If this were the only case, (it would be well, indeed, if it were,) but if it
 were, the only case, still you, O judges, being such as you are, ought to be unwilling that an
 affair of the greatest importance, affecting not only the welfare of the entire republic but
 also the fortunes of individuals—that a most dignified tribunal, one established
 with the greatest deliberation, and for the weightiest reasons, should appear to be put an end
 to by you. But this is not the only thing at stake. the decision in this
 case is waited for with so much anxiety as shows that it is expected to rule not one case
 only, but all cases. 
					 Shall I say that violence was done by the household of Publius Fabius? Our adversaries do
 not deny it. That damage was done to Marcus Tullius? You grant that—I have carried
 one point. That this violence was done by armed men? You do not deny that—I have
 carried a second point. You deny that it was done with malice; on this point we join issue.
 Nor, indeed, do I see any need of looking for arguments by which that
 trivial and insignificant defence of his may be refuted and done away with.
 
 And yet I must speak to the statements which Quinctius has
 made; not that they have anything to do with the matter, but that it may not be thought that
 anything has been granted by me, merely because it has been overlooked. 
 You say that inquiry ought to be instituted whether the men of Marcus Tullius were slain
 wrongfully or no. This is the first inquiry that I make about the matter,—whether
 that matter has come before the court or not. If it has not come, why then need we say
 anything about it, or why need they ask any questions about it? But if it has, what was your
 object in making such a long speech to the praetor, to beg him to add to the formula the word
 “wrongfully,” and because you had not succeeded, to appeal to the tribunes
 of the people, and here before the court to complain of the injustice of the praetor because
 he did not add the word “wrongfully.” When you were requesting this of the praetor,—when you were appealing to the
 tribunes, you said that you ought to have an opportunity given to you of persuading the
 judges, if you could, that damage had not been done to Marcus Tullius wrongfully. Though,
 therefore, you wish that to be added to the formula of the trial, in order to be allowed to
 speak to that point before the judges; though it was not added, do you nevertheless speak to
 it as if you had gained the very thing which was refused to you? 
			But the same words which Metellus used in making his decree, the others, whom you appealed
 to, likewise used. Was not this the language of them all,—that although that which a
 household was said to have done by means of men armed and collected in a violent manner, could
 not possibly be done rightly, still they would add nothing, And they ware right, O judges. For
 if, when there is a refuge open to them, still slaves commit these wickednesses with the
 greatest audacity, and masters avow them with the greatest shamelessness, what do you think
 would be the case if the praetor were to decide that it is possible that such murders should
 be committed lawfully? Does it make any difference whether the magistrates establish a defence
 for a crime, or give people power and liberty to commit crime?