If shameless impudence had as much power in the forum and in the courts of law, as audacity
 has in the country and in desolate places, then Aulus Caecina would now, in this trial, yield to
 the impudence of Sextus Aebutius as much as he has already yielded to his audacity in committing
 deeds of violence. But he thought that it became a considerate man not to contend in arms about
 a matter which ought to be decided by law; and he thought that it became an honest man, to
 defeat by law and judicial proceedings the man with whom he had declined contending in arms and
 violence. And Aebutius appears to me to have been most
 especially audacious in assembling and arming men, and most especially impudent in his legal
 measures. Not only in that he has dared to come before the court, (for that, although it is a
 scandalous thing to do in a clear case, still is an ordinary course for wicked and artful men to
 adopt,) but because he has not hesitated to avow the very act which he is accused of; unless,
 perhaps, his idea was this,—if ordinary The usual course on claiming
 possession of disputed property was for the claimant to present himself with his friends in the
 land, and then to be driven off by the occupant. This violence was vis
 moribus facta . On this the claimant appealed to the praetor. But Aebutius had driven
 Caecina off with armed men, and had used unnecessary and actual violence. This was vis contra jus moremque. violence according to precedent had
 been used, he would not have had any superior right of possession; but as the violence was
 committed in a way contrary to all law and precedent, Aulus Caecina fled in alarm with his
 friends. And so in this count, if he defends his cause according to the custom and established
 principles of all men, he thinks that we shall not be his inferiors in managing our case; but if
 he departs from all usage, the more impudently he conducts himself, the more likely to succeed
 shall he be: as if dishonesty had as much influence in a court of justice as confidence in a
 scene of violence, or as if we had not yielded at that time the more willingly to his audacity,
 in order now with the greater ease to resist his impudence. 
 Therefore, O judges, I come now to plead the cause in this trial on a very different plan from
 the one I adopted at first. For then the hope of our cause depended on the arguments I could use
 in our defence; now it rests on the confession of our adversary;—then I relied on our witnesses;
 now I rely on theirs. And about them I was formerly anxious, lest, if they were wicked men, they
 should speak falsely,—lest, if they were thought honest men, they should establish their case;
 now I am very much at ease on the subject. For, if they are good men, they assist me by saying
 that on their oaths, which I, not being on my oath, am urging in accusation. But if they are not
 so respectable, they do me no injury, since, if they are believed, then the very facts which we
 urge in accusation are believed; and if credit be not given to them, then credit is refused to
 the witnesses of our adversary. But when I consider the way in which they are conducting their case, I do not see what more
 impudent thing can be said; when I consider your hesitation in airing your decision, I am afraid
 that what they seem to have been doing shamelessly, may have been done cunningly and wisely; for
 if they had denied that violence had been committed by armed men, they would easily have been
 convicted in a plain case by most unimpeachable witnesses: if they had confessed it, and
 defended a deed which can never be rightfully done, as having been done by them at that time
 legally, they hoped— what, indeed, they gained—that they should give you cause to deliberate,
 and inspire you with proper hesitation and scrupulousness in deciding: and also, though that is
 a most scandalous thing, they thought that the trial in this case would appear to be not about
 the dishonesty of Sextus Aebutius, but about the civil law. 
 And in this case, if I had to plead the cause of Aulus Caecina alone, I should profess myself a
 sufficiently capable defender of it, because I had behaved with the greatest good faith and
 diligence; and when these qualities are found in an advocate, there is no reason, especially in
 a plain and simple matter, for requiring any extraordinary ability. But as I have now to speak
 of those rights which concern all men,—which were established by our ancestors, and have been
 preserved to this time; while, if they were taken away, not only would some part of our rights
 be diminished, but also that violence, which is the greatest enemy to law, would seem to be
 strengthened by that decision,—I see that the cause is one requiring the greatest abilities, not
 in order to demonstrate what is before men's eyes, but to prevent (if any mistake is made by you
 in so important a matter) every one from thinking that I have been wanting to the cause, rather
 than that you have to your religious obligations.