Although I should grant to you that it would be a scandalous thing, (and the
 fact I will examine into presently,) still you must inevitably grant to me that it is a much
 more scandalous thing that the laws should be departed from in that state which is entirely held
 together by the laws; for this is the bond of this dignity which we enjoy in the republic, this
 is the foundation of our liberty, this is the source of justice. The mind, and spirit, and
 wisdom, and intentions of the city are all situated in the laws. As our bodies cannot, if
 deprived of the mind, so the state, if deprived of law, cannot use its separate parts, which are
 to it as its sinews, its blood, and its limbs. The ministers of the law are the magistrates; the
 interpreters of the law are the judges; lastly, we are all servants of the laws, for the very
 purpose of being able to be freemen. What is the reason, O Naso , why you sit in that place? What is the power by which those judges, invested with such dignity, are
 separated from you? And you too, O judges, how is it that out of such a multitude of citizens,
 you with your small numbers decide on the fortunes of man? By what right is it that Attius said
 whatever he chose? Why have I had an opportunity of speaking at such length? What is the meaning
 of all these secretaries and lictors, and all the rest of those whom I see assisting at this
 investigation? I think that all these things take place according to law, and that the whole of
 this trial is conducted and governed (as I said before) by the mind, as it were, of the law.
 What, then, shall we say? Is this the only investigation that is so conducted? What became of
 the question of classing Marcus Plaetorius and Caius Flaminius as assassins? What became of the
 charge of peculation brought against Caius Orchinius? or of my oration, when prosecuting a
 charge of embezzlement? or of the speech of Caius Aquillius, before whom a case of bribery is at
 this moment being tried? or of all the other investigations that are habitually taking place?
 Survey all the different parts of the republic; you will see that everything takes place under
 the general dominion, and according to the special enactment of the laws. If anyone, O Titus Attius, were to wish to prosecute you before me as judge,
 you would cry out that you were not liable under the law about extortion. Nor would this
 demurrer of yours be any confession that you had appropriated the money illegally; but it would
 be merely a refusal to encounter a labour and a danger which you were not obliged to encounter
 by the law. 
 Now see what is being done, and what law is laid down by you. The law, according to the
 provisions of which this investigation has been instituted, orders the judge who presides over
 the investigation, that is to say, Quintus Voconius, with the other judges, who are his
 colleagues, (it means you, O judges,) to make inquiry concerning the fact of poisoning. To make
 inquiry with respect to whom? The subject is interminable. “Whoever has made it, or sold it, or
 bought it, or had it in his possession, or administered it.” What does the same law subjoin
 immediately afterwards? Read—“And bring him to a capital trial.” Whom? He who has conspired? he
 who has agreed? Not so. What, then, is meant? Tell me. “Whoever is a military tribune of the
 four first legions, or a quaestor, or a tribune of the people.” Then all the magistrates are
 named. “Or who has delivered or shall deliver his opinion in the senate?” What then? “If any one
 of them has agreed, or shall agree, has conspired, or shall conspire, to get any one condemned
 in a criminal trial.” “Any one of them:” Of whom? Of those, forsooth, who have been enumerated
 above. What does it signify in which way the law was framed? Although it is plain enough, yet
 the law itself shows its own meaning; for when it binds all the world, it uses this expression:
 “Whoever has committed or shall commit an act of poisoning.” All men and women, freemen and
 slaves, are brought under the power of the court. If, again, it had wished to include
 conspiracy, it would have added, “or who has conspired.” Now it runs, “And let any one who has
 conspired, or shall conspire, be brought to a capital trial, before one who has filled any
 magistracy, or who has delivered his opinion in the senate.” 
 Does that apply to Cluentius? Certainly not. Who, then, is Cluentius? He is a man who still does
 not wish to get off on a trial by any quibble of law. Well, then, I discard the law. I comply
 with Cluentius's wishes; still I will say a few things which are not connected with my client's
 case, by way of reply to you, O Attius. For there is something in this cause which Cluentius
 thinks concerns him; there is also something which I think concerns me. He thinks it is for his
 interest that his defence should rest on the facts and merits of the case, not on the letter of
 the law; but I think that it concerns me not to appear defeated by Attius in any discussion. For
 this is not the only cause that I have to plead; my labour is at the service of every one who
 can be content with my ability as their advocate. I do not wish any one of those who are present
 to think, if I remain silent, that I approve of what has been said by Attius respecting the law.
 Wherefore, O Cluentius, I am complying with your wishes in this your cause; and I do not read
 any law in this court, nor do I allege any law in your favour. But I will not omit those things
 which I think are expected from me. It seems to you, O Attius, to be a scandalous thing that every one should not be bound by the
 same laws. In the first place, (suppose I do grant to you that it is a most scandalous thing,)
 it is an evil of this sort, that it is a proof that we have need to have the laws altered, not
 that we are not to obey the laws while they are in existence. In the next place, what senator
 has ever made this complaint, that when, by the kindness of the Roman people, he had attained a
 higher rank, he did not think he ought by that promotion to be put under more severe conditions
 of law? How many advantages are there, which we are without; how many troubles and annoyances
 are there which we undergo.—And all these things are compensated by the advantages of honour and
 dignity. Now apply these same conditions of life to the equestrian order, and to the other ranks
 of the state. They will not endure them; for they think that fewer inconveniences of the laws,
 and of the courts of justice, ought to be allotted to them, who have either never been able to
 mount to the higher ranks of the state, or have never tried.