Ἀλλ’ εἰ ταὐτὸν τῷ πατρί, φασιν, ὁ υἱὸς κατ’ οὐσίαν, ἀγέννητον δὲ ὁ πατήρ, ἔσται τοῦτο καὶ ὁ υἱός. καλῶς, εἴπερ οὐσία θεοῦ τὸ ἀγέννητον, ἵν ᾖ τις καινὴ μίξις, γεννητοαγέννητον. εἰ δὲ περὶ οὐσίαν ἡ διαφορά, τί τοῦτο ὡς ἰσχυρὸν λέγεις; ἢ καὶ σὺ πατὴρ τοῦ πατρός, ἵνα μηδενὶ λείπῃ τοῦ σοῦ πατρός, ἐπειδὴ ταὐτὸν εἶ κατ’ οὐσίαν; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι, τῆς ἰδιότητος ἀκινήτου μενούσης, ζητήσομεν οὐσίαν θεοῦ, ἥ τις ποτέ ἐστιν, εἴπερ ζητήσομεν; ὅτι δὲ οὐ ταὐτὸν ἀγέννητον καὶ θεός, ὧδε ἂν μάθοις. εἰ 4 σεβασμιον] σεμνὸν ‘Reg, a’ II χαμαιπετέσι] χαμερπέσι b 12. 6 ταῦτον φασι τὼ πατρὶ ο ὑίος b: ταὐτὸν φ. ο ὑίος τὼ πατρὶ df || 7 ἀγέννητος bde || 9 om ’δε c || 10 om η c 12.‘If ’the Father is unbegotten,’ they urge, ‘and the Son is what the Father is, then the Son too is unbegotten.’ That would be true if unbegottenness zuere the actual essence of God; but it is ἴοι. If ‘unbegotten’ and ‘God’ were equivalent terms, then we should be able to put the one for the other, and say not only ’ the God of Israel’ but ‘the Unbegotten of Israel? On this theory, the nature of the begotten Son is not only different from that of the unbegotten Father, but is its exact opposite; and indeed it might be argued that since the positive is prior to the negative, the begotten Son is prior to the unbegotten Father. 7. ἔσται τοῦτο] sc. ἀγέννητον Quite true, Gr. replies, on the assumption that unbegottenness is the essence of God; the Son in that case will be begotten-unbegotten! 9. περὶ οὐσίαν] The prep, is emphatic. It is used as in § 10 sub fin. ‘If the difference between begotten and unbegotten is (not one of nature but only) one affecting the modes of that nature.’ 10. πατὴρ τοῦ π.] ‘Are you your father's father?’ If not, ace. to your argument, you cannot have the same essence as your father. 12. ἰδιότητος] not ’’personality’ but the special distinguishing peculiarities which differentiate one person from another; the ‘property,’ as Hooker calls it (E. P. v 51). If we enquire at all what the nature of God is, we will do so without touching these individual properties. ταὐτὸν ἦν, ἔδει πάντως, ἐπειδὴ τινῶν θεὸς ὁ θεός, τινῶν εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἀγέννητον· ἢ ἐπεὶ μηδενὸς τὸ ἀγέννητον, μηδὲ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι τινῶν. τὰ γὰρ πάντῃ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὁμοίως ἐκφέρεται. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐ τινῶν τὸ ἀγέννητον, τίνων γάρ; καὶ τινῶν θεὸς ὁ θεός, πάντων γάρ. πῶς οὖν ἂν εἴη ταὐτὸν θεὸς καὶ ἀγέννητον; καὶ πάλιν, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἀγέννητον καἲ τὸ γεννητὸν ἀντίκειται ἀλλήλοις, ὡς ἕξις καὶ στέρησις, ἀνάγκη καὶ οὐσίας εἰσαχθῆναι ἀντικειμένας ἀλλήλαις, ὅπερ οὐ δέδοται· ἢ ἐπειδὴ πάλιν αἱ ἕξεις τῶν στερήσεων πρότεραι, καὶ ἀναιρετικαὶ τῶν ἕξεων αἱ στερήσεις, μὴ μόνον πρεσβυτέραν εἶναι τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας τὴν τοῦ υἱοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀναιρουμένην ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρός, ὅσον ἐπὶ ταῖς σαῖς ὑποθέσεσι.

8 εἰσαχθῆναι] ἀντεισαχθῆναι b1. τινῶν ὁ θεός] ’God,’ acc. to Gr., is a relative term; a ’ God ’ must be ’God of’ some one. If then unbegottenness is the very essence of God, and ‘unbegotten’ and ‘God’ are convertible terms, then we must be able to say with equal correctness, ’ the God of all ’ and ‘the unbegotten of all’; or conversely, as the unbegotten is ’no one's unbegotten,’ so God must be ‘no one's God.‘ The argument does not seem a very valuable one, because, to begin with, it must be questioned whether ‘God’ is really a term of relationship. If it be so, then apart from creation God would not be God. But the main purpose of the argument is sound, inasmuch as it shews the absurdity of identifying absolutely the positive existence of God with a merely negative description. On Gr. ’s interprettation of the word θεός, see iv 18.3. ὁμοίως ἐκφέρεται] True synonyms are used interchangeably (lit. ’are produced, employed, in a similar manner’); cp. προφέρεται in § 5.8. ἀνάγκη] If ἀγέννητον is the very nature of God, and yet God begets a Son (which the Eunomians in a sense allow), it follows that the nature of the Son is not only different from that of the Father, but is diametrically opposite to it. This is not allowed by any one οὐ δέδοται).9. αἱ ἔξεις τῶν ’στ’. πρότεραι] You cannot take away a thing which is not there to begin with. But ἀγέννητον implies a taking away of γέννεννητάν. Therefore γέννητον is prior to ἀγέννητον, — the Son to the Father, — and when the Father comes, and His ἀγέννητον is alone recongised as divine, He does away with the Son who occupied the ground before Him. Of course this argument is one of mere mockery ἐρεσχελία, i 3).13. ’If the begetting of the Son is not a thing finished ἀν’ ’done with, it is as yet incomplete, and will one day be completed: if it is finished, it must have begun.’ That does not follow. ἱν soul had a beginning, but will never have an end.No; our belief is, that whatever possesses the essential notes of a class of beings — say of α horse or an ox — is rightly called by that name, whatever distinctive properties it may have which mark it off from others of the class. So it ἲς with God; the nature is one, although there are differences of designation, corresponding to differences hi fact, between the Persons who share that natitre.