For Titus Attius, a
 virtuous and eloquent young man, conducts this case in such a manner; saying that all the
 citizens are bound by all the laws; and you attend and listen in silence, as you ought to do. 
 Aulus Cluentius, a Roman knight, is prosecuted according to that law by which the senators,
 and those who have served magistracies, alone are bound. I, by his desire, am prevented from
 demurring to this and from establishing the main bulwark of my defence on the citadel of the
 law. If Cluentius gains his cause, as we, relying on your equity, feel sure that he will, all
 will believe, what indeed will be the truth, that he has gained it because of his innocence,
 since he has been defended in such a manner as this; but in the law, all appeal to which he
 discarded, he found no protection at all. Here now is
 something which concerns me, as I said before, and which I ought to make good to the
 satisfaction of the Roman people, since my condition of life is such that the whole of my care
 and labour is devoted to defending every one from danger. I see how great, and how dangerous,
 and how bound less a field of investigation is attempted to be opened by the prosecutors, when
 they endeavour to transfer that law, which was framed with reference to our order alone, to the
 whole Roman people. And in that law are the words—“Who has conspired.” You see how wide an
 application that may have. “Or agreed.” That is just as vague and indefinite. “Or consented.”
 But this is not only vague and indefinite, but is also obscure and unintelligible. “Or given any
 false evidence.” Who is there of the common people at Rome , who has ever given any evidence at all, who is not, as you see, exposed to
 this danger, if Titus Attius is to have his own way? At all events I assert this positively,
 that no one will ever give evidence for the future, if this tribunal is held over the common
 people of Rome . But
 I make this promise to every one, if by chance any one is brought into trouble by this law, who
 is not properly liable to this law, that if he will employ me to defend him, I will defend his
 cause by the protection that the law affords, and that I will prove my ease easily to these
 judges, or to any others who resemble them, and that I will use every means of defence with
 which the law provides me, which I am now not permitted to use, by the man with whose wishes I
 am bound to comply. 
 For I ought not to doubt, O judges, that, if a cause of this sort be brought before you, of a
 man who does not come under the provisions of that law, even if he be unpopular, or if he seem
 to be disliked by many, or even if you hate him yourselves, and are unwilling to acquit him,
 still you will acquit him; and you will be guided rather by your sense of duty than by your
 personal hatred. For it is the part of a wise judge, to
 think that he has just that power permitted to him by the Roman people, which is committed and
 entrusted to him; and to remember that not only is power given to him, but also that confidence
 is placed in him: that he is a man capable of acquitting a man whom he hates, of condemning one
 whom he does not hate; and of always thinking not what he himself wishes, but what the law and
 the obligation of his oath requires of him—of considering according to what law the defendant is
 brought before him, who the defendant is into whose conduct he is inquiring, and what are the
 facts which are being investigated. All these things require to be looked at, and also it is the
 part of a great and wise man, O judges, when he has taken in his hand his judicial tablet, to
 think that he is not alone, and that it is not lawful for him to do whatever he wishes; but that
 he must employ in his deliberations law, equity, religion, and good faith; that he must discard
 lust, hatred, envy, fear, and all evil passions, and must think that consciousness implanted in
 one's mind, which we have received from the immortal gods, and which cannot be taken from us, to
 be the most powerful motive of all. And if that is a witness of virtuous counsels and virtuous
 actions throughout our whole lives, we shall live without any fear, and in the greatest honour. 
 If Titus Attius had known these things, or thought of
 them, certainly he would not have ventured to say what he did assert at great length, that a
 judge decides whatever he chooses, and ought not to be bound by the laws. But now concerning all
 these topics I think I have said too much, if judged by the inclination of Cluentius; little
 enough, if we love to the dignity of the republic; but quite enough with reference to your
 wisdom. There are a few topics remaining, which because they belonged to your investigation they
 thought ought to be considered and urged by them, that they might not be considered the most
 worthless of all men, as they would deserve to be if they brought nothing into the court but
 their own personal ill-feeling. 
 And that you may see that it is of necessity that I have urged the topics which I have now
 been mentioning, at considerable length, listen to what remains. You will then understand that
 all those points of the defence which could be stated in a few words, have been stated with the
 greatest brevity possible.