<TEI xmlns="http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0" xmlns:py="http://codespeak.net/lxml/objectify/pytype" py:pytype="TREE"><text><body><div type="edition" n="urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2022.tlg009.1st1K-grc1" xml:lang="grc"><div type="textpart" subtype="chapter" n="6"><p>τοῦτο μὲν δὴ τοιοῦτον. οἷον δὲ αὐτῶν κἀκεῖνο, ὡς
λίαν δύσερι καὶ ἀναίσχυντον* βουληθείς, φασι, γεγέννηκε
τὸν υἱόν, ἢ μὴ βουλόμενος. εἶτα δεσμοῦσιν, ὡς οἴονται,
ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἅμμασιν, οὐκ ἰσχυροῖς, ἁλλὰ καὶ λίαν σαθροῖς.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ οὐ θέλων, φασί, τετυράννηται. καὶ τίς
το ὁ τυραννήσας; καὶ πῶς ὁ τυραννηθεὶς θεός; εἰ δὲ θέλων,
θελήσεως υἱὸς ὁ υἱός· πῶς οὖν ἐκ τοῦ πατρός; καὶ καινήν
τινα μητέρα τὴν θέλησιν ἀντὶ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀναπλάττουσιν.
ἓν μὲν οὖν τοῦτο χαρίεν αὐτῶν, ἂν τοῦτο λέγωσιν, ὅτι τοῦ
πάθους ἀποστάντες ἐπὶ τὴν βούλησιν καταφεύγουσιν· οὐ
<lb n="15"/> γὰρ πάθος ἡ βούλησις. δεύτερον δὲ ἴδωμεν τὸ ἰσχυρὸν
<note type="footnote">3 εἴη] ην f 6 φασι] φησι df || 7 οιονται] οιον τε ’duo Colb.’ ||
11 καινὴν] κενὴν ’Reg. Cypr.’</note>
<note type="footnote">1. ἐν ποταμῶ Psalm lxv (lxvi)
6.</note>
<note type="footnote">4. τετήρηνται] ‘have been observed.’</note>
<note type="footnote">6. ’Did the Father beget the
Son,’ asks the opponent, ‘by an act
of will, or not? If not, He was
tinder constraint, which is impossible;
if so, then the Son owes His
being not to the Father only, but
also to the Father's will, zvhich thus
becomes α kind of motherhood.’ This
dilemma is met by a similar one
with regard to the ’s οὗκ
birth, and by another with regard to
creation. Gr. then shews that ἃς a
word is not the result of speaking,
considered as α separate ajtd sub-
stantive thing, but springs direct
from the speaker, so the thing willed
springs not from will in the abstract,
but direct from him who wills.</note>
<note type="footnote">8. σαθροῖς] Cp. i 3.</note>
<note type="footnote">11. πῶς οὖν ἐκ τοῦ π.] It certainly
seems a strangely captious
argument. If it was ever seriously
urged by the Eunomians, we must
suppose that θέλων is not merely =
ἑκών, but ’by willing’; i.e. it was
the act of will which produced the
Son. Then, as other faculties of
the divine being are represented to
us as hypostatic — notably the Λόγος
— we are driven to suppose that
this primary faculty, antecedent and
necessary to the production of the
Son, is hypostatic also. If that is
the case, He does not owe His
being solely to the Father, but
partly also to the ’s Will,
which is thus constituted a kind of
mother in the Godhead. But Gr.'s
subsequent words ἂν τοῦτο λέγωσιν
suggest the doubt whether he did
not himself invent this part of the
argument for the Eunomians.</note>
<note type="footnote">13. αὐτῶν] depends upon χαρίεν
(av εἴη) by an idiom well known in
colloquial English as well as in
Greek; ‘it it will be delightful of
them.’</note>
<note type="footnote">14. οὐ γὰρ πάθος ἢ β.] This is
