<TEI xmlns="http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0" xmlns:py="http://codespeak.net/lxml/objectify/pytype" py:pytype="TREE"><text><body><div type="edition" n="urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2022.tlg009.1st1K-grc1" xml:lang="grc"><div type="textpart" subtype="chapter" n="11"><p>ταῦτα μὲν οὔ φασι, κοινὰ γὰρ καὶ ἄλλων. ὃ δὲ
μόνου θεοῦ καὶ ἴδιον, τοῦτο οὐσία. οὐκ ἂν μὲν συγχωρήσαιεν
<lb n="15"/> εἶναι μόνου θεοῦ τὸ ἀγέννητον οἱ καὶ τὴν ὕλην καὶ
<note type="footnote">1 γεγεννημένον] + οὐ ταὐτὸν λέγεις dg || 1 φύσις] + γεννήτορος καὶ be ||
3 φύσιν] + τὸ γέννημα b || 4 εἰ μὲν] + γὰρ e || 5 τὴν ἄγεν.] om τὴν e</note>
<note type="footnote">5. τὴν ἀγενν. αὐτήν] ’ unbegottenness
itself? the very character of not
being begotten.</note>
<note type="footnote">7. περὶ ταὐτὸν δέ] not, of course,
περὶ τὸν αὐτόν. They are opposite
characteristics, but both are found
in man without any difference of
nature being involved. The wise
man and the foolish man are alike
man.</note>
<note type="footnote">8. οὐκ οὐσίας τ.] ‘they do not
divide the essences; they are divisions
(lit. divided) within (in connexion
with) the same essence.’</note>
<note type="footnote">9. ἢ καὶ τὸ ἀθ’.] Α fresh argument.
If τὸ ἀγέννητον constitutes
the divine nature, so that it and
τὸ θεῖον are convertible terms, a
similar case can be made out for
these other predicates. Then, since
the divine nature is absolutely identified
with τὸ ἀγέννητον, and yet
at the same time with τὸ ἀθάνατον,
we are driven to suppose that these
are separate natures, or essences, or
that they compose the divine nature
by their aggregation.</note>
<note type="footnote">11. Assume for the sake of argument
that to be unbegotten belongs
to God alone, though the assertion
would by some be denied. It does
not follow that unbegottenness is a
necessary part of the divine essence.
Adam alone was directly fashioned
by God; yet Seth is as truly man
as Adam. The divine essence is a
positive, not α negative thing. If
you ask me what it is, I can
answer that I hope we may know
some day, but not here. Meanwhile,
whatever glory there is in the underived
existence belongs to the Son
who is begotten of the Underived.</note>
<note type="footnote">13. κοινὰ γάρ] Angels e.g. are
ἀθάνατοι; doves and lambs are called
ἄκακα.</note>
<note type="footnote">15. οἱ καὶ τὴν ὔ.] The Platonists.
Gr. does not adopt their opinion.
He only uses it to embarrass the
Eunomian. He might have cited
in like manner the ’darkness,’ which
the Manichees made to be coeternal
with light ; but he disdains to do so.</note>

<pb n="89"/>
τὴν ἰδέαν συνεισάγοντες ὡς ἀγέννητα. τὸ γὰρ Μανιχαίων
πορρωτέρω ῥίψωμεν σκότος. πλὴν ἔστω μόνου θεοῦ. τί
δὲ ὁ Ἀδάμ; οὐ μόνος πλάσμα θεοῦ; καὶ πάνυ, φήσεις.
