And so, in making his reply, he first of
 all explained the difference between the two times, so that the speech might appear to have
 arisen from the case and from its circumstances; after that, in order that Brutus might learn
 what a man, not only eloquent but endued with the greatest wit and facetiousness, he had
 provoked, he himself in his turn brought up three readers with a book a piece, all which books
 Marcus Brutus, the father of the prosecutor, had left, on the civil law. When the first lines of
 them were read, those which I take to be known to all of you, “It happened by chance that I and
 Brutus my son were in the country near Privernum ,” he asked what had become of his farm at Privernum . “I and Brutus my son were in the district of
 Alba.” He begged to know where his Alban farm was.
 “Once, when I and Brutus my son had sat down in the fields near Tibur .” Where was his farm near Tibur ?
 And he said that “Brutus, a wise man, seeing the profligacy of his son, evidently wished to
 leave a record behind him of what farms he left him. And if he could with any decency have
 written that he had been in the bath with a son of that age, he would not have passed it over;
 and still that he preferred inquiring about those baths, not from the books of his father, but
 from the registers and the census.” Crassus then chastised Brutus in this manner, and made him
 repent of his readings. For perhaps he had been annoyed at being reproved for those speeches
 which he had delivered in the affairs of the republic; in which perhaps deliberate wisdom is
 more required than in those in court. But I am not at all
 vexed at those things having been read. For they were not unsuited to the state of the times
 which then existed, nor to the cause in which they were spoken. Nor did I take any obligation on
 myself when I spoke them, to prevent my defending this cause with honour and freedom. But
 suppose I were now to confess, that I had now become acquainted with the real merits of
 Cluentius's case, but that I was previously influenced by popular opinion concerning it, who
 could blame me especially when, O judges, it is most reasonable that this also should be granted
 me by you, which I begged at the beginning, and which I request now, that if you have brought
 with you into court a somewhat unfavourable opinion of this cause, you will lay it aside now
 that you have thoroughly investigated the case and learnt the whole truth. Now since, O Titus Attius, I replied to everything which was said by you concerning the
 condemnation of Oppianicus, you must inevitably confess that you were very much deceived when
 you thought that I would defend the cause of Aulus Cluentius, not by arguing on his own actions,
 but on the law. For you very often said that you had been informed that I intended to defend
 this action, relying on the protection of the law. Is it so? Are we, then, without knowing it,
 betrayed by our friends? and is there some one among those whom we think our friends, who
 carries intelligence of our plans to our adversaries? Who reported this to you? Who was so
 dishonest? But to whom did I tell it? No one I imagine, is in fault; but in truth it was the law
 itself which suggested this to you. But do I appear to have defended it in such a way as to have
 made throughout the whole case the least mention of the law? Do I appear to have defended this
 cause differently from the way in which I should have defended it if Habitus had been guilty by
 law, supposing the facts to be proved? Certainly, as far as a man may assert a thing positively,
 I have omitted no opportunity of clearing him from the odious imputation sought to be cast on
 him. What do I mean, then? Some one will ask, perhaps,
 whether I have any objection to ward off danger from a client's life by the protection with
 which the law supplies me? I have no objection at all, O judges; but I adhere to my own plan of
 action. In a trial in which all honourable and a wise man is concerned, I have been accustomed,
 not only to consult my own judgment, but very much also to be guided by the judgment and
 inclination of him whom I am defending. For when this cause was brought to me, as to a person
 who ought to know the laws on which we are employed, and to which we devote ourselves, I said at
 once to Habitus that he was perfectly safe from the law about “those who conspired together to
 procure a man's condemnation;” but that our order was liable to be impeached under that law. And
 he began to beg and entreat me not to defend him by urging points of law. And when I said what I
 thought, he brought me over to his opinion; for he affirmed with tears that he was not more
 desirous of retaining his freedom as a citizen, than of preserving his character. I complied with his wishes, and yet I did it (for it is not a thing
 which we ought to do at all times) because I saw that the cause itself could be amply defended
 on its own merits, without any reference to law at all. I saw that in this defence, which I now
 have employed, there was more dignity, but that in that one which he begged me not to use, there
 would be less trouble. But if I had no other object in view beyond merely gaining this cause, I
 should have read the laws to you, and then have summed up. 
 Nor am I moved by that argument which Attius uses when he says that it is a scandalous thing
 that, if a senator should procure a wrongful conviction of any one, he should be made liable to
 the laws, but that if a Roman knight does the same, he should not.