<TEI xmlns="http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0" xmlns:py="http://codespeak.net/lxml/objectify/pytype" py:pytype="TREE"><text xml:lang="eng"><body><div type="translation" n="urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0062.tlg063.perseus-eng4" xml:lang="eng"><div type="textpart" subtype="section" xml:base="urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0062.tlg063.perseus-eng4:" n="66"><p><label>Hermotimus</label> How can it possibly be?</p><p><label>Lycinus</label> This way: take a correct number, twenty; suppose, I
mean, a man has twenty beans in his closed hand, and asks ten different persons to guess the number; they guess seven, five, thirty, ten, fifteen—various numbers, in short. It is possible, I suppose, that one may be right?</p><p><label>Hermotimus</label> Yes.</p><p><label>Lycinus</label> It is not impossible, however, that they may all guess different incorrect numbers, and not one of them suggest twenty beans, What say you?</p><p><label>Hermotimus</label> It is not impossible.</p><p><label>Lycinus</label> In the same way, all philosophers are investigating the nature of Happiness; they get different answers, one Pleasure, another Goodness, and so through the list. It is probable that Happiness is one of these; but it is also not improbable that it is something else altogether. We seem to have reversed the proper procedure, and hurried on to the end before we had

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found the beginning. I suppose we ought first to have ascertained that the truth has actually been discovered, and that some philosopher or other has it, and only then to have gone on to the next question, which of them is to be believed.</p><p><label>Hermotimus</label> So that, even if we go all through all philosophy, we shall have no certainty of finding the truth even then; that is what you say.</p><p><label>Lycinus</label> Please, please do not ask me; once more, apply to reason itself. Its answer will perhaps be that there can be no certainty yet—as long as we cannot be sure that it is one or other of the things they say it is.

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