Now, since proofs are effected by these means, it is evident that, to be able to grasp them, a man must be capable of logical reasoning, of studying characters and the virtues, and thirdly the emotions—the nature and character of each, its origin, and the manner in which it is produced. Thus it appears that Rhetoric is as it were an offshoot of Dialectic and of the science of Ethics, which may be reasonably called Politics. Rhetoric, as dealing with human actions, characters, virtues, and emotions, is closely connected with Politics, which includes Ethics. The two latter treat of the same subject from a different point of view. Both deal with happiness and virtue, but the object of Politics is, by comparison of the different forms of States to find the one in which man will be most virtuous. Lastly, Rhetoric, as an important factor in the training and education of the individual citizen and of the members of the State as a whole, may be described as an offshoot of Politics, with which the sophistical rhetoricians identified it. That is why Rhetoric assumes Or, slips into the garb of (Jebb). Probably a stage metaphor. the character of Politics, and those who claim to possess it, partly from ignorance, partly from boastfulness, and partly from other human weaknesses, do the same. For, as we said at the outset, Rhetoric is a sort of division or likeness of Dialectic, since neither of them is a science that deals with the nature of any definite subject, but they are merely faculties of furnishing arguments. We have now said nearly enough about the faculties of these arts and their mutual relations. But for purposes of demonstration, real or apparent, just as Dialectic possesses two modes of argument, induction and the syllogism, real or apparent, the same is the case in Rhetoric; for the example is induction, and the enthymeme a syllogism, and the apparent enthymeme an apparent syllogism. Accordingly I call an enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, and an example rhetorical induction. Now all orators produce belief by employing as proofs either examples or enthymemes and nothing else; so that if, generally speaking, it is necessary to prove any fact whatever either by syllogism or by induction—and that this is so is clear from the Analytics Aristot. Pr. Anal. 2.23 ; Aristot. Post. Anal. 1.1 . —each of the two former must be identical with each of the two latter. That is, enthymeme and example must be the same as syllogism and induction. 
 The difference between example and enthymeme is evident from the Topics , From the definitions of syllogism (1.1) and induction (1.12). No particular passage, however, explains the difference here mentioned. where, in discussing syllogism and induction, it has previously been said that the proof from a number of particular cases that such is the rule, is called in Dialectic induction, in Rhetoric example; but when, certain things being posited, something different results by reason of them, alongside of them, from their being true, either universally or in most cases, such a conclusion in Dialectic is called a syllogism, in Rhetoric an enthymeme. It is evident that Rhetoric enjoys both these advantages The employment of syllogism and induction, τὸ εἶδος τῆς ῥητορικῆς being taken as simply = ἡ ῥητορική . Another rendering is: that each kind of Rhetoric (that which depends upon example or upon enthymeme) enjoys some special advantage. — for what has been said in the Methodica A lost treatise, mentioned by Diogenes Laertius in his Life of Aristotle , 24, and by Dionysius of Halicarnassus in the first letter to Ammaeus, 6. It is supposed to have dealt with some branch of Logic. holds good also in this case—for rhetorical speeches are sometimes characterized by examples and sometimes by enthymemes, and orators themselves may be similarly distinguished by their fondness for one or the other. Now arguments that depend on examples are not less calculated to persuade, but those which depend upon enthymemes meet with greater approval. 
 Their origin and the way in which each should be used will be discussed later 2.20-24. ; for the moment let us define more clearly these proofs themselves. Now, that which is persuasive is persuasive in reference to some one, and is persuasive and convincing either at once and in and by itself, or because it appears to be proved by propositions that are convincing Or, by persons which are so (Jebb). ; further, no art has the particular in view, medicine for instance what is good for Socrates or Callias, but what is good for this or that class of persons (for this is a matter that comes within the province of an art, whereas the particular is infinite and cannot be the subject of a true science); similarly, therefore, Rhetoric will not consider what seems probable in each individual case, for instance to Socrates or Hippias, but that which seems probable to this or that class of persons. It is the same with Dialectic, which does not draw conclusions from any random premises—for even madmen have some fancies—but it takes its material from subjects which demand reasoned discussion, as Rhetoric does from those which are common subjects of deliberation.