation; but that those vaine quirkes of the bishops
 might be vtterly refelled. For it is an old prouerbe with vs, That the
 king The king neuer dieth. doth neuer die, but that
 so soone as he is dead, the next male of his stocke is seised of the kingdome,
 and in possession thereof before he be crowned, which is not conferred unto him
 by succession of his father, but by vertue of the law of the land; least the
 succession of the kingdome should be vncertaine, then
 which nothing can be more daungerous in a
 Commonweale. Wherefore let vs this hold, that the king which is by lawfull
 right called unto his kingdome, is so farre bound unto the couenants and
 promises of the kings his predecessours, as is for the good of the Commonweale:
 and so much the more, if the contracts were made by the consent and good liking
 of the people ingenerall, or of the states, or high court of parliament: which
 it is not onely seemely for a king to keepe, but also necessarie, although it
 be hurtfull unto the Commonweale, considering that it concerneth the faith and
 obligation of his subiects. But if the soueraigne prince hath contracted either
 with strangers, or with his subiects, for such things as concerne the
 Commonweale, without the consent of them wee have before said, if any great
 harme redound unto the Commonweale by such contract, it is not reason
 the lawfull successour to be therunto
 bound: and much lesse if hee have obtained the kingdome by election: For that
 he holdeth nothing from his predecessor, as he should doe if he held his state
 by resignation, for then he should be bound unto the contracts and promises of
 his predecessours, except it were expresly otherwise excepted. But by what
 right soeuer the prince shal have receiued his kingdome, whether it be by law,
 by testament, by election, or by lot, it is reason that the successours should
 performe all such contracts of his predecessor, as redounded to the profit of
 the Commonweale: for otherwise it should be lawfull for him contrarie to the
 law of nature, by fraud and indirect meanes to draw his owne profit out of
 others harmes: but it much concerneth a Commonweale, so much as in it lieth, to
 preserue and keepe the publike faith, least in 
 the extreame daungers thereof, all the meanes for the reliefe thereof should be
 shut up. And thus are to bee vnderstood, those things which the court of Paris
 decreed in the yeares 1256, and 1294, viz. The king not
 to be bound unto the couenants and agreements of the former kings his
 predecessours: their opinion being reiected, which say, That a soueraigne
 prince is to be thrust out of his kingdome, if he performe not the testament of
 the former prince his predecessor: without putting the difference of princely
 successions, by vs before put, but vtterly confounding the succession of
 princes. But what needeth (might some man say) this distinction in succession of
 princes? seeing that all princes are bound and subiect unto the lawes of
 nations, whereof contracts and testaments do depend. Which is not so if wee
 speake of all contracts and testaments in
 generall: but admit that to be true, yet there of it followeth not, that a
 prince is more bound unto the laws of nations, than unto his owne: and that so
 far as they agree with the laws of God and nature: wherunto all that we haue
 said concerning the obliging of princes, is to be referred. For as for the laws
 of nations, if they be any of them vniust, the prince may abrogat them by the
 law of his realme, & forbid his subiects to vse the same: as we said before
 of seruitude and slaues: which by a daungerous example, by the law almost of
 all nations brought into Commonweales, were againe by the wholsome decrees of
 many princes well agreeing with the lawes of nature taken away: which being
 said of one thing, may also be extended unto other things of like condition:
 prouided alwaies, that nothing be done contrarie to the lawes of God and
 nature. For if iustice be the end of the
 law, and the law is the worke of the prince, and the prince is the lively image
 of almightie God; it must needes follow, that the law of the prince should be
 framed unto the modell of the law of God.