ἆρ’ οὖν καὶ μόνος ἄνθρωπος; οὐδαμῶς. τί δή ποτε; ὅτι
μὴ ἀνθρωπότης ἡ πλάσις· καὶ γὰρ τὸ γεννηθὲν ἄνθρωπος. <lb n="5"/>
οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ ἀγέννητον μόνον θεός, εἰ καὶ μόνου πατρός,
ἁλλὰ δέξαι καὶ τὸ γεννητὸν εἶναι θεόν. ἐκ θεοῦ γάρ, εἰ
καὶ λίαν εἰ φιλαγέννητος. ἔπειτα πῶς οὐσίαν θεοῦ λέγεις,
οὐ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θέσιν, ἁλλὰ τὴν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἀναίρεσιν;
τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ γέννησιν ὁ λόγος δηλοῖ, οὐχ <lb n="10"/>
ὃ τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶ παρίστησιν, οὐδ’ ὃ ὑπάρχει τὸ μὴ ἔχον
γέννησιν. τίς οὖν οὐσία θεοῦ; τῆς σῆς ἀπονοίας τοῦτο
λέγειν, ὃς πολυπραγμονεῖς καὶ τὴν γέννησιν. ἡμῖν δὲ
μέγα, κἂν εἴποτε καὶ εἰς ὕστερον τοῦτο μάθοιμεν, λυθέντος
ἡμῖν τοῦ ζόφου καὶ τῆς παχύτητος, ὡς ἡ τοῦ ἀψευδοῦς <lb n="15"/>
ὑπόσχεσις. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ νοείσθω καὶ ἐλπιζέσθω
τοῖς ἐπὶ τούτῳ καθαιρομένοις. ἡμεῖς δὲ τοσοῦτον εἰπεῖν
θαρρήσομεν, ὅτι εἰ καὶ μέγα τῷ πατρὶ τὸ μηδαμόθεν
<note type="footnote">11. 1 ἀγένητα de || 2 ριψωμεν] -ομεν b ΙΙ 5 γὰρ] + καὶ d || 6 fiovov]
μόνος c || 11 om ἐστι df || o] ω e2 || 14 om εἰς ’Reg. a’ 15 ws] +
φησιν b || 17 τούτω] τοῦτο g || 18 θαρρήσομεν] -ωμεν adef</note>
<note type="footnote">2. ἔστω] for argument's sake, he
will assume that none but God is
unbegotten. That does not preclude
the possibility of One who is
begotten being God likewise, any
more than the fact that Adam alone
was directly formed by God precludes
others who are not so formed
from having the same nature as
Adam.</note>
<note type="footnote">6. ovbt τὸ ἂγ. μόνον θεός] It
would not be true to say that only
what is unbegotten can be God —
though nothing can be God which
is not begotten of the Father; you
must admit that what is begotten of
Him is God likewise.</note>
<note type="footnote">8. πῶς οὐσίαν θ. λ] How can a
merely negative attribute be spoken
of as constituting the essence of
God? Cp. ii 9.</note>
<note type="footnote">11. ὂ τὴν φύσιν ἐστι] ‘what He
is by nature; nor what it is that
has no generation.’</note>
<note type="footnote">12. τοῦτο λέγειν] ’to ash the question.’
Πολυπρ., cp. ii. 9.</note>
<note type="footnote">15. ὡς ἡ τοῦ ἂψ. vir.] Prob. Gr.
refers to 1 Gor. xiii 12; cp. ii <lb n="17."/>
Ὁ ἀψευδής, Tit. i <lb n="2."/></note>
<note type="footnote">17. τοῖς ἐπὶ τ. καθαιρ] Gp. ii 12
τοῖς ἐνταῦθα κεκ. . . .πρὸς τὸ ποθούμένον.</note>
<note type="footnote">18. εἰ καἰ μέγα κτλ.] If it is a
great thing to be altogether underived,
as the Father is, it is no
less a thing to be derived from Him
in the way the Son is. He shares
the nature and glory of the Selfexistent,
and has the additional
glory of being begotten of Him.
Cp. iv 7.</note>

<pb n="90"/>
ὡρμῆσθαι, οὐκ ἔλαττον τῷ υἱῷ τὸ ἐκ τοιούτου πατρός.
τῆς τε γὰρ τοῦ ἀναιτίου δόξης μετέχοι ἄν, ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ
ἀναιτίου, καὶ πρόσεστι τὸ τῆς γεννήσεως, πρᾶγμα τοσοῦτον
καὶ οὕτω σεβάσμιον τοῖς μὴ πάντῃ χαμαιπετέσι καὶ
<lb n="5"/> ὑλικοῖς τὴν διάνοιαν.</p></div><div type="textpart" subtype="chapter" n="12"><p>Ἀλλ’ εἰ ταὐτὸν τῷ πατρί, φασιν, ὁ υἱὸς κατ’
οὐσίαν, ἀγέννητον δὲ ὁ πατήρ, ἔσται τοῦτο καὶ ὁ υἱός.
καλῶς, εἴπερ οὐσία θεοῦ τὸ ἀγέννητον, ἵν ᾖ τις καινὴ
μίξις, γεννητοαγέννητον. εἰ δὲ περὶ οὐσίαν ἡ διαφορά,
<lb n="10"/> τί τοῦτο ὡς ἰσχυρὸν λέγεις; ἢ καὶ σὺ πατὴρ τοῦ πατρός,
ἵνα μηδενὶ λείπῃ τοῦ σοῦ πατρός, ἐπειδὴ ταὐτὸν εἶ κατ’
οὐσίαν; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι, τῆς ἰδιότητος ἀκινήτου μενούσης,
ζητήσομεν οὐσίαν θεοῦ, ἥ τις ποτέ ἐστιν, εἴπερ ζητήσομεν;
ὅτι δὲ οὐ ταὐτὸν ἀγέννητον καὶ θεός, ὧδε ἂν μάθοις. εἰ
<note type="footnote">4 σεβασμιον] σεμνὸν ‘Reg, a’ II χαμαιπετέσι] χαμερπέσι b 12. 6 ταῦτον
φασι τὼ πατρὶ ο ὑίος b: ταὐτὸν φ. ο ὑίος τὼ πατρὶ df || 7 ἀγέννητος bde ||
9 om ’δε c || 10 om η c</note>
<note type="footnote">12.‘If ’the Father is unbegotten,’
they urge, ‘and the Son is what the
Father is, then the Son too is unbegotten.’
