Of that the very words of the formula are a proof. What is the
 formula in a trial before a judge? Direct severe, and simple; “if it be plain
 that fifty thousand sesterces ought to be paid.”
 Unless he makes it plain that fifty thousand sesterces to a
 single farthing are due to him, he loses his cause. What is the formula in a cause
 brought before an arbiter? “That whatever is just and right shall be
 given.” But that man confesses that he is asking more than is owed to him, but
 that he will be satisfied and more than satisfied with what is given him by the arbiter.
 Therefore the one has confidence in his case, the other distrusts his. And as this is the case, I ask you why you made an agreement to abide
 by arbitration in a matter involving this sum, this very fifty thousand sesterces , and the credit of your own account-books? why you
 admitted an arbitrator in such a case to decide what it was right and proper should be
 paid to you; or secured to you by bond, if it so seemed good to him? Who was the
 arbitrator in this matter? I wish he were at Rome . He is at Rome . I wish he
 were in court. He is. I wish he were sitting as assessor to Caius 
 Piso . He is Caius Piso himself. Did you take the same
 man for both arbitrator, and judge? Did you permit to the same man unlimited liberty of
 varying his decision, and also limit him to the strictest formula of the bond? Who ever
 went before an arbitrator and got all that he demanded? No one; for he only got all that
 it was just should be given him. You have come before a judge for the very same sum for
 which you had recourse to an arbiter. Other men, when
 they see that their cause is failing before a judge, fly to an arbitrator. This man has
 dared to come from an arbiter to a judge, who when he admitted an arbitrator about this
 money, and about the credit due to his account-books, gave a plain indication that no
 money was owing to him. Already two-thirds of the cause are over. He admits that he has
 not set down the sum as due, and he does not venture to say that he has entered it as
 paid, since he does not produce his books. The only alternative remaining, is for him to
 assert that he had received a promise of it; for otherwise I do not see how he can
 possibly demand a definite sum of money. 
 Did you receive a promise of it? When? On what day? At what time? In whose presence? Who says that I made such a promise? No one. If I
 were to make an end of speaking here, I appear to have said enough to acquit myself as
 far as my good faith and diligence are at stake—to have said enough for the
 cause and dispute, enough for the formula and bond; I seem to have said enough to
 satisfy the judge why judgment ought to pass for Roscius. A definite sum of money has
 been demanded; security is given for a third part of it; this money must either have
 been given, or set down as paid, or promised. Fannius admits it was not given; the books
 of Fannius prove that it has not been set down as paid; the silence of witnesses proves
 that it was never promised. What do we want more?
 Because the defendant is a man to whom money has always seemed of no value, but
 character of the very highest, and the judge is a man whom we are no less anxious to
 have think well of us than to decide favourably for us, and the bar present is such,
 that on account of its extraordinary brilliancy we ought to feel almost as much respect
 for it as for another judge, we will speak as if every regular trial, every honorary
 arbitration, every domestic duty were included and comprehended in the present formula.
 That former oration was necessary, this shall be a voluntary one; the other was
 addressed to the judge, this is addressed to Caius Piso; that was on behalf of a
 defendant, this is on behalf of Roscius; the one was prepared to gain a victory, this
 one to preserve a good character.