true; nevertheless it is difficult for
the human mind to imagine an act
of will which is not caused by something
which would come under the
description of a πάθος.</note>

<pb n="81"/>
αὐτῶν, ὅ τι λέγουσιν. ἄριστον δὲ αὐτοῖς συμπλακῆναι
πρότερον ἐγγυτέρω. σὺ δὲ αὐτὸς ὁ λέγων εὐχερῶς ὅ τι ἃν
ἐθέλῃς, ἐκ θέλοντος ὑπέστης τοῦ σοῦ πατρός, ἢ μὴ θέλοντος;
εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐξ οὐ θέλοντος, τετυράννηται. τῆς βίας·
καὶ τίς ὁ τυραννήσας αὐτόν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὴν φύσιν ἐρεῖς· <lb n="5"/>
ἐκείνη γὰρ ἔχει καὶ τὸ σωφρονεῖν. εἰ δὲ θέλοντος, ἀπόλωλέ
σοι δι’ ὀλίγας συλλαβὰς ὁ πατήρ. θελήματος γὰρ υἱός,
ἁλλ’ οὐ πατρὸς ἀναπέφηνας. ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τὸν θεὸν μέτειμι
καὶ τὰ κτίσματα, καὶ τὸ σὸν ἐρώτημα προσάγω τῇ σῇ
σοφίᾳ. θέλων ὑπέστησε τὰ πάντα, ἢ βιασθείς; εἰ μὲν <lb n="10"/>
βιασθείς, κἀνταῦθα ἡ τυραννίς, καὶ ὁ τυραννήσας. εἰ
δὲ βουλόμενος, ἐστέρηται τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τὰ κτίσματα, καὶ
σὺ πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων, ὁ τοιούτους ἀνευρίσκων λογισμοὺς
καὶ τοιαῦτα σοφιζόμενος. θελήσει γὰρ μέσῃ τοῦ κτίστου
διατειχίζεται. ἁλλ’ ἕτερον, οἶμαι, θέλων ἐστὶ καὶ θέλησις, <lb n="15"/>
<note type="footnote">2 αν] ἔαν b || 3 εθελης] θέλῃς def ΙΙ 7 θεληματος] θελήσεως def || 10 υπεστησε]
+ θεὸς bcd: + ο θεὸς ef || 14 θελησει] θέλησις b || om γὰρ b || 15 ἐστιν
οἴμαι θέλων bdf</note>
<note type="footnote">1. τὸ ἴσχ’. αὐτ’. ö τι λ] ‘what they
consider their strong point? Δεύτερον
δὲ corresponds to ἐν μέν. Before,
however, entering upon this
δεύτερον, which he does at ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ
τ. θ., Gr. thinks it best πρότερον)
to grapple with his adversaries at
closer quarters. This he does in the
question σὺ δὲ αὐτός κτλ., which
brings the argument home to them
personally ἐγγυτέρω).</note>
<note type="footnote">5. οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὴν φύσιν ἐρεῖς]
‘You will not say that he was compelled
by nature. Nature admits
equally of self-restraint.’</note>
<note type="footnote">10. ὑπέστησε] ‘gave them existence,’
ence? i.e. by creation.</note>
<note type="footnote">12. ἐσηρηται τοῦ θ.κ. τὰ κτ] As,
ace. to their supposed argument,
the Son is deprived of the Father
by the interposition of the Will
from which He sprang, so is creation
deprived of its Creator. His
Will runs like a wall between it
and Him. The Eunomian is the
first to suffer the loss, because
he invented it; that is poetical
justice.</note>
<note type="footnote">15. ἕτερον οἷμαι] Gr.'s argument
is not very clear; because the Eunomians
also had distinguished very
sharply between the will and the
person who wills, — so sharply that
they said that the Son could not be
the Son of one who willed to beget
Him, but only of that will itself.
But in so arguing they set up
a new, though fictitious, identity.
They converted the will itself into
a personal agency. This is what
Gr. combats. Will is one thing,
and the person who wills is another.