That would be true if
unbegottenness zuere the actual essence
of God; but it is ἴοι. If ‘unbegotten’
and ‘God’ were equivalent
terms, then we should be able to put
the one for the other, and say not
only ’ the God of Israel’ but ‘the
Unbegotten of Israel? On this theory,
the nature of the begotten Son is not
only different from that of the unbegotten
Father, but is its exact
opposite; and indeed it might be
argued that since the positive is prior
to the negative, the begotten Son is
prior to the unbegotten Father.</note>
<note type="footnote">7. ἔσται τοῦτο] sc. ἀγέννητον
Quite true, Gr. replies, on the assumption
that unbegottenness is the
essence of God; the Son in that
case will be begotten-unbegotten!</note>
<note type="footnote">9. περὶ οὐσίαν] The prep, is
emphatic. It is used as in § 10
sub fin. ‘If the difference between
begotten and unbegotten is (not one
of nature but only) one affecting the
modes of that nature.’</note>
<note type="footnote">10. πατὴρ τοῦ π.] ‘Are you your
father's father?’ If not, ace. to
your argument, you cannot have the
same essence as your father.</note>
<note type="footnote">12. ἰδιότητος] not ’’personality’
but the special distinguishing peculiarities
which differentiate one person
from another; the ‘property,’
as Hooker calls it (E. P. v 51). If
we enquire at all what the nature
of God is, we will do so without
touching these individual properties.</note>

<pb n="91"/>
ταὐτὸν ἦν, ἔδει πάντως, ἐπειδὴ τινῶν θεὸς ὁ θεός, τινῶν
εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἀγέννητον· ἢ ἐπεὶ μηδενὸς τὸ ἀγέννητον, μηδὲ
τὸν θεὸν εἶναι τινῶν. τὰ γὰρ πάντῃ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὁμοίως
ἐκφέρεται. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐ τινῶν τὸ ἀγέννητον, τίνων γάρ;
καὶ τινῶν θεὸς ὁ θεός, πάντων γάρ. πῶς οὖν ἂν εἴη ταὐτὸν <lb n="5"/>
θεὸς καὶ ἀγέννητον; καὶ πάλιν, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἀγέννητον καἲ
τὸ γεννητὸν ἀντίκειται ἀλλήλοις, ὡς ἕξις καὶ στέρησις,
ἀνάγκη καὶ οὐσίας εἰσαχθῆναι ἀντικειμένας ἀλλήλαις,
ὅπερ οὐ δέδοται· ἢ ἐπειδὴ πάλιν αἱ ἕξεις τῶν στερήσεων
πρότεραι, καὶ ἀναιρετικαὶ τῶν ἕξεων αἱ στερήσεις, μὴ <lb n="10"/>
μόνον πρεσβυτέραν εἶναι τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας τὴν τοῦ
υἱοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀναιρουμένην ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρός, ὅσον ἐπὶ
ταῖς σαῖς ὑποθέσεσι.</p><note type="footnote">8 εἰσαχθῆναι] ἀντεισαχθῆναι b</note><note type="footnote">1. τινῶν ὁ θεός] ’God,’ acc. to
Gr., is a relative term; a ’ God ’
must be ’God of’ some one. If
then unbegottenness is the very
essence of God, and ‘unbegotten’
and ‘God’ are convertible terms,
then we must be able to say with
equal correctness, ’ the God of all ’
and ‘the unbegotten of all’; or
conversely, as the unbegotten is ’no
one's unbegotten,’ so God must be
‘no one's God.‘ The argument
does not seem a very valuable one,
because, to begin with, it must be
questioned whether ‘God’ is really
a term of relationship. If it be
so, then apart from creation God
would not be God. But the main
purpose of the argument is sound,
inasmuch as it shews the absurdity
of identifying absolutely the positive
existence of God with a merely
negative description. On Gr. ’s interprettation
of the word θεός, see iv
18.</note><note type="footnote">3. ὁμοίως ἐκφέρεται] True synonyms
are used interchangeably (lit.
