<TEI xmlns="http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0" xmlns:py="http://codespeak.net/lxml/objectify/pytype" py:pytype="TREE"><text xml:lang="eng"><body><div type="translation" xml:lang="eng" n="urn:cts:latinLit:phi0474.phi008.perseus-eng2" subtype="translation"><div type="textpart" subtype="section" n="51" resp="perseus"><p> Is
    this doubtful, that there is not such an abundance of words,—I will not say in our language,
    which is confessedly poor, but not in any other language either,—as to enable every imaginable
    thing and circumstance to be expressed by its own fixed end appropriate name? Is it doubtful
    that we have no need of words when the matter, for the sake of which words were first invented,
    is thoroughly understood? What law, what resolution of the senate, what edict of a magistrate,
    what treaty, or covenant, (to return to men's private affairs,) what will, what judicial
    decision, what bond, what formula of bargain or agreement cannot be invalidated and torn to
    pieces, if we choose to bend facts to words, and leave out of the question the intention, and
    design, and authority of those who wrote them? </p></div><div type="textpart" subtype="section" n="52" resp="perseus"><p> In truth, even
    our familiar and daily discourse will cease to have any coherence, if we are to spend all our
    time in word catching. Lastly, there will be no such thing at all as any domestic rule, if we
    grant this to our slaves, that they are to obey the letter of our commands, and not attend to
    what may be gathered from the spirit of our expressions. Must I produce instances of all these
    things? Do not different examples in each separate glass occur to every one of you, which may be
    a proof that right does not depend only on the strict words of the law, but that words are meant
    to be subservient to the intentions and purposes of men? </p></div><div type="textpart" subtype="section" n="53" resp="perseus"><p> In a
    most elegant and fluent manner did Lucius Crassus, by far the most eloquent of all men, a little
    before we came into the forum, defend this opinion in a trial before the <foreign xml:lang="lat">centumviri</foreign>; <note anchored="true">The origin, constitution, and powers of the
      <foreign xml:lang="lat">centumviri</foreign> are exceedingly obscure; they were judges, but
     they differed from other judges in being a definite body or <foreign xml:lang="lat">collegium</foreign>. According to Festus three <foreign xml:lang="lat">centumviri</foreign>
     were chosen out of each tribe, so that their actual number must have been a hundred and five.
     Their powers were probably limited to <placeName key="perseus,Rome">Rome</placeName>, and at
     all events to <placeName key="tgn,1000080">Italy</placeName>. It appears that they had
     cognisance of both civil and criminal matters. It was the practice to set up a spear in the
     place where the <foreign xml:lang="lat">centumviri</foreign> were sitting, and accordingly the
     word <foreign xml:lang="lat">hasta</foreign> or <foreign xml:lang="lat">hasta
      centumviralis</foreign>, is sometimes used as equivalent to <foreign xml:lang="lat">judicium
      centumvirale</foreign>. <foreign xml:lang="lat">Vide </foreign>Smith, Dict. Ant. p. 212, v.
      <foreign xml:lang="lat">Centumviri</foreign>.</note>and with great ease, too, though that very
    sagacious man, Quintus Mucius, was arguing against him, did he prove to every one that Marcus
    Curius, who had been left a certain person's heir in the case of the death of a posthumous son
    who was expected, ought to be the heir, though the son was not dead, never, in fact, having been
    born. What? was this case sufficiently provided for by the terms of the will? Certainly not.
    What was the thing, then, that influenced the judges? The intention; and if it could be
    understood though we were silent, we should not employ words at all: because it could not, words
    have been invented, not to hinder people's intentions, but to point them out. </p></div><milestone n="19" unit="chapter" resp="yonge"/><div type="textpart" subtype="section" n="54" resp="perseus"><p><milestone unit="para"/>The law commands the property in land to be determined by two years' possession. But we adopt
    the same principle also in the case of houses, which are not mentioned at all in the law. If a
    road is not properly made, the law allows a man to drive a beast of burden wherever he likes.
    Can it be understood from this, that if a road in the Bruttii be out of repair, a man may, if he
    pleases, drive his beast through the Tusculan farm of Marcus Scaurus? There is a right of action
    against a vendor who is present, according to this formula, “Since I behold you before the
    court.” . . . Now the blind Appius could never have availed himself of this form of action, if
    men adhered to words with such strictness as not to consider the matter for the sake of which
    the words are used. If a person's heir had been stated in his will to be the minor Cornelius,
    and if Cornelius were twenty years old, according to your interpretation he would lose his
    inheritance. </p></div><div type="textpart" subtype="section" n="55" resp="perseus"><p> Many such cases occur to me at present, and
    still more to you, I am quite sure. But not to dwell on too many such points, and not to wander
    too far from where we set out, let us consider this very interdict which is now before the
    court; for by that very document you will understand, that if we determine that the law depends
    on its precise words, we shall lose all the advantage of this interdict, while we wish to be
    very acute and clever. “Whence you, or your household, or your agent . . . ” Suppose your
    steward by himself had driven me away, your household would not, as I suppose, have driven me
    away, but only a member of your household. Would you then have a right to say that you had made
    the necessary restitution? No doubt; for what can be more easy than to prove to all those who
    understood the Latin language, that the name of a household does not apply to one single slave?
    But suppose you have not even one slave besides the one who drove me away; then you would cry
    out, “If I have a household, I will admit that you were driven away by my household.” Nor is
    there any doubt, that, if we are influenced in our decisions by the mere letter of the law, and
    not by the facts, we must understand a household to consist of many slaves, and we must admit
    that one slave is not a household. </p></div></div></body></text></TEI>