You might as well say that the
thing begotten is the son of beget-
ting, or trace the thing spoken to
speaking instead of the speaker, as
thus erect will into a substantive
and independent force.</note>

<pb n="82"/>
γεννῶν καὶ γέννησις, λέγων καὶ λόγος, εἰ μὴ μεθύομεν. τὰ
μὲν ὁ κινούμενος, τὰ δὲ οἷον ἡ κίνησις. οὔκουν θελήσεως
τὸ θεληθέν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἕπεται πάντως· οὐδὲ τὸ γεννηθὲν
γεννήσεως, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀκουσθὲν ἐκφωνήσεως, ἀλλὰ τοῦ θέλοντος,
<lb n="5"/> καὶ τοῦ γεννήσαντος, καὶ τοῦ λέγοντος. τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ δὲ
καὶ ὑπὲρ πάντα ταῦτα, ᾧ γέννησίς ἐστιν ἴσως ἡ τοῦ γεννᾷν
θέλησις, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν μέσον, εἴ γε καὶ τοῦτο δεξώμεθα ὅλως,
ἀλλὰ μὴ καὶ θελήσεως κρείττων ἢ γέννησις.</p></div><div type="textpart" subtype="chapter" n="7"><p>Βούλει τι προσπαίξω καὶ τὸν πατέρα; παρὰ σοῦ
<lb n="10"/> γὰρ ἔχω τὰ τοιαῦτα τολμᾷν. θέλων θεὸς ὁ πατήρ, ἢ μὴ
θέλων. καὶ ὅπως ἀποφεύξῃ τὸ σὸν περιδέξιον, εἰ μὲν δὴ
θέλων, πότε τοῦ θέλειν ἠργμένος; οὐ γὰρ πρὶν εἶναι· οὐδὲ
γὰρ ἦν τι πρότερον. ἢ τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ θελῆσαν, τὸ δὲ
<note type="footnote">1 μεθύωμεν b ΙΙ 5 γεννῶντος cdefg || 7 δεξ̣ͅομεθα deg ‘Or. 1’</note>
<note type="footnote">1. τὰ μέν] i.e. the series θέλων,
γεννῶν, λέγων; τὰ δέ, i.e. the series
θέλησις, γέννησις, λόγος.</note>
<note type="footnote">3. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἕπεται πάντως] Gr.
is using ἕπεται in its logical sense.
He does not mean that in the order
of facts the act of will sometimes
fails of its effect; he means that it
does not ‘follow’ that, because a
thing has been willed, that thing is
the result of will. It is the result
of the personal force lying behind
the will.</note>
<note type="footnote">5. τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ δέ] All this holds
true even in the experience of our
limited personalities; much more
may we suppose it to be so in
regard to the divine nature. With
God, so far as we know ἴσως), will
and action are identical, and there
is no medium whatever.</note>
<note type="footnote">7. καὶ τοῦτο] i.e. the proposition
that γέννησις = ἡ τοῦ γ. θ. Gr. evidently
inclines rather to the view
that ‘the generation ὁ the Son of
God is even above and beyond
will.’</note>
<note type="footnote">7. Gr. retaliates by asking how
God comes to be God. If by His
will, when did He first will it? is
one portion of His being the result of
the will of another portion? is He
not in this case as much a child of
will as the Son? If He is God
without willing to be so, then He is
under compulsion.</note>
<note type="footnote">‘How then, is the Son begotten?’
asks the Eunomian. ‘How is He
created?’ οἱ. replies. Men do
create in the way which it is
to assume was ’s way.</note>
<note type="footnote">9. βούλει τι κτλ.] ’Do you wish
me to make sport awhile with the
Father also? ’ Hitherto the ‘sport’
has been with the Son. Gr. intentionally
uses a shocking expression.</note>
<note type="footnote">11. καὶ ὅπως ἀποφ.] ’and in order
that you may escape: The main
verb is the imperative implied in
the question πότε. . . ἠργμένος μόνος — ‘tell
me when.’</note>
<note type="footnote">12. πρὶν εἶναι] sc θεός; ‘not befpre
He was so; for He tvas never
anything before.’</note>
<note type="footnote">13. τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ] ‘or did one part
of Him will it, while the other part
was the result of that will?</note>

<pb n="83"/>
θεληθέν; μεριστὸς οὖν. πῶς δὲ οὐ θελήσεως καὶ οὗτος,
κατὰ σέ, πρόβλημα; εἰ δὲ οὐ θέλων, τί τὸ βιασάμενον εἰς
τὸ εἶναι; καὶ πῶς θεός, εἰ βεβίασται, καὶ ταῦτα οὐκ
ἄλλο τι ἢ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι θεός; πῶς οὖν γεγέννηται; πῶς
ἔκτισται, εἴπερ ἔκτισται κατὰ σέ; καὶ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο τῆς <lb n="5"/>
αὐτῆς ἀπορίας. τάχα ἂν εἴποις, βουλήσει καὶ λόγῳ.