’are produced, employed, in a similar
manner’); cp. προφέρεται in § 5.</note><note type="footnote">8. ἀνάγκη] If ἀγέννητον is the
very nature of God, and yet God
begets a Son (which the Eunomians
in a sense allow), it follows that the
nature of the Son is not only different
from that of the Father, but
is diametrically opposite to it. This
is not allowed by any one οὐ δέδοται).</note><note type="footnote">9. αἱ ἔξεις τῶν ’στ’. πρότεραι] You
cannot take away a thing which is
not there to begin with. But ἀγέννητον
implies a taking away of γέννεννητάν.
Therefore γέννητον is prior
to ἀγέννητον, — the Son to the Father,
— and when the Father comes,
and His ἀγέννητον is alone recongised
as divine, He does away
with the Son who occupied the
ground before Him. Of course this
argument is one of mere mockery
ἐρεσχελία, i 3).</note><note type="footnote">13. ’If the begetting of the Son
is not a thing finished ἀν’ ’done with,
it is as yet incomplete, and will one
day be completed: if it is finished, it
must have begun.’ That does not
follow. ἱν soul had a beginning,
but will never have an end.</note><note type="footnote">No; our belief is, that whatever
possesses the essential notes of a class
of beings — say of α horse or an ox —
is rightly called by that name, whatever
distinctive properties it may
have which mark it off from others
of the class. So it ἲς with God; the
nature is one, although there are
differences of designation, corresponding
to differences hi fact, between the
Persons who share that natitre.</note><pb n="92"/></div><div type="textpart" subtype="chapter" n="13"><p>τίς ἔτι λόγος αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀφύκτων; τάχα ἂν ἐπ’
ἐκεῖνο καταφύγοιεν τελευταῖον· ὡς εἰ μὲν οὐ πέπαυται τοῦ
γεννᾷν ὁ θεός, ἀτελὴς ἡ γέννησις, καί ποτε παύσεται.
εἰ πέπαυται δέ, πάντως καὶ ἤρξατο. πάλιν οἱ σωματικοὶ
<lb n="5"/> τὰ σωματικά. ἐγὼ δὲ εἰ μὲν ἀίδιον αὐτῷ τὸ γεννᾶσθαι,
ἢ μή, οὔπω λέγω, ἕως ἂν τὸ Πρὸ πάντων βουνῶν γεννᾶ
με ἀκριβῶς ἐπισκέψωμαι. οὐχ ὁρῶ δὲ τίς ἡ ἀνάγκη
τοῦ λόγου. εἰ γὰρ ἦρκται κατ’ αὐτοὺς τὸ παυσόμενον, οὐκ
ἦρκται πάντως τὸ μὴ παυσόμενον. τί τοίνυν ἀποφανοῦνται
<lb n="10"/> περὶ ψυχῆς, ἢ τῆς ἀγγελικῆς φύσεως; εἰ μὲν ἦρκται, καὶ
παύσεται· εἰ δὲ οὐ παύσεται, δῆλον ὅτι κατ’ αὐτοὺς οὐδὲ
ἦρκται. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἦρκται, καὶ οὐ παύσεται. οὐκ ἄρα
ἦρκται κατ’ αὐτοὺς τὸ παυσόμενον. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἡμέτερος
λόγος· ὥσπερ ἵππου, καὶ βοός, καὶ ἀνθρώπου, καὶ ἑκάστου
<lb n="15"/> τῶν ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος, εἷς λόγος ἐστί, καὶ ὂ μὲν ἂν
μετέχῃ τοῦ λόγου, τοῦτο καὶ κυρίως λέγεσθαι, ὃ δ’ ἂν μὴ
μετέχῃ, τοῦτο ἢ μὴ λέγεσθαι, ἢ μὴ κυρίως λέγεσθαι, οὕτω
δὲ καὶ θεοῦ μίαν οὐσίαν εἶναι, καὶ φύσιν, καὶ κλῆσιν, κἂν
<note type="footnote">13. 4 εἰ ’δε πέπαυται df || 15 λογος] ὄρος ’tres Colb.’ II 16 om καὶ c
17 μὴ λέγεσθαι] μηδὲ λ. df</note>
<note type="footnote">1. τῶν ἀφύκτων] i.e. which they
consider to be so.</note>
<note type="footnote">3. καί ποτε παύσεται] ‘and some
day He will stop,’ viz. when τελεία
ἡ γέννησις. This is more pointed
than to make πότε interrogative.</note>
<note type="footnote">6. π,ρὸ πάντων β.] Prov. viii 25.</note>
<note type="footnote">9. ἀποφανοῦνται] ’will they shew
to be the case.’</note>
<note type="footnote">12. οὐκἄραἢρκται κ.αὐτοὐςτὸπ.]
