But those words “with malice” are added
 in this form of procedure with reference to the man who does the deed, not to him to whom it
 is done. And that you may understand this, O judges, attend, I beg of you, carefully. And, in
 truth, you will not doubt that this is the case. 
					 If the trial were assigned to proceed on this ground, that the fact to be proved was,
 “That it had been done by the household,” then if any household itself had
 been unwilling to appear personally in the slaughter, and had either compelled or hired the
 assistance of other men, whether slaves or free men, all this trial, and the severe justice of
 the praetor, would be at an end. For no one can decide that, if the household were not present
 at a transaction, in that transaction the household itself committed damage with men armed, in
 a violent manner. Therefore, because that could be done, and done easily too, on that account
 it was not thought sufficient for investigation to be made as to what the household itself had
 done, but as to this point also, “What had been done by the malice of the
 household.” For when the household itself does
 anything, men being collected together and armed, in a violent manner, and inflicts damage on
 any one, that must be done by malice. But when it forms a plan to procure such a thing to be
 done, the household itself does not do it, but it is done by its malice. And so by the
 addition of the words “by malice” the cause of both plaintiff and
 defendant is made more comprehensive. For whichever point he can prove, whether that the
 household itself did him the damage, or that it was done by the contrivance and assistance of
 that household, he must gain his cause. 
 You see that the praetors in these last years have interposed between me and Marcus Claudius
 with the insertion of this clause,—“From which, O Marcus Tullius, Marcus
 Claudius, or his household, or his agent, was driven by violence.” find what follows
 is according to the formula in the terms in which the praetor's interdict ran, and in which
 the securities were drawn up. If I were to defend myself before a judge in this
 way,—to confess that I had driven men out by violence— to deny that there
 was malice in it,—who would listen to me? No one, I suppose; because, if I drove out
 Marcus Claudius by violence, I drove him out by malice; for malice is a necessary ingredient
 in violence; and it is sufficient for Claudius to prove either point,—either that he
 was driven out with violence by me myself, or that I contrived a plan to have him driven out
 with violence. More, therefore, is granted to Claudius when
 the interdict runs thus, “from which he was driven by violence, by my
 malice,” than if it had merely said, “whence he was driven by me by
 violence.” For, in this latter case, unless I had myself driven him out, I should
 gain my cause. In the former case, when the word “malice” is added,
 whether I had merely originated the design, or had myself driven him out, it is inevitable
 that it should be decided that he had been violently driven out by me with malice.