Men are driven away in two ways, either without the employment of men collected together and armed, or by means of them, and by violence. There are two separate interdicts for two dissimilar cases. In the first and formal kind of violence, it is not enough for a man to be able to prove that he was driven away, unless he is also able to show that he was driven away when he was in possession. And even that is not enough, unless he can show that he was in possession, having become so neither by violence, nor by underhand practices, nor by having begged the property. Therefore, he who said that he had replaced him is often accustomed to avow loudly that he drove him away by violence; but he adds this, “He was not in possession.” Or again, when he has admitted even this, still he gains his cause if he can prove that the man had obtained possession from him either by violence, or by underhand practices, or by begging for it.

Do you not perceive how many defensive pleas our ancestors allowed a man to be able to employ who had done this violence without arms and without a multitude? But as for the man who, neglecting right, and duty, and proper customs, has betaken himself to the sword, to arms, and to murder, him you see naked and defenceless in the cause; so that the man who has contended in arms for the possession, must clearly contend unarmed in the court of justice. Is there, then, any real difference, O Piso, between these interdicts? Does it make any difference whether the words “As Aulus Caecina was in possession” be added, or not? Does the consideration of right,—does the dissimilarity of the interdicts,—does the authority of your ancestors, at all influence you? If the addition had been made, inquiry must have been made as to this point. The addition has not been made. Must that inquiry still be instituted?

And in this particular I do not defend Caecina. For, O judges, Caecina was in possession; and although it is foreign to this cause, still I will briefly touch upon this point, to make you as desirous to protect the man himself, as the common rights of all men. You do not deny that Caesennia had a life interest in the farm. As the same farmer who rented it of Caesennia continued to hold it on the same tenure, is there any doubt, that if Caesennia was the owner while the farmer was tenant of the farm, so after her death her heir was the owner by the same right? Afterwards Caecina, when he was going the round of his estates, came to that farm. He received his accounts from the farmer. There is evidence to that point.

After that, why, O. Aebutius, did you give notice to Caecina to give up that farm, rather than some others, if you could find any other, unless Caecina was in possession of it? Moreover, why did Caecina consent to be ejected in a regular and formal manner? and why did he make you the answer he did by the advice of his friends, and of Caius Aquillius himself? Oh, but Sulla passed a law. Without wasting time in making any complaints about that time, and about the disasters of the republic, I make you this answer,—that Sulla also added to that same law, “that if anything were enacted in this statute contrary to law, to that extent this statute was to have no validity.” What is there which is contrary to law which the Roman people is unable to command or to prohibit? Not to digress too far, this very additional clause proves that there is something. For unless there were, this would not be appended to all statutes.