Then indeed those decisions of the senatorial body, branded with no imaginary odium, but with
 real and conspicuous infamy, covered with disgrace and ignominy, would have left no room for any
 defence of them. For what answer could these judges make if any one asked of them, “You have
 condemned Scamander; of what crime? Because, forsooth, he attempted to murder Habitus by poison,
 by the agency of the slave of the doctor. What was Scamander to gain by the death of Habitus?
 Nothing; but he was the agent of Oppianicus. You have condemned Caius Fabricius; why so?
 Because, as he himself was exceedingly intimate with Oppianicus, and as his freedman had been
 detected in the very act, it was not proved that he was entirely ignorant of his design.” If,
 then, they had acquitted Oppianicus himself, after he had been twice condemned by their own
 decisions, who could have endured such infamy on the part of the tribunals, such inconsistency
 in judicial decisions, and such caprice on the part of the judges? 
 But if you now clearly see this, which has been long ago
 proved by the whole of my speech, that the defendant must inevitably be condemned by that
 decision, especially when brought before the same judges who had made two previous
 investigations into the matter, you must at the same time see this, that the accuser could have
 had no imaginable reason for wishing to bribe the bench of judges. 
 For I ask you, O Titus Altius, leaving out of the question all other arguments, whether you
 think that the Fabricii who were condemned were innocent? whether you say that those decisions
 also were corruptly procured by bribes? though in one of those decisions one of the defendants
 was acquitted by Stalenus alone; in the other, the defendant, of his own accord, condemned
 himself. Come, now, if they were guilty, of what crime were they guilty? Was there any crime
 imputed to them except the seeking for poison with which to murder Habitus? Was there any other
 point mooted at those trials, except these plots which were laid against Habitus by Oppianicus,
 through the instrumentality of the Fabricii? Nothing else, you will find; I say, O judges,
 nothing else. It is fresh in people's memories There are public records of the trial. Correct me
 if I am speaking falsely. Read the statements of the witnesses. Tell me, in those trials, what
 was objected to them, I will not say as an accusation, but even as a reproach, except this
 poison of Oppianicus. Many reasons can be alleged why it was
 necessary that this decision should be given; but I will meet your expectation half-way, O
 judges. For although I am listened to by you in such a way, that I am persuaded no one was ever
 listened to more kindly or more attentively, still your silent expectation has been for some
 time calling me in another direction, and seeming to chide me thus:—“What then? Do you deny that
 that sentence was procured by corruption?” I do not deny that, but I say that the corruption was
 not practiced by my client. By whom, then, was it practiced? I think, in the first place, if it
 had been uncertain what was likely to be the result of that trial, that still it would have been
 more probable that he would have recourse to corruption, who was afraid of being himself
 convicted, than he who was only afraid of another man being acquitted. In the second place, as
 it was doubtful to no one what decision must inevitably be given, that he would employ such
 means, who for any reason distrusted his case, rather than he who had every possible reason to
 feel confidence in his. Lastly, that at all events, he who had twice failed before those judges
 must have been the corrupter, rather than he who had twice established his case to their
 satisfaction. One thing is quite certain. No one will be so
 unjust to Cluentius, as not to grant to me, if it be proved that that tribunal was bribed, that
 it was bribed either by Habitus or by Oppianicus. If I prove that it was not bribed by Habitus,
 I prove that it was by Oppianicus,—I clear Habitus. Wherefore, although I have already
 established plainly enough that the one had no reason whatever for having recourse to bribery,
 (and from this alone it follows that the bribery must have been committed by Oppianicus,) still
 you shall have separate proofs of this particular point. 
 And I will adduce those facts as arguments which, however, are very weighty ones—namely, that
 he was the briber, who was in danger,—that he was the briber, who was afraid,—that he was the
 briber, who had no hope of safety by any other means; he who was always a man of extraordinary
 audacity. There are many such arguments. But when I have a case which is not doubtful, bull open
 and evident, the enumeration of every separate argument is superfluous. I say that Statius Albius gave Caius Attius Stalenus the judge a large sum of
 money to influence his decision. Does any one deny it? I appeal to you, O Oppianicus; to you, O
 Titus Attius; the one of whom deplores that conviction with his eloquence, the other with silent
 piety. Dare to deny it, if you can, that money was given by Oppianicus to Stalenus the judge.
 Deny it—deny it, I say, where you stand. Why are you silent? But you cannot deny it, for you
 sought to recover what had been paid. You have admitted it,—you have recovered it. With what
 face now do you dare to mention a decision given through corruption, when you confess that money
 was given by the opposite side to the judge before trial, and recovered from him after the
 trial?