I showed how many things ought to be
 done before a demand was made that the goods of a relation should be taken possession
 of; especially when he had at Rome his house,
 his wife, his children, and an agent who was equally an intimate friend of both. I
 proved that when he said the recognizances were forfeited, there were actually no
 recognizances at all; that on the day on which he says he gave him the promise, he was
 not even at Rome . I promised that I would make
 that plain by witnesses, who both must know the truth, and who had no reason for
 speaking falsely. I proved also that it was not possible that the goods should have been
 taken possession of according to the edict; because he was neither said to have kept out
 of the way for the purpose of fraud, nor to have left the country in banishment.
 The charge remains, that no one defended him at the
 trial. In opposition to which I argued that he was most abundantly defended, and that
 not by a man unconnected with him, nor by any slanderous or worthless person, but by a
 Roman knight, his own relation and intimate friend, whom Sextus Naevius himself had been
 accustomed previously to leave as his own agent. And that even if he did appeal to the
 tribunes, he was not on that account the less prepared to submit to a trial; and that
 Naevius had not had his rights wrested from him by the powerful interest of the agent;
 that on the other hand he was so much superior to us in interest that he now scarcely
 gives us the liberty of breathing. I asked what the reason was why the goods had not been sold, since they had been taken
 possession of according to the edict. Secondly, I asked this also, on what account not
 one of so many creditors either did the same thing then, why not one speaks against him
 now, but why they are all striving for Publius Quinctius? Especially when in such a
 trial the testimonies of creditors are thought exceedingly material. After that, I
 employed the testimony of the adversary, who lately entered as his partner the man who,
 according to the language of his present claim, Intentio was the technical legal term for the claim made by the
 plaintiff. he demonstrates was at that time not even in the number of living
 men. Then I mentioned that incredible rapidity, or rather audacity of his. I showed that
 it was inevitable, either that seven hundred miles had been run over in two days, or
 that Sextus Naevius had sent men to take possession many days before he demanded leave
 so to seize his goods. After that I recited the
 edict, which expressly forbade the owner to be driven off his by which it was plain that
 Naevius had not taken possession according to the edict, as he confessed that Quinctius
 had been driven off his farm by force. But I thoroughly proved that the goods had
 actually not been taken possession of, because such a seizure of goods is looked at not
 as to part but with respect to everything which can be seized or taken possession of. I
 said that he had a house at Rome which that
 fellow never even made an attempt on; that he had many slaves, of which he neither took
 possession of any, and did not even touch any; that there was one whom he attempted to
 touch; that he was forbidden to, and that he remained quiet. You know also that Sextus Naevius never came on to the private farms
 of Quinctius even in Gaul . Lastly I proved that
 the private servants of Quinctius were not all driven away from that very estate which
 he took possession of, having expelled his partner by force. From which, and from all
 the other sayings, and actions, and thoughts of Sextus Naevius, any one can understand
 that that fellow did nothing else, and is now doing nothing, but endeavouring by
 violence, by injustice, and by unfair means at this trial, to make the whole farm his
 own which belongs to both partners in common.