Therefore the thing which zuill one
day stop can never according to them
have had a beginning.’ So Gr. turns
their logic against them.</note>
<note type="footnote">13. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἠμ’. λ.] sc. λέγει.</note>
<note type="footnote">15. εἷς λόγος ἐστί] ’one ’ or
‘principle of existence’; and so, from
the observer’s point of view, ‘definition.’
What is implied may be seen
by the corresponding words in the
apodosis, οὐσίαν κ. φύσιν κ. κλῆσιν.
The meaning is not the same as in ὁ
ἡμέτερος λ. just before, nor has it any
relation to λέγεσθαι directly after.</note>
<note type="footnote">ib. ὃ μὲν ἂν μετέχῃ τ. λ.] ‘what.
ever shares that characteristic principle,
is rightly called by that name.’
Tοῦτο, however, is grammatically
the subject of λῆ., not the predicate.</note>
<note type="footnote">17. οὕτω δέ] The ‘apodotic’ force
of δέ is well known. It recurs again
in the next section.</note>

<pb n="93"/>
ἐπινοίαις τισὶ διαιρουμέναις συνδιαιρῆται καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα.
καὶ ὃ μὲν ἂν κυρίως λέγηται, τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι θεόν· ὃ δ’ ἂν
ἦ κατὰ φύσιν, τοῦτο καὶ ἀληθῶς ὀνομάζεσθαι· εἴπερ μὴ
ἐν ὀνόμασιν, ἀλλ’ ἐν πράγμασίν ἐστιν ἡμῖν ἢ ἀλήθεια. οἱ
δέ, ὥσπερ δεδοικότες μὴ πάντα κινεῖν κατὰ τῆς ἀληθείας, <lb n="5"/>
θεὸν μὲν εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν ὁμολογοῦσιν, ὅταν βιασθῶσι τῶ
λόγῳ καὶ ταῖς μαρτυρίαις, ὁμώνυμον δὲ καὶ μόνης κοινω-
νοῦντα τῆς κλήσεως.</p></div><div type="textpart" subtype="chapter" n="14"><p>Ὅταν δὲ ἀνθυποφέρωμεν αὐτοῖς· τί οὖν; οὐ
κυρίως θεὸς ὁ υἱός, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ζῷον τὸ γεγραμμένον; πῶς <lb n="10"/>
οὖν θεός, εἰ μὴ κυρίως θεός; τί γὰρ κωλύει, φασί, καὶ
ὁμώνυμα ταῦτα εἶναι, καὶ κυρίως ἀμφότερα λέγεσθαι; καὶ
προοίσουσιν ἡμῖν τὸν κύνα, τὸν χερσαῖον, καὶ τὸν θαλάτ-
τιον, ὁμώνυμά τε ὄντα, καὶ κυρίως λεγόμενα, — ἔστι γάρ τι
καὶ τοιοῦτον εἶδος ἐν τοῖς ὁμωνύμοις, — καὶ εἴτε τι ἄλλο τῇ <lb n="15"/>
<note type="footnote">4 ἥμιν ἐστιν f 14. 3 προσοίσουσιν bedef</note>
<note type="footnote">1. κἂν ἐπινοίαις τισι] The distinctive
’notions’ which Gr. has in
view are, of course, those of giving
and of receiving life, of ‘proceeding ’
and its correlative. They are not,
however, to be considered as merely
subjective distinctions drawn by
us, any more than the distinctions
which we draw between one man
and another. Td ὀνόματα, sc. πατήρ,
υἱός, πνεῦμα.</note>
<note type="footnote">2. ὃ μὲν ἂν κ. λέγηται] sc. θεός.
This seems hardly necessary to say;
but it lends a kind of fulness to the
following statement, ὃ δ’ ἃν ἢ κατὰ
φύσιν θεός), τοῦτο κ. ἅλ’. ὀνομάζεσθαι
θεόν). The ὀνομάζεσθαι = λέγεσθαι,
and has nothing to do with the ὀνόματα
above.</note>
<note type="footnote">4. οἱ δέ] While names are not of
much importance, so long as we get
the facts right, they, the Eunomians,
when pressed, will use the name of
θεός to describe the Son, but explain
it to have no foundation in fact.</note>
<note type="footnote">7. ταῖς μαρτυρίαις] ’’testimonies
of Scripture.’ Cp v 2 29.</note>
<note type="footnote">ib. ὁμώνυμον] ‘in an equivocal
sense.’ Ὁμώνυμα are in logic
which bear the same name but in
different senses.</note>
<note type="footnote">14. ’ The word God,’ they
’is an aequivocum; it is used to
denote two things which are essehtially
different, as dig, for example,
denotes both α beast and α ’ Ah,
but in the one case there is no difference
in dignity between the two things
which bear the same name; in the
other, if your theory were true, two
beings would bear the same name
which cotild not be even distantly
compared.</note>
<note type="footnote">12. ὁμ. ταῦτα εἶναι] The neut.
