Of the Sceptic philosophy one argument (or branch of exposition) is called ‟general,” the other ‟special.” In the general argument we set forth the distinctive features of Scepticism, stating its purport and principles, its logical methods, criterion, and end or aim; the ‟Tropes,” also, or ‟Modes,”Cf. Introd. p. xxxvii; §§ 36 f. infra. which lead to suspension of judgement, and in what sense we adopt the Sceptic formulae, and the distinction between Scepticism and the philosophies which stand next to it.

In the special argument we state our objections regarding the several divisions of so-called philosophy. Bks. II and III belong to the ‟special” part of the exposition. Let us, then, deal first with the general argument, beginning our description with the names given to the Sceptic School.

The Sceptic School, then, is also called ‟Zetetic” from its activity in investigation and inquiry, and ‟Ephectic” or Suspensive from the state of mind produced in the inquirer after his search, and ‟Aporetic” or Dubitative either from its habit of doubting and seeking, as some say, or from its indecision as regards assent and denial, and ‟Pyrrhonian” from the fact that PyrrhoSee Introd. pp. xxx f. appears to us to have applied himself to Scepticism more thoroughly and more conspicuously than his predecessors.

Scepticism is an ability, or mental attitude, which opposes appearances to judgements in any way whatsoever, with the result that, owing to the equipollence of the objects and reasons thus opposed, we are brought firstly to a state of mental suspense and next to a state of ‟unperturbedness” or quietude.