And, therefore, O judges, I beg this of you before I begin
 to speak of the cause itself; in the first place, as is most reasonable, that you will bring no
 prejudice into court with you. In truth, we shall lose not only the authority, but even the name
 of judges, unless we judge from the facts which appear in the actual trials, and if we bring
 into court with us minds already made up on the subject at home. In the second place, I beg of
 you, if you have already adopted any opinion in your minds, that if reason shall eradicate
 it,—if my speech shall shake it,—if, in short, truth shall wrest it from you, you will not
 resist, but will dismiss it from your minds, if not willingly, at all events, impartially. I beg
 you, also, when I am speaking to each particular point, and effacing any impression my adversary
 may have made, not silently to let your thoughts dwell on the contrary statement to mine, but to
 wait to the end, and allow me to maintain the order of my arguments which I propose to myself;
 and when I have summed up, then to consider in your minds whether I have passed over anything.
 I, O judges, am thoroughly aware that I am under taking a cause which has now for eight years
 together been constantly discussed in a spirit opposed to the interests of my client, and which
 has been almost convicted and condemned by the silent opinion of men; but if any god will only
 incline your good-will to listen to me patiently, I will show you that there is nothing which a
 man has so much reason to dread as envy,—that when he has incurred envy, there is nothing so
 much to be desired by an innocent man as an impartial tribunal, because in this alone can any
 end and termination be found at last to undeserved disgrace. Wherefore, I am in very great hope,
 if I am able fully to unravel all the circumstances of this case, and to effect all that I wish
 by my speech, that this place, and this bench of judges before whom I am pleading, which the
 other side has expected to be most terrible and formidable to Aulus Cluentius, will be to him a
 harbour at last, and a refuge for the hitherto miserable and tempest-tossed bark of his
 fortunes. Although there are many things which seem to me
 necessary to be mentioned respecting the common dangers to which all men are exposed by
 unpopularity, before I speak about the cause itself; still, that I may not keep your
 expectations too long in suspense by my speech, I will come to the charge itself, only begging
 you, O judges, as I am aware I must frequently do in the course of this trial, to listen to me,
 as if this cause were now being this day pleaded for the first time,—as, in fact, it is; and not
 as if it had already been often discussed and proved. For on this day opportunity is given us
 for the first time of effacing that old accusation; up to this time mistake and odium have had
 the principal influence in the whole cause. Wherefore, while I reply with brevity and clearness
 to the accusation of many years standing, I entreat you, O judges, to listen to me, as I know
 that you are predetermined to do, with kindness and attention. Aulus Cluentius is said to have corrupted a tribunal with money, in order to procure the
 condemnation of his innocent enemy, Statius Albius. I will prove, O judges, in the first place,
 (since that is the principal wickedness charged against him, and the chief pretext for casting
 odium upon him, that an innocent man was condemned through the influence of in your minds
 whether I have money,) that no one was ever brought before a court on heavier charges, or with
 more unimpeachable witnesses against him to prove them. In the second place, that a previous
 examination into the matter had been made by the very same judges who afterwards condemned him,
 with such a result that he could not possibly have been acquitted, not only by them, but by any
 other imaginable tribunal. When I have demonstrated this, then I will prove that point which I
 am aware is particularly indispensable, that that tribunal was indeed tampered with, not by
 Cluentius, but by the party hostile to Cluentius; and I will enable you to see clearly in the
 whole of that cause what the facts really were—what mistake gave rise to—and what had its origin
 in the unpopularity undeservedly stirred up against Cluentius. The first point is this, from which it may be clearly seen that Cluentius had the greatest
 reason to confide in the justice of his cause, because he came down to accuse Albius relying on
 the most certain facts and unimpeachable witnesses. While on this topic, it is necessary for me,
 O judges, briefly to explain the accusations of which Albius was convicted. I demand of you, O
 Oppianicus, to believe that I speak unwillingly of the affair in which your father was
 implicated, because I am compelled by considerations of good faith, and of my duty as counsel
 for the defence. And, if I am unable at the present moment to satisfy you of this, yet I shall
 have many other opportunities of satisfying you at some future time; but unless I do justice to
 Cluentius now, I shall have no subsequent opportunity of doing justice to him. At the same time
 who is there who can possibly hesitate to speak against a man who has been condemned and is
 dead, on behalf of one unconvicted and living, when in the case of him who is being so spoken
 against conviction has taken away all danger of further disgrace, and death all fear of any
 further pain? and when, on the other hand, no disaster can happen to that man on behalf of whom
 one is speaking, without causing him the most acute feeling and pain of mind, and without
 branding his future life with the greatest disgrace and ignominy?