This conciliation of good-will was laughed at,
 and so was this assumption of the character of a good man, as in the gilded statues which he
 erected in front of the temple of Juturna, at the bottom of which he had the following
 inscription engraved,—“that the kings had been restored by him to the favour of the people.” All
 his frauds and dishonest tricks were brought under discussion; his whole life, which has been
 spent in such a way as that, was laid open; his domestic poverty, the profits which he made in
 the courts of law, were all brought to light: an interpreter of peace and concord who regulated
 everything by the bribes which he received was not approved of. Therefore, Stalenus was
 condemned at that time, while he urged the same defence as Attius did. When the Cominii did the same thing that I have done throughout the whole of
 this cause, people approved of them. Wherefore, if by the condemnation of Stalenus it was
 decided that Oppianicus had desired to corrupt the judges,—that Oppianicus had given one of the
 judges money to purchase the votes of the other judges, (since it has been already settled that
 either Cluentius is guilty of that offence, or else Oppianicus, but that no trace whatever is
 found of any money belonging to Cluentius having been ever given to any judge, while money
 belonging to Oppianicus was taken away, after the trial was over, from a judge,)—can it be
 doubtful that that conviction of Stalenus does not only not make against Cluentius, but is the
 greatest possible confirmation of our cause and of our defence? Therefore, I see now that the case respecting the decision of
 Junius is of this nature, that I think it ought to be
 called an inroad of sedition, an instance of the violence of the multitude, an outrage on the
 part of a tribune, any thing rather than a judicial proceeding. But if any one calls that a
 regular trial, still he must inevitably admit this,—that that penalty which was sought to be
 recovered from Junius cannot by any means be connected
 with the cause of Cluentius. That decision of the tribunal over which
 Junius presided, was brought about by evidence. The
 cases of Bulbus, of Popillius, and of Gutta, do not make against Cluentius. That of Stalenus is
 actually in favour of Cluentius. Let us now see if there is any other decision which we can
 produce which is favourable to Cluentius. 
 Was not Caius Fidiculanius Falcula, who had condemned Oppianicus, prosecuted especially
 because—and that was the point which in that trial was the hardest to excuse—he had sat as judge
 a few days after the appointment of a substitute? He was, indeed, prosecuted, and that twice.
 For Lucius Quinctius had brought him into extreme unpopularity by means of daily seditious and
 turbulent assemblies. On one trial a penalty was sought to be recovered from him, as from
 Junius , because he had sat as judge, not in his own
 decury, nor according to the law. He was prosecuted at a rather more peaceable time than
 Junius , but under almost the same law, and on very
 nearly the same indictment. But because at the trial shore was no sedition, no violence, and no
 crowd, he was easily acquitted at the first hearing. I do not count this acquittal. The passage which follows in the text is given up by Orellius altogether
 corrupt, and is wholly unintelligible as it stands at present. Weiske thinks that several words
 have dropped out. What was Fidiculanius said to have done? To have received
 from Cluentius four hundred sesterces. Of what rank was he? A senator. He was accused according
 to that law by which an account is properly demanded of a senator in a prosecution for
 peculation, and he was most honourably acquitted. For the cause was pleaded according to the
 custom of our ancestors, without violence, without fear, without danger. Everything was fairly
 stated, and explained, and proved. The judges were taught that not only could a defendant be
 honestly condemned by a man who had not sat as a judge uninterruptedly, but that if that judge
 had known nothing else except what previous investigations it was clear had taken place in the
 case, he ought to have heard nothing else. Then, also, those five judges, who, hunting for the vague rumours of ignorant men, acquitted
 him at the time, were unwilling that their clemency should be extravagantly praised; and if any
 one asked them whether they had sat as judges on Caius Fabricius, they said that they had, if
 they were asked whether he had been accused of any crime except of that poison which was said to
 have been endeavoured to be administered to Habitus, they said no; if, after that, they were
 asked what their decision had been, they said that they had condemned him. For no one acquitted
 him. In the same manner, if any question had been asked about Scamander, they would certainly
 have given the same answer, although he was acquitted by one vote; but at that time no one of
 those men would have liked that one vote to be called his.