used, as in the preceding section, to
avoid the irreverence of a direct
reference to the Divine Persons.</note>
<note type="footnote">13. τὸν κύνα] the name of a fish,
as well as of the beast. Both fish
and beast are quite properly called
’dog,’ but not in the same sense.</note>
<note type="footnote">15. τοιοῦτον εἶδος] ’such a class’;
namely, ὁμώνυμα both of which
’properly’ bear the common name.</note>

<pb n="94"/>
αὐτῇ προσχρῆται προσηγορίᾳ, καὶ μετέχει ταύτης ἐπ’ ἴσης,
τῇ φύσει διεστηκός. ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖ μέν, ὦ βέλτιστε, δύο φύσεις
τιθεὶς ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν προσηγορίαν, οὐδὲν ἀμείνω τὴν ἑτέραν
τῆς ἑτέρας εἰσάγεις, οὐδὲ τὴν μὲν πρότερον, τὴν δὲ ὕστερον,
<lb n="5"/> οὐδὲ τὴν μὲν μᾶλλον, τὴν δὲ ἧττον οὖσαν τοῦθ’ ὅπερ
λέγεται. οὐδὲ γάρ τι συνέζευκται τὸ ταύτην παρέχον
αὐταῖς τὴν ἀνάγκην. οὐ γὰρ ὁ μὲν μᾶλλον κύων, ὁ δὲ
ἧττον τοῦ ἑτέρου κυνός, οἷον ὁ θαλάττιος τοῦ χερσαίου,
ἢ ὁ χερσαῖος ἔμπαλιν τοῦ θαλαττίου· διὰ τί γάρ, ἢ κατὰ
<lb n="10"/> τίνα λόγον; ἀλλ’ ἐν ὁμοτίμοις πράγμασι καὶ διαφόροις
ἡ κοινωνία τῆς κλήσεως. ἐνταῦθα δὲ τῷ θεῷ παραζευγνὺς
τὸ σεβάσμιον, καὶ τὸ ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν οὐσίαν εἶναι καὶ φύσιν,
ὂ μόνου θεοῦ καὶ οἱονεὶ φύσις θεότητος, εἶτα τῷ πατρὶ μὲν
τοῦτο διδούς, τὸν υἱὸν δὲ ἀποστερῶν καὶ ὑποτιθείς, καὶ τὰ
<lb n="15"/> δεύτερα νέμων αὐτῷ τῆς τιμῆς καὶ τῆς προσκυνήσεως, κἂν
ταῖς συλλαβαῖς χαρίζῃ τὸ ὅμοιον, τῷ πράγματι τὴν θεότητα
περικόπτεις, καὶ μεταβαίνεις κακούργως ἀπὸ τῆς τὸ ἴσον
ἐχούσης ὁμωνυμίας ἐπὶ τὴν τὰ μὴ ἴσα συνδέουσαν· ὥστε
ὁ γραπτός σοι καὶ ὁ ζῶν ἄνθρωπος μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ τοῦ
<note type="footnote">13 οιονει] οἶον a ΙΙ 17 μεταβαίνεις] ης (non ῃς) a: ει d1</note>
<note type="footnote">2. δύο φύσεις] perh. ‘two kinds
of animals.’</note>
<note type="footnote">4. πρότερον...ὕστερον] as well as
μᾶλλον and ἦττον, qualify οὖσαν τοῦθ’
ὄπ. λέγ’.</note>
<note type="footnote">6. οὐδὲ γάρ τι σ.] ’for there is
nothing attached to the name which
forces such distinctions upon ’
There is nothing in the name ’dog’
to make you care to enquire whether
the beast or the fish was the first to
bear it, or whether the beast is more
of a dog than the fish: the one 
of ’dog’ is for all practical purposes
as good as the other. The common
name is borne by creatures which,
though different from each other,
are equals.</note>
<note type="footnote">11. ἐνταῦθα δέ] ’ But when
come to the case in point, you attach
to God an awful solemnity, and say
that He is too high to be described as
having any essence or nature, — athing
which belongs to none but God and
constitutes as it were the nature of
the Godhead; and you give this to
the Father, but take it away from the
Son, and make a subject of Him.’</note>
<note type="footnote">17. περικόπτεις] ‘mutitate.’
ib. τῆς τὸ 1. ἐχ’. ὁμων.] such as
that of the different ’dogs.’</note>
<note type="footnote">19. ὁ γραπτός σ. κ. ὁ ζῶν ἆ] The
real man and the picture of a man
(either of which is spoken of as ’a
man’) illustrate more nearly such a
Godhead as the Eunomians speak
of than the two kinds of ’dogs.’
