τοῦτο μὲν δὴ τοιοῦτον. οἷον δὲ αὐτῶν κἀκεῖνο, ὡς λίαν δύσερι καὶ ἀναίσχυντον* βουληθείς, φασι, γεγέννηκε τὸν υἱόν, ἢ μὴ βουλόμενος. εἶτα δεσμοῦσιν, ὡς οἴονται, ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἅμμασιν, οὐκ ἰσχυροῖς, ἁλλὰ καὶ λίαν σαθροῖς. εἰ μὲν γὰρ οὐ θέλων, φασί, τετυράννηται. καὶ τίς το ὁ τυραννήσας; καὶ πῶς ὁ τυραννηθεὶς θεός; εἰ δὲ θέλων, θελήσεως υἱὸς ὁ υἱός· πῶς οὖν ἐκ τοῦ πατρός; καὶ καινήν τινα μητέρα τὴν θέλησιν ἀντὶ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀναπλάττουσιν. ἓν μὲν οὖν τοῦτο χαρίεν αὐτῶν, ἂν τοῦτο λέγωσιν, ὅτι τοῦ πάθους ἀποστάντες ἐπὶ τὴν βούλησιν καταφεύγουσιν· οὐ γὰρ πάθος ἡ βούλησις. δεύτερον δὲ ἴδωμεν τὸ ἰσχυρὸν 3 εἴη] ην f 6 φασι] φησι df || 7 οιονται] οιον τε ’duo Colb.’ || 11 καινὴν] κενὴν ’Reg. Cypr.’ 1. ἐν ποταμῶ Psalm lxv (lxvi) 6. 4. τετήρηνται] ‘have been observed.’ 6. ’Did the Father beget the Son,’ asks the opponent, ‘by an act of will, or not? If not, He was tinder constraint, which is impossible; if so, then the Son owes His being not to the Father only, but also to the Father's will, zvhich thus becomes α kind of motherhood.’ This dilemma is met by a similar one with regard to the ’s οὗκ birth, and by another with regard to creation. Gr. then shews that ἃς a word is not the result of speaking, considered as α separate ajtd sub- stantive thing, but springs direct from the speaker, so the thing willed springs not from will in the abstract, but direct from him who wills. 8. σαθροῖς] Cp. i 3. 11. πῶς οὖν ἐκ τοῦ π.] It certainly seems a strangely captious argument. If it was ever seriously urged by the Eunomians, we must suppose that θέλων is not merely = ἑκών, but ’by willing’; i.e. it was the act of will which produced the Son. Then, as other faculties of the divine being are represented to us as hypostatic — notably the Λόγος — we are driven to suppose that this primary faculty, antecedent and necessary to the production of the Son, is hypostatic also. If that is the case, He does not owe His being solely to the Father, but partly also to the ’s Will, which is thus constituted a kind of mother in the Godhead. But Gr.'s subsequent words ἂν τοῦτο λέγωσιν suggest the doubt whether he did not himself invent this part of the argument for the Eunomians. 13. αὐτῶν] depends upon χαρίεν (av εἴη) by an idiom well known in colloquial English as well as in Greek; ‘it it will be delightful of them.’ 14. οὐ γὰρ πάθος ἢ β.] This is true; nevertheless it is difficult for the human mind to imagine an act of will which is not caused by something which would come under the description of a πάθος. αὐτῶν, ὅ τι λέγουσιν. ἄριστον δὲ αὐτοῖς συμπλακῆναι πρότερον ἐγγυτέρω. σὺ δὲ αὐτὸς ὁ λέγων εὐχερῶς ὅ τι ἃν ἐθέλῃς, ἐκ θέλοντος ὑπέστης τοῦ σοῦ πατρός, ἢ μὴ θέλοντος; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐξ οὐ θέλοντος, τετυράννηται. τῆς βίας· καὶ τίς ὁ τυραννήσας αὐτόν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὴν φύσιν ἐρεῖς· ἐκείνη γὰρ ἔχει καὶ τὸ σωφρονεῖν. εἰ δὲ θέλοντος, ἀπόλωλέ σοι δι’ ὀλίγας συλλαβὰς ὁ πατήρ. θελήματος γὰρ υἱός, ἁλλ’ οὐ πατρὸς ἀναπέφηνας. ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τὸν θεὸν μέτειμι καὶ τὰ κτίσματα, καὶ τὸ σὸν ἐρώτημα προσάγω τῇ σῇ σοφίᾳ. θέλων ὑπέστησε τὰ πάντα, ἢ βιασθείς; εἰ μὲν βιασθείς, κἀνταῦθα ἡ τυραννίς, καὶ ὁ τυραννήσας. εἰ δὲ βουλόμενος, ἐστέρηται τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τὰ κτίσματα, καὶ σὺ πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων, ὁ τοιούτους ἀνευρίσκων λογισμοὺς καὶ τοιαῦτα σοφιζόμενος. θελήσει γὰρ μέσῃ τοῦ κτίστου διατειχίζεται. ἁλλ’ ἕτερον, οἶμαι, θέλων ἐστὶ καὶ θέλησις, 2 αν] ἔαν b || 3 εθελης] θέλῃς def ΙΙ 7 θεληματος] θελήσεως def || 10 υπεστησε] + θεὸς bcd: + ο θεὸς ef || 14 θελησει] θέλησις b || om γὰρ b || 15 ἐστιν οἴμαι θέλων bdf 1. τὸ ἴσχ’. αὐτ’. ö τι λ] ‘what they consider their strong point? Δεύτερον δὲ corresponds to ἐν μέν. Before, however, entering upon this δεύτερον, which he does at ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τ. θ., Gr. thinks it best πρότερον) to grapple with his adversaries at closer quarters. This he does in the question σὺ δὲ αὐτός κτλ., which brings the argument home to them personally ἐγγυτέρω). 5. οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὴν φύσιν ἐρεῖς] ‘You will not say that he was compelled by nature. Nature admits equally of self-restraint.’ 10. ὑπέστησε] ‘gave them existence,’ ence? i.e. by creation. 12. ἐσηρηται τοῦ θ.κ. τὰ κτ] As, ace. to their supposed argument, the Son is deprived of the Father by the interposition of the Will from which He sprang, so is creation deprived of its Creator. His Will runs like a wall between it and Him. The Eunomian is the first to suffer the loss, because he invented it; that is poetical justice. 15. ἕτερον οἷμαι] Gr.'s argument is not very clear; because the Eunomians also had distinguished very sharply between the will and the person who wills, — so sharply that they said that the Son could not be the Son of one who willed to beget Him, but only of that will itself. But in so arguing they set up a new, though fictitious, identity. They converted the will itself into a personal agency. This is what Gr. combats. Will is one thing, and the person who wills is another. You might as well say that the thing begotten is the son of beget- ting, or trace the thing spoken to speaking instead of the speaker, as thus erect will into a substantive and independent force. γεννῶν καὶ γέννησις, λέγων καὶ λόγος, εἰ μὴ μεθύομεν. τὰ μὲν ὁ κινούμενος, τὰ δὲ οἷον ἡ κίνησις. οὔκουν θελήσεως τὸ θεληθέν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἕπεται πάντως· οὐδὲ τὸ γεννηθὲν γεννήσεως, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀκουσθὲν ἐκφωνήσεως, ἀλλὰ τοῦ θέλοντος, καὶ τοῦ γεννήσαντος, καὶ τοῦ λέγοντος. τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ πάντα ταῦτα, ᾧ γέννησίς ἐστιν ἴσως ἡ τοῦ γεννᾷν θέλησις, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν μέσον, εἴ γε καὶ τοῦτο δεξώμεθα ὅλως, ἀλλὰ μὴ καὶ θελήσεως κρείττων ἢ γέννησις.