ἀλλ’ οὔπω λέγεις τὸ πᾶν. πῶς γὰρ ἔργου δύναμιν ἔσχεν
ἡ βούλησις καὶ ὁ λόγος; ἔτι λείπεται λέγειν. οὐ γὰρ
οὕτως ἄνθρωπος.</p></div><div type="textpart" subtype="chapter" n="8"><p>Πῶς οὖν γεγέννηται; οὐκ ἂν ἢν μεγάλη ἡ γέννησις, <lb n="10"/>
εἰ σοὶ κατελαμβάνετο, ὃς οὐδὲ τὴν ἰδίαν ἐπίστῃ γέννησιν,
ἢ μικρόν τι ταύτης κατείληφας, καὶ ὅσον αἰσχύνῃ λέγειν·
ἔπειτα οἴει τὸ πᾶν γινώσκειν; πολλὰ ἂν κάμοις πρότερον,
ἢ εὕροις λόγους συμπήξεως, μορφώσεως, φανερώσεως,
ψυχῆς πρὸς σῶμα δεσμόν, νοῦ πρὸς ψυχήν, λόγου πρὸς <lb n="15"/>
νοῦν, κίνησιν, αὔξησιν, τροφῆς ἐξομοίωσιν, αἴσθησιν,
μνήμην, ἀνάμνησιν, τἄλλα ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκας· καὶ τίνα
μὲν τοῦ συναμφοτέρου ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, τίνα δὲ
τὰ μεμερισμένα, τίνα δὲ ἃ παρ’ ἀλλήλων λαμβάνουσιν·
<note type="footnote">7. 1 ουν] + φησι bedf ΙΙ 6 ειποις] + ὅτι b 8. 13 οιει] οιη e || τα ce race</note>
<note type="footnote">2. εἰς τὸ εἶναι] again ’ to be so,’
i.e. θεός.</note>
<note type="footnote">3. καἰ ταῦτα κτλ.] ‘and compelled
to that very thing, namely to
be God.’</note>
<note type="footnote">4. πῶς οὖν] Gr. returns rapidly
to the original question, and again
parries it by the counter question
as to the creation of the Son. The
difficulty of imagining the creation
is as great as that of imagining the
generation.</note>
<note type="footnote">7. ἔργου δύν. ἔσχειν] ‘how came
it to have that effective force?"</note>
<note type="footnote">9. οὕτως] sc βούλεται καἰ λόγει.</note>
<note type="footnote">8. You do not understand your
own generation, or the law of your
own development; how can you expeel
to understand that of God?
That, however, ἲς no proof that God
does not beget. If nothing is to be
true but what you understand,
must reduce the list of existences,
beginning with that of God Himself
The mode of the divine generation
is evidently beyond us.</note>
<note type="footnote">14. λόγους συμπ.] ‘the formulae,’
or ‘laws.’</note>
<note type="footnote">16. τροφῆς ἐξομ.] ‘assimilation of
food.’</note>
<note type="footnote">17. μνήμην, ἀνάμν.] Cp. ii 22.</note>
<note type="footnote">ib. τίνα μέν] ‘what things belong
to the united compound of soul and
body.’</note>
<note type="footnote">19. τὰ μεμερ.] We might have
expected μεμερισμένων, ‘belong to
soul and body apart’; but it
‘which are the things distributable’
to soul and body respectively.</note>

<pb n="84"/>
ὧν γὰρ ὕστερον ἡ τελείωσις, τούτων οἱ λόγοι μετὰ τῆς
γεννήσεως. εἰπὲ τίνες· καὶ μηδὲ τότε φιλοσοφήσῃς θεοῦ
γέννησιν· οὐ γὰρ ἀσφαλές. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν σὴν γινώσκεις,
οὐ πάντως καὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ· εἰ δὲ μηδὲ τὴν σήν, πῶς τὴν
<lb n="5"/> τοῦ θεοῦ; ὅσῳ γὰρ θεὸς ἀνθρώπου δυστεκμαρτότερος,
τοσούτῳ καὶ τῆς σῆς γεννήσεως ἀληπτοτέρα ἡ ἄνω γέν-
νησις. εἰ δὲ ὅτι μή σοι κατείληπται, διὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲ
γεγέννηται, ὥρα σοι πολλὰ διαγράφειν τῶν ὄντων, ἃ μὴ
κατείληφας, καὶ πρό γε ἁπάντων τὸν θεὸν αὐτόν· οὐδὲ γὰρ
<lb n="10"/> ὅ τι ποτέ ἐστιν εἰπεῖν ἔχεις, καὶ εἰ λίαν τολμηρὸς εἰ, καὶ τὰ
περιττὰ μεγαλόψυχος. κατάβαλέ σου τὰς ῥεύσεις, καὶ
τὰς διαιρέσεις, καὶ τὰς τομάς, καὶ τὸ ὡς περὶ σώματος
διανοεῖσθαι τῆς ἀσωμάτου φύσεως· καὶ τάχα ἃν ἄξιόν τι
διανοηθείης θεοῦ γεννήσεως. πῶς γεγέννηται; πάλιν γὰρ
<lb n="15"/> τὸ αὐτὸ φθέγξομαι δυσχεραίνων. θεοῦ γέννησις σιωπῇ
τιμάσθω. μέγα σοι τὸ μαθεῖν, ὅτι γεγέννηται. τὸ δὲ πῶς,
οὐδὲ ἀγγέλοις ἐννοεῖν, μὴ ὅτι γέ σοι νοεῖν συγχωρήσομεν.
