Did you not, O judges, believe these witnesses when you considered the
 case not proved? But there was no question that they were speaking the truth. When there was a
 multitude collected together, and arms, and weapons, and instant fear of death, and visible
 danger of murder, was it doubtful to you whether there seemed to have been any violence
 committed, or not? In what circumstances can violence be possibly understood to exist, if it
 does not exist in these? Or did that defence of his seem to you a very sufficient one, “I did
 not drive you out, I opposed your entrance; I did not suffer you to come on the farm at all, but
 I opposed armed men to you, in order that you might understand that, if you set your foot on the
 farm, you would immediately perish?” What do you say? Does not the man who was terrified and put
 to flight, and driven away by force of arms, appear to have been turned out? We will examine hereafter into the appropriate expression; at present let us
 prove the fact, which they do not deny, and let us inquire into the law of the case, and the
 proper method of proceeding by law under such circumstances.
 This fact is proved, which is not denied by the opposite party,—that Caecina, when he had come
 on the appointed day, and at the appointed time, in order that a formal and regular ejectment
 might take place, was driven away and prevented from entering by open violence, by men
 collected: together in arms. As this is proved, I, a man unskilled in law, ignorant of matters
 of business and of law-suits, think that I can proceed in this way, that I can obtain my rights
 and prosecute you for the injury I have sustained, by means of the interdict which I have
 obtained. Suppose that I am mistaken in this, and that I cannot possibly obtain what I wish by
 means of this interdict. In this affair I wish to take you for my master. I ask whether there is any legal proceeding open to me in this ease, or
 whether there is not. It is not right for men to be summoned together on account of a dispute
 about possession; it is not right for a multitude to be armed for the sake of preserving a
 right; nor is there anything so contrary to law as violence; nor is there anything so
 irreconcilable with justice as men collected together and armed. 
 And as the law is such, and the circumstances of the case such, that it appears above all
 others worthy of being brought under the notice of the magistrates, I ask again whether there is
 any legal proceeding open to me in this case, or whether there is not. Will you say that there
 is not? I wish to hear. Is a man, who in time of peace and tranquillity has collected a band,
 prepared his forces, got together a great number of men, armed them, equipped them,—who has
 repelled, put to flight and driven off, by arms, and armed men, and terror, and danger of death,
 unarmed men who had come at a time agreed upon to go through an ordinary legal form;—is such a
 man to say: “Yes, indeed, I have done everything which you
 say; and my conduct was turbulent, and rash, and hazardous. What then; I did it all with
 impunity; for you have no means of proceeding against me by civil action before the praetor?” Is
 it so, O judges? Will you listen to this? and will you permit such a thing to be said before you
 more than once? When our ancestors were men of such diligence and prudence as to establish every
 requisite law, not only for such important cases as this, but for even the most trivial matters,
 and to prosecute all offences against them, will you allow that they overlooked this class of
 cases, the most important of all; so that, if people had compelled me to depart from my home by
 force of arms, I should have had a right of action, but as they only prevented me from entering
 my home, I have none? I am not yet arguing the particular case of Caecina, I am not yet speaking
 of our own particular right of possession. I am resting my complaint wholly on your defence, O
 Caius Piso. Since you make this statement, and lay down this
 principle, “that, if Caecina, when he was actually in his farm, had been driven from it, then it
 would have been right for him to be restored by means of this interdict; but now he can by no
 means be said to have been from a place where he has not been; and, therefore, we have gained
 nothing by this interdict;” I ask you, if, this day, when you are returning home, men collected
 in a body, and armed, not only prevent you from crossing the threshold and from coming under the
 roof of your own house, but keep you off from approaching it— from even entering the court
 yard,—what will you do? My friend Lucius Calpurnius reminds you to say the same thing that he
 said before, namely that you would bring an action for the injury. But what has this to do with
 possession? What has this to do with restoring a man who ought to be restored? or with the civil
 law? I will grant you even more. I will allow you not only to bring your
 action, but also to succeed in it. Will you be any the more in possession of your property for
 that? For an action for injury done does not carry with it, even if successful, any right of
 possession; but merely makes up to a man for the loss he sustains through the diminution of his
 liberty, by the trial and penalty imposed upon the offender.