The picture is not further from being
a real man than the Son is from
being really God, if the Eunomian
account is correct; and at the same
time it bears externally a greater
resemblance to its original.</note>

<pb n="95"/>
ὑποδείγματος κύνες τῇ θεότητι πλησιάζουσιν. ἢ δὸς ἀμ-
φοτέροις, ὥσπερ τὴν κοινωνίαν τῆς κλήσεως, οὕτω δὲ καὶ
τὴν ὁμοτιμίαν τῶν φύσεων, εἰ καὶ διαφόρους ταύτας εἰσάγεις·
καὶ καταλέλυκάς σου τοὺς κύνας, οὓς ἐξηῦρες κατὰ
τῆς ἀνισότητος. τί γὰρ ὄφελος τῆς ὁμωνυμίας, εἰ τὸ <lb n="5"/>
ἰσότιμον ἔχοιεν οἱ παρά σου διαιρούμενοι; οὐ γὰρ ἵνα
ἰσότιμα δείξῃς, ἁλλ’ ἵνα ἀνισότιμα, πρὸς τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν
καὶ τοὺς κύνας κατέφυγες. πῶς ἄν τις ἐλεγχθείη μᾶλλον
καὶ ἑαυτῷ μαχόμενος καὶ θεότητι;</p></div><div type="textpart" subtype="chapter" n="15"><p>Ἐὰν δὲ λεγόντων ἡμῶν, ὅτι τῷ αἰτίῳ μείζων ὁ <lb n="10"/>
πατὴρ τοῦ υἱοῦ, προσλαβόντες τὴν Τὰ δὲ αἴτιον φύσει
<note type="footnote">3 τῶν φύσεων] τῆς φύσεως ’nonnul.’ || 6 ἰσότιμον] + μὴ bedef</note>
<note type="footnote">15. 11 om ’δε b ’nonnul.’</note>
<note type="footnote">1. ἢ δός] Otherwise, — if the
chasm between the two Persons
bearing the name of God is not, on
your theory, as vast as I have indicated,
suppose you admit that the
equivocal name is in this instance
applied to two natures of equal
splendour. You shall call them
different natures, if you like; but
admit that they are equal. What is
the result? You are no longer satisfied
with your illustration of the
dogs. You invented it to justify an
insinuation of inequality. The κατὰ
in κατὰ τῆς ἀνισ. appears to be used
as in the phrase τοξεύειν κατὰ σκοποῦ,
of the point aimed at.</note>
<note type="footnote">5. εἰ τὸ ἴσ’. ἔχοιεν] It requires
great ingenuity to extract any meaning
from the sentence, in relation
to the context, if the reading μὴ
ἔχ. is adopted. The μὴ was evidently
introduced by copyists who
thought that Gr. was making a
statement of his own belief, which
was that the name θεός is applied in
precisely the same sense to Father
and Son. But this ignores Gr.'s
argument, — and, it may he added,
the meaning of ὁμωνυμία. Gr.'s
immediate purpose is to shew that
the Eunomian illustration is, from
their own point of view, ill-chosen.
To be of any service to them, their
instance of ’equivocation’ should
have been one where the same name
is applied to two objects of very
different value.</note>
<note type="footnote">15.‘You admit,’ they say, ‘that
the Father is greater than the Son,
inasmuch ἃς He is the author of the
Son's being; but since He ἲς by
nature author of the ’s being, it
follows that He is by nature greater
than the ’ The fallacy of the
argument, Gr. annoers, lies in this,
—that they attribute to the underlying
essence what is predicated of
the particular possessor of that essence.
It is like arguing that because so and
so is a dead man, therefore man is
dead.</note>
<note type="footnote">10. τῷ αἰτίῳ μ.] lby virtue of being
the cause of His existence.</note>
<note type="footnote">11. προσλαβόντες τὴν . . . πρότασιν]
‘taking ὂν their minor premiss.