βούλει παραστήσω τὸ πῶς; ὡς οἶδεν ὁ γεννήσας πατήρ,
καὶ ὁ γεννηθεὶς υἱός. τὸ δὲ ὑπὲρ ταῦτα νέφει κρύπτεται,
<lb n="20"/> τὴν σὴν διαφεῦγον ἀμβλυωπίαν.</p><note type="footnote">2 φιλοσοφήσεις af: -σοις ‘Or. Ι’ ΙΙ 9 ἀπάντων] πάντων ef ΙΙ οὐδὲ] οὐ bf ||
<lb n="14"/> διανοηθείης] + πέρι b II 17 ἀγγέλοις μὴ ὅτι γε σοι ἐννοεῖν b II om νοεῖν
df ΙΙ συγχωρήσωμεν aefg || 20 ἀποφεῦγον a</note><note type="footnote">1. ὧν γὰρ ὔστ. ἡ τελ.] Although
some parts and faculties of our nature
only reach their perfection at a
later time, the law of their development
ment is present in the very moment
of generation.</note><note type="footnote">2. μηδὲ τότε] not even when you
have stated the laws of human development.</note><note type="footnote">8. διαγράφειν] ’to cancel,’ ‘strike
off the list.’ Cp. v23.</note><note type="footnote">11. κατάβαλέ σου τὰς ᾿ρ.] ‘drop
your dissipations. ’ The Eunomians
conceived of the orthodox theology
in a materialistic way, and proceeded
to apply to it language of this
kind. For ῥεύσεις cp. v 31; for
διαιρ. and τομάς cp. i 6.</note><note type="footnote">15. δυσχεραίνων] ‘with loathing.’</note><note type="footnote">20. ἀμβλυωπίαν] ’the dulness of’
your ’blinded sight.’</note><note type="footnote">9. A fresh puzzle is proposed by
the Eunomian. Does the Son exist
prior to generation, or not? The
answer ἲς that there is no such
as a time prior to that generation.
It is from all eternity. There is no
more need to ask whether the Son is
ἐξ ὄντων or ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων than there
is to ask the same question concerning
the Father. We are not compelled
to believe that either one or the other
of two alternates is true. Take
instances. Is time in time or outside
of time? A man says, ‘I am
lying’: is he speaking the truth or
not? Were yon present at your
own conception or not? Both alternatives
may be false. The question
is absurd.</note><pb n="85"/></div><div type="textpart" subtype="chapter" n="9"><p>ὄντα οὖν γεγέννηκεν, ἢ οὐκ ὄντα; τῶν ληρημάτων·
περὶ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ ταῦτα, οἳ τὸ μέν τι ἦμεν, ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ
ὀσφύι τοῦ Ἀβραὰμ ὁ Λευὶ, τὸ δὲ γεγόναμεν’ ὥστε ἐξ
ὄντων τρόπον τινὰ τὸ ἡμέτερον, καὶ οὐκ ὄντων· ἐναντίως
περὶ τὴν ἀρχέγονον ὕλην ὑποστᾶσαν σαφῶς ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, <lb n="5"/>
κἄν τινες ἀγένητον ἀναπλάττωσιν. ἐνταῦθα δὲ σύνδρομον
τῷ εἶναι τὸ γεγεννῆσθαι, καὶ ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς· ὥστε ποῦ θήσεις
τὸ ἀμφίκρημνον τοῦτο ἐρώτημα; τί γὰρ τοῦ ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς
πρεσβύτερον, ἵν ἐκεῖ θῶμεν τὸ εἶναί ποτε τοῦ υἱοῦ, ἢ τὸ
μὴ εἶναι; ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ τὸ ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς λυθήσεται. εἰ μή <lb n="10"/>
σοι καὶ ὁ πατήρ, πάλιν ἐρωτώντων ἡμῶν, ἐξ ὄντων, ἢ ἐξ
<note type="footnote">9. 1 τῶν] ω τῶν e || 6 ἀγένητον] ἀγέννητον def ΙΙ ἀναπλάττουσιν e ||
7 τὼ εἶναι τὸ] τὸ εἶναι τὼ ‘Reg.’ a’ 9 η τὸ μὴ] om τὸ cd</note>
<note type="footnote">1. ὄντα] Α fresh difficulty: was
the Son already in existence when
He was begotten, or not? Gr.
