And again, it seems to me at any rate, that those who i.e. those referred to in § 46 ad init. , the Cyrenaics followers of Aristippus of Cyrene. falsely assume expediency to be the basis of friendship, take from friendship’s chain its loveliest link. For it is not so much the material gain procured through a friend, as it is his love, and his love alone, that gives us delight; and that advantage which we derive from him becomes a pleasure only when his service is inspired by an ardent zeal. And it is far from being true that friendship is cultivated because of need; rather, is it cultivated by those who are most abundantly blessed with wealth and power and especially with virtue, which is man’s best defence; by those least in need of another’s help; and by those most generous and most given to acts of kindness. Indeed, I should be inclined to think that it is not well for friends never to need anything at all. Wherein, for example, would my zeal have displayed itself if Scipio had never been in need of my advice or assistance either at home or abroad? But Cf. § 30: Quid enim? Africanus indigens mei? It is not the case, therefore, that friendship attends upon advantage, but, on the contrary, that advantage attends upon friendship. It will be our duty, then, not to listen to those besotted men of pleasure i.e. Epicureans and Cyrenaics, referred to in § 46 when they argue about friendship, of which they understand neither the practice nor the theory. For what person is there, in the name of gods and men! who would wish to be surrounded by unlimited wealth and to abound in every material blessing, on condition that he love no one and that no one love him? Such indeed is the life of tyrants—a life, I mean, in which there can be no faith, no affection, no trust in the continuance of goodwill; where every act arouses suspicion and anxiety and where friendship has no place. For can anyone love either the man whom he fears, or the man by whom he believes himself to be feared? Yet tyrants are courted under a pretence of affection, but only for a season. For when by chance they have fallen from power, as they generally do, then is it known how poor they were in friends. And this is illustrated by the remark said to have been made by Tarquin as he was going into exile: I have learned what friends of mine are true and what are false, now that I am no longer able to reward or punish either. And yet, such was the haughtiness and perversity of the man that I wonder if he could have had anyone as a friend. Now just as the character of Tarquin could not procure him true friends, so, with many, their power, if it be very great, is a bar to faithful friendships. For not only is Fortune blind herself, but as a rule she even blinds those whom she has embraced; and thus they are generally transported beyond themselves by wanton pride and obstinacy—nor can anything in the world be more insufferable than one of Fortune’s fools. Indeed we may observe that men, formerly affable in their manners, become changed by military rank, by power, and by prosperity, spurn their old-time friends and revel in the new. But what is more foolish, when men are in the plenitude of resources, opportunities, and wealth, than to procure the other things which money provides—horses, slaves, splendid raiment, and costly plate—and not procure friends, who are, if I may say so, life’s best and fairest furniture? And really while they are procuring those material things, they know not for whom they do it, nor for whose benefit they toil; for such things are the prey of the strongest; but to every man the tenure of his friendships ever remains settled and sure, so that even if there should be a continuance of those things which are, so to speak, the gratuities of fortune, yet life unadorned and unattended by friends could not be pleasant. But enough on this point.