Πρότασις is the tehnical word for a
‘premiss’; the πρός in προσλ. denotes
that this is a second (or minor) premiss.</note>

<pb n="96"/>
πρότασιν, ἔπειτα τὸ Μεῖζον τῆ φύσει συνάγωσιν· οὐκ
οἶδα πότερον ἑαυτοὺς παραλογίζονται, ἢ τοὺς πρὸς οὓς ὁ
λόγος. οὐ γὰρ ἁπλῶς ὅσα κατά τινος λέγεται, ταῦτα καὶ
κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου τούτῳ ῥηθήσεται· ἀλλὰ δῆλον κατὰ
<lb n="5"/> τίνος, καὶ τίνα. ἐπεὶ τί κωλύει κἀμὲ ταύτην πρότασιν
ποιησάμενον τήν, ὅτι ὁ πατὴρ μείζων τῇ φύσει, ἔπειτα
προσλαβόντα τὸ Φύσει δὲ οὐ πάντως μείζων οὐδὲ πατήρ,
ἐντεῦθεν συναγαγεῖν τὸ Μεῖζον οὐ πάντως μεῖζον· ἤ, Ὁ
<note type="footnote">1. συνάγωσιν] ‘conclude.’ The
Eunomian syllogism is this: ’The
Father is greater than the Son inasmuch
as the Son owes His existence
to Him. But the giving of existence
to the Son belongs to the Father by
nature. Therefore the Father is
greater than the Son by nature.’</note>
<note type="footnote">3. οὐ γὰρ ἁπλῶς κτλ.] The
reply is that not everything which
is predicated of a particular thing
(e.g. of Socrates) is predicated of the
nature which underlies that thing
(in the example chosen, human nature).
Everyone recognises what
the statements are intended to
apply to, and how they apply. So,
what we say of the Father does not
necessarily apply to the Divine
Essence which belongs to Him;
some things apply to Him as Father,
not as God.</note>
<note type="footnote">4. κατὰ τίνος, καὶ τίνα] The
words are interrogative; if Gr. had
intended the indef. pron., he must
have said δ. ὅτι κ. τ. It seems
necessary to understand κατὰ again
before τίνα, ’in regard to what
’ — i.e. in regard to nature, or
to individuality, or what. To take
the example given by Gr. at the end
of the section, if I say that Socrates
is a dead man, it is plain that I am
speaking of Socrates in particular
and of no one else, and that I am
speaking of Socrates in relation to
the bodily life, not about his soul,
nor about his influence.</note>
<note type="footnote">5. τί κωλύει κἀμέ] Two can play
at that game, Gr. says. He too can
draw that kind of conclusion, and
they shall see whether it will hold.
He makes a major premiss of that
conclusion of theirs, ’The father is
by nature greater than the ’
(We need not suppose that Gr. is
for the moment speaking of God:
the words would suit any father and
son.) The minor premiss is, ’But
he is not by nature necessarily greater,
or necessarily ’ So far there
is no absurdity. He need never have
had a son; there might have been
nothing else to compare him with.
(Gr., 1 repeat, is not speaking of
God.) The right conclusion would
be that the ’s ’natural’ superiority
over his son consists solely in
his fatherhood, and not in his nature,
—in his relationship, and not
in that which he is when considered
apart by himself. But the false conclusion
which Gr. draws, to illustrate
the false conclusions of the
Eunomians, is this: ’Therefore the
greater is not necessarily greater, ’ or
‘The father is not necessarily father.’
It will be observed that Gr. says
μεῖζον, not 6 μείζων, which makes it
clearer that the proposition is intended
to be quite general: Ἁ thing
which is greater than another need
not be greater, but might be at the
same time equal or less; a father
need not be his ’s father, but
might be his brother or his son.’
The second paralogism ὁ θεὸς οὐ
πάντως θεός) helps to shew that this
is Gr.'s meaning.</note>	

<pb n="97"/>
πατὴρ οὐ πάντως πατήρ. εἰ βούλει δὲ οὕτως· ὁ θεός
οὐσία· ἡ οὐσία δέ, οὐ πάντως θεός· τὸ ἑξῆς αὐτὸς συνάγαγε·
ὁ θεός, οὐ πάντως θεός. ἀλλ’ οἶμαι, παρὰ τὸ πῇ καὶ
ἁπλῶς ὁ παραλογισμὸς οὗτος, ὡς τοῖς περὶ ταῦτα τεχνολογεῖν
σύνηθες. ἡμῶν γὰρ τὸ μεῖζον τῇ τοῦ αἰτίου φύσει <lb n="5"/>
διδόντων, αὐτοὶ τὸ τῇ φύσει μεῖζον ἐπάγουσιν· ὥσπερ ἂν
εἰ καὶ λεγόντων ἡμῶν, ὅτι ὁ δεῖνα νεκρὸς ἄνθρωπος, ἁπλῶς
ἐπῆγον αὐτοὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον.</p></div></div></body></text></TEI>