admits that the question might have
some meaning in regard to human
generation. In one sense we already
existed τὸ μέν τι); in another, we
then began to be (λγλόναμεν practically=ἐγενήθημεν).</note>
<note type="footnote">3. ὁ Λευί] Heb. vii 10.</note>
<note type="footnote">4. τὸ ἡμέτερον] = ἡμεῖς.</note>
<note type="footnote">6. κἄν τινες ἂγ. ἀναπλ.] The
reference is to ’s Timaeus.</note>
<note type="footnote">ib. σύνδρομον τῷ εἰ. τὸ γ.] ’In
this ’ of the Eternal Son, ‘generation
is coincident with existence,
and is from all eternity.’</note>
<note type="footnote">7. ποῦ θήσεις] Where will you
find a place, a date, for your question
to apply to? ‘Already in
existence when He was begotten ’
implies a time before the begetting;
but there was no such time. He
was begotten from the beginning.
What was there before ’the begin-
ning, ’ that we may say whether the
Son then existed or not? In either
case, whether we affirm or deny His
existence, it is clear that that subsequent
moment at which we suppose
Him to have been begotten
cannot really have been the beginning.</note>
<note type="footnote">10. εἰ μή σοι κ. ὁ π.] If you still
press your question, we will once
more ask you about the Father,
whether His existence is derived
from elements that were beforehand
or from elements that were not.
Perhaps then you will make out
that both propositions are true, and
that He has two modes or stages of
existence, one before and the other
after the absorption of those elements.
Or you will choose the
latter alternative, and say of Him,
as you say of the Son, that He
comes into being from nothingness.
If you are ready to admit this of the
Father (such is the force of the εἰ
μή), there is some consistency in
what you affirm of the Son.</note>

<pb n="86"/>
οὐκ ὄντων, κινδυνεύσειεν ἢ δὶς εἶναι, ὃ μὲν προών, ὃ δὲ ὤν,
ἢ ταὐτὸν τῷ υἱῷ παθεῖν, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων εἶναι, διὰ τὰ σὰ τῶν
ἐρωτημάτων παίγνια, καὶ τὰς ἐκ ψάμμων οἰκοδομάς, αἱ
μηδὲ αὔραις ἵστανται. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν οὐδέτερον τούτων
<lb n="5"/> δέχομαι, καὶ τὴν ἐρώτησίν φημι τὸ ἄτοπον ἔχειν, οὐχὶ τὸ
ἄπορον τὴν ἀπάντησιν. εἰ δέ σοι φαίνεται ἀναγκαῖον
εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον ἀληθεύειν ἐπὶ παντός, κατὰ τὰς σὰς δια-
λεκτικὰς ὑπολήψεις, δέξαι μού τι μικρὸν ἐρώτημα. ὁ
χρόνος ἐν χρόνῳ, ἢ οὐκ ἐν χρόνῳ; εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐν χρόνῳ,
