Of the Sceptic philosophy one argument (or branch 
of exposition) is called ‟general,” the other ‟special.”
In the general argument we set forth the distinctive
features of Scepticism, stating its purport and 
principles, its logical methods, criterion, and end or aim; 
the ‟Tropes,” also, or ‟Modes,” Cf. Introd. p. xxxvii; §§ 36 f. infra. which lead to suspension 
of judgement, and in what sense we adopt the Sceptic 
formulae, and the distinction between Scepticism 
and the philosophies which stand next to it. 
In the special argument we state our objections 
regarding the several divisions of so-called philosophy.
 Bks. II and III belong to the ‟special” 
part of the exposition. 
Let us, then, deal first with the general
argument, beginning our description with the names
given to the Sceptic School. Chapter III.—Of The Nomenclature of Scepticism 
The Sceptic School, then, is also called ‟Zetetic” 
from its activity in investigation and inquiry, and
‟Ephectic” or Suspensive from the state of mind
produced in the inquirer after his search, and
‟Aporetic” or Dubitative either from its habit of
doubting and seeking, as some say, or from its
indecision as regards assent and denial, and ‟Pyrrhonian” 
from the fact that Pyrrho See Introd. pp. xxx f. appears to us to
have applied himself to Scepticism more thoroughly
and more conspicuously than his predecessors. Chapter IV.—What Scepticism Is 
Scepticism is an ability, or mental attitude, which
opposes appearances to judgements in any way
whatsoever, with the result that, owing to the 
equipollence of the objects and reasons thus opposed, we
are brought firstly to a state of mental suspense and
next to a state of ‟unperturbedness” or quietude.