Yes, and when there is a trial about arms, then urge
 all these arguments; but when there is a trial about law and justice, do not take shelter in
 such tame and meager evasions. For you will not find any judge or recuperator who will decide on
 a man's being armed as if it were his duty to inspect the arms of a trooper; but it will have
 just the same weight in his mind as if they were most completely armed, if they are found to
 have been equipped in such a manner as to be able to do violence to life or limb. And, that you may more clearly understand of how small value words are,—if you by yourself, or
 if any one person had made an onset on me with shield and sword, and I had been driven away by
 these means, would you venture to say that the interdict spoke of armed men, but that in this
 case there had only been one armed man? I do not believe you would be so impudent. And yet see
 if you are not far more impudent now. For then, indeed, you might implore the assistance of all
 men, because men, in deciding on your case, were forgetting the native language; because unarmed
 men were being decided to be armed; because though an interdict had been framed expressly about
 many men, the deed had been done by one man only—one man was being decided to be many men.
 But in causes like this words are not brought before the
 court, but that fact on account of which these words have been introduced into the interdict.
 Our legislators intended that restitution should be made, without exception, in every case in
 which violence had been offered, threatening life or limb. That generally takes place by the
 agency of men collected together and armed; but though the operation be different, still, if the
 danger is the same, the case is the same; and then they intended that the law should be the
 same. For the injury is not greater if inflicted by your household than if inflicted by your
 steward; nor if it was your own slaves who wrought it, is it greater than if the slaves of
 others, or people hired on purpose, had done so. It is no worse if your agent did it, than if
 your neighbor or your freedman was the person; nor if it was the work of men collected together
 on purpose, than if it was the deed of men who offered themselves voluntarily, or of your
 regular day-labourers. It is not a more serious injury if inflicted by armed men, than by
 unarmed men who had as much power to injure as if they had been armed; nor if it were caused by
 many, than if it were the work of one single armed man. For the facts are in an interdict
 expressed by the circumstances under which violence usually takes place. If the same violence
 has been committed under other circumstances, although it may not be comprehended in the strict
 language of the interdict, it still comes under the meaning and intention, and authority of the
 law. I now come to that argument of yours, “I did not drive him away, if I never allowed him to
 approach.” I think that you yourself, O Piso , perceive
 how much narrower and how much more unreasonable that defence is, than if you were even to
 employ that other one, “They were not armed,— they had only bludgeons and stones.” If, in truth,
 the option were given to me, who do not profess to be a very fluent speaker, which argument I
 would prefer advancing in defence, either that a man had not been driven away who had been met
 on his entrance with violence and arms, or, that those men were not armed, who had neither
 swords nor shields; as far as proving my case goes, I should consider both the positions equally
 trifling and worthless; but as for making a speech about them, I think that I might find some
 arguments to make it appear that those men were not armed who had no shield nor any description
 of iron weapon; but I should be wholly at a loss if I had to maintain that a man who had been
 repulsed and put to flight had not been driven away. And in
 the whole of your defence, that appeared to me the most marvellous thing, that you said there
 was no necessity for being guided by the authority of lawyers. And although this is not the
 first time that, nor this the only cause in which, I have heard it, still, I did wonder
 exceedingly why it was said by you. For other men have recourse to this sort of exhortation when
 they think they have in their case some reasonable and good point which they are defending. If
 people are arguing against them relying on the letter and exact words, and (as people say) on
 the strict law, they are in the habit of opposing to injustice of that sort the name and dignity
 of virtue and justice. Then they laugh at that expression,—“if, or if not.” Then they seek to
 bring all word-catching, all traps and snares made up of the strict letter of the law, into
 odium. Then they say loudly that the case ought to be decided by considerations of what is
 honest and just, and not of cunning and tricky law; that to adhere to the mere text is the part
 of a false accuser, but that it is the duty of a good judge to uphold the intention and
 authority of him who framed the law.