IO τίνι τούτῳ; καὶ τί παρὰ τοῦτον ὄντι; καὶ πῶς περιέχοντι;
εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἐν χρόνῳ, τίς ἢ περιττὴ σοφία χρόνον εἰσάγειν
ἄχρονον; τοῦ δέ, Νῦν ἐγὼ ψεύδομαι, δὸς τὸ ἕτερον, ἢ
ἀληθεύεσθαι μόνον, ἢ ψεύδεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ ἀμφότερα δώ-
σομεν. ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται. ἢ γὰρ ψευδόμενος ἀληθεύσει,
<lb n="15"/> ἢ ἀληθεύων ψεύσεται· πᾶσα ἀνάγκη. τί οὖν θαυμαστόν,
ὥσπερ ἐνταῦθα συμβαίνει τὰ ἐναντία, οὕτως ἐκεῖσε ἀμφότερα
ψεύδεσθαι, καὶ οὕτω σοι τὸ σοφὸν ἠλίθιον ἀναφανήσεται;
ἓν ἔτι μοι λῦσον τῶν αἰνιγμάτων· σεαυτῷ δὲ
γεννωμένῳ παρῆς; πάρει δὲ νῦν; ἢ οὐδέτερον; εἰ μὲν γὰρ
<lb n="20"/> καὶ παρῆς, καὶ πάρει, ὡς τίς, καὶ τίνι; καὶ πῶς ὁ εἷς
ἄμφω γεγόνατε; εἰ δὲ μηδέτερον τῶν εἰρημένων, πῶς
<note type="footnote">3 ἐκ ψάμμων] εξ ἄμμων a || οἰκοδομίας ac || 12 om η ’duo Reg.’</note>
<note type="footnote">1. ö μὲν πρ., δ δὲ ὤν] For this
use of δ (here accus.) cp. Matt.
xiii 8.</note>
<note type="footnote">4. μ. αὔραις ἵστανται] ‘cannot
even stand a puff of wind’; a natural
use of ἴστ’. but difficult to parallel.
ib. τούτων] of the two alternatives,
ὄντα ἢ οὐκ ὄντα γεγέννηκεν. </note>
<note type="footnote">5. τὸ ἄπορον τὴν ἀπ’.] Α chiasm:
ἀπάντ. corresponds to ἐρώτ., as τὸ
ἄπορον to τὸ ἄτοπον. It is not that
the encounter presents a difficulty,
but the question presents an ab-
surdity.</note>
<note type="footnote">10. τί παρὰ τοῦτον ὄντι] ’what is
it besides the time which is in it?
and how does it contain that ?’</note>
<note type="footnote">12. τοῦ δέ, Νῦν ἐγὼ ψ.] Α well-known
puzzle. ’"I am now telling
a lie." One thing or the other; is
the statement true or false? We
will not admit that it is both.
you answer, it is impossible to adopt
the one alternative to the exclusion
of the other, for if he is lying, he
speaks the truth, and if he speaks
the truth, he lying.’</note>
<note type="footnote">15. τί οὖν θαυμαστόν] As, in the
case of the ψευδόμενος, contradictories
are reconciled, so we need
not be surprised if, in the proposed
dilemma of ὄντα ἢ οὐκ ὄντα, both
alternatives are false.</note>
<note type="footnote">17. ἠλίθιον] ‘silly.’</note>

<pb n="87"/>
σεαυτοῦ χωρίζῃ; καὶ τίς ἡ αἰτία τῆς διαζεύξεως; ἀλλ’
ἀπαίδευτον περὶ τοῦ ἑνός, εἰ ἑαυτῷ πάρεστιν, ἢ μή,
πολυπραγμονεῖν. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐπ’ ἄλλων, οὐχ ἑαυτοῦ λέγεται.
