<TEI xmlns="http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0" xmlns:py="http://codespeak.net/lxml/objectify/pytype" py:pytype="TREE"><text><body><div type="translation" n="urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0544.tlg001.1st1K-eng1" xml:lang="eng"><div type="textpart" subtype="book" n="1"><div type="textpart" subtype="chapter" n="4"><div type="textpart" subtype="section" n="9"><p>
Now we call it an ‟ability” not in any subtle sense,
but simply in respect of its ‟being able.” By
‟appearances” we now mean the objects of sense-
perception, whence we contrast them with the objects
of thought or ‟judgements.” The phrase ‟in any
way whatsoever” can be connected either with the
word ‟ability,” to make us take the word ‟ability,”
as we said, in its simple sense, or with the phrase
‟opposing appearances to judgements;” for inasmuch 
as we oppose these in a variety of ways—appearances 
to appearances, or judgements to judgements, or 
/alternando/ appearances to judgements,—in order to 
ensure the inclusion of all these antitheses
we employ the phrase ‟in any way whatsoever.”
Or, again, we join ‟in any way whatsoever” to
‟appearances and judgements” in order that we may
not have to inquire how the appearances appear or
how the thought-objects are judged, but may take
these terms in the simple sense.</p></div><div type="textpart" subtype="section" n="10"><p>
The phrase ‟opposed judgements” we do not employ 
in the sense of negations and affirmations only but 
simply as equivalent to ‟conflicting judgements.”
<note n="a" resp="Loeb">i.e. ‟opposites” includes, for the Sceptics,
‟contraries” (e.g. ‟All are wise”)(‟None are wise”), as well
as ‟contradictories” (e.g. ‟Some are wise”)(‟None are wise”),
whereas the Stoics used it of the latter only.</note> 
‟Equipollence” we use of equality in respect of 
probability and improbability, to indicate that no 
one of the conflicting judgements takes precedence 
of any other as being more probable. ‟Suspense” 
is a state of mental rest owing to which we neither 
deny nor affirm anything. ‟Quietude” is an untroubled 
and tranquil condition of soul. And how quietude 
enters the soul along with suspension of judgement 
we shall explain in our chapter (XII.) ‟Concerning the End.”</p></div></div><div type="textpart" subtype="chapter" n="5"><head>Chapter V.—Of The Sceptic</head><div type="textpart" subtype="section" n="11"><p rend="align(indent)">
In the definition of the Sceptic system there is also
implicitly included that of the Pyrrhonean philosopher:
he is the man who participates in this ‟ability.”</p></div></div><div type="textpart" subtype="chapter" n="6"><head>Chapter VI.—Of The Principles of Scepticism</head><div type="textpart" subtype="section" n="12"><p rend="align(indent)">
The originating cause of Scepticism is, we say, the
hope of attaining quietude. Men of talent, who were
perturbed by the contradictions in things and in
doubt as to which of the alternatives they ought to
accept, were led on to inquire what is true in things
and what false, hoping by the settlement of this
question to attain quietude. The main basic principle
of the Sceptic system is that of opposing to every
proposition an equal proposition; for we believe that
as a consequence of this we end by ceasing to dogmatize.</p></div></div></div></div></body></text></TEI>