ἀπαιδευτότερον, εὖ ἴσθι, τὸ ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς γεγεννημένον,
εἰ ἢν πρὸ τῆς γεννήσεως, ἢ οὐκ ἦν, διευθύνεσθαι. οὗτος <lb n="5"/>
γὰρ περὶ τῶν χρόνῳ διαιρετῶν ὁ λόγος.</p></div><div type="textpart" subtype="chapter" n="10"><p>Ἀλλ’ οὐ ταὐτόν, φησι, τὸ ἀγέννητον καὶ τὸ
γεννητόν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐδὲ ὁ υἱὸς τῷ πατρὶ ταὐτόν. ὅτι
μὲν φανερῶς ὁ λόγος οὗτος ἐκβάλλει τὸν υἱὸν τῆς θεότητος,
ἢ τὸν πατέρα, τί χρὴ λέγειν; εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἀγέννητον οὐσία ΙΟ
θεοῦ, τὸ γεννητὸν οὐκ οὐσία· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἐκεῖνο. τίς
ἀντερεῖ λόγος; ἑλοῦ τοίνυν τῶν ἀσεβειῶν ὁποτέραν βούλει,
ὦ κενὲ θεολόγε, εἴπερ ἀσεβεῖν πάντως ἐσπούδακας. ἔπειτα
πῶς οὐ ταὐτὸν λέγεις τὸ ἀγέννητον καὶ τὸ γεννητόν; εἰ μὲν
τὸ μὴ ἐκτισμένον καὶ ἐκτισμένον, κἀγὼ δέχομαι. οὐ γὰρ <lb n="15"/>
ταὐτὸν τῆ φύσει τὸ ἄναρχον καὶ τὸ κτιζόμενον. εἰ δὲ τὸ
<note type="footnote">1 σεαυτοῦ] ἑαυτοῦ ’in nonnull.’ || 2 απαιδευτον] + το bdf 10. 7 φασι b ||
10 χρὴ] + καὶ cef Ἴ’ 13 κενε] καινὲ c</note>
<note type="footnote">1. ἀλλ’ ἀπαίδευτον] Ἀλλά = at;
as above, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται. ‘Nay,
you will answer, it is stupid to
enquire about a single individual,
whether he is present with himself,
or not. Those things apply to other
people, not to oneself.’</note>
<note type="footnote">5. διευθύνεσθαι] ‘to be setting
people to rights about the question
whether.’</note>
<note type="footnote">6. περὶ τῶν χρ. διαιρ.] ᾿about
things which are divided by an interval
of time.’</note>
<note type="footnote">10. ‘Begotten and Unbegotten
are not the same; therefore if the
Son is begotten and the Father unbegotten,
the Son differs from the
Father.’ The statement is false;
it is the very meaning of generation
to transmit the nature of the parent.
The contrast of begotten and unbegottens
is only like that of wise and
uniwise, which can be predicated of
different individuals without involvomg
α difference of nature or essence.
To erect Unbegottenness into Constituting
the very essence of God
brings you into difficulties with other
attributes, like Immortal, Unchangesable,
able, which have ἃς good a right to
be considered ἃς constituting that
essence.</note>
<note type="footnote">7. οὐ ταὐτόν] ‘not the same thing’;
i.e. a difference of nature itself is
involved.</note>
<note type="footnote">14. πῶς οὐ ταὐτόν] llOt ’ III what
sense do you ’ for Gr. is not
prepared to admit that it is true in
any sense ; but simply challenging
the statement altogether: ’ how can
you say so? if you had said thai
created and uncreated are not tin
same, I should agree with you,
but the transmission of the ’s
nature is of the very essence of
generation.’</note>

<pb n="88"/>
γεγεννηκὸς καὶ τὸ γεγεννημένον, οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγεται. ταὐτὸν
γὰρ εἶναι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη. αὕτη γὰρ φύσις γεννήματος,
ταὐτὸν εἶναι τῷ γεγεννηκότι κατὰ τὴν φύσιν. ἢ οὕτω
πάλιν· πῶς λέγεις τὸ ἀγέννητον καὶ τὸ γεννητόν; εἰ μὲν
<lb n="5"/> τὴν ἀγεννησίαν αὐτὴν καὶ τὴν γέννησιν, οὐ ταὐτόν·
εἰ δὲ οἷς ὑπάρχει ταῦτα, πῶς οὐ ταὐτόν; ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ
ἄσοφον καὶ τὸ σοφὸν ἀλλήλοις μὲν οὐ ταὐτά, περὶ ταὐτὸν
δέ, τὸν ἄνθρωπον· καὶ οὐκ οὐσίας τέμνει, περὶ δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν
οὐσίαν τέμνεται. ἢ καὶ τὸ ἀθάνατον, καὶ τὸ ἄκακον, καὶ
<lb n="10"/> τὸ ἀναλλοίωτον οὐσία θεοῦ. ἀλλ’ εἰ τοῦτο, πολλαὶ οὐσίαι
θεοῦ, καὶ οὐ μία. ἢ σύνθετον ἐκ τούτων τὸ θεῖον. οὐ γὰρ
ἀσυνθέτως ταῦτα, εἴπερ οὐσίαι.</p></div></div></body></text></TEI>