When a man has endured all this, has wrestled with
an illness so serious, and has conquered the ailment
of all ailments most difficult to master, will you
empower the plaintiff to disown him again, permit
him to interpret the laws in any way he will against
a benefactor, and allow him to fight with nature?
 I, obeying nature, save and preserve my father for
my own sake, gentlemen of the jury, even if he
wrongs me; but that father, following, he says, the
laws, ruins the son that has done him a benefit, and
deprives him of his family. He is his son’s enemy,
I am my father’s friend. I cherish nature, he slights
and insults her just claims. To think of a father who
hates his son unjustly! To think of a son that loves his
father still more unjustly! For I bring it as a charge


 

against myself, since my father constrains me to do
so, that I who am hated love when I should not and
love more than I ought. Yet it is nature’s behest
that fathers love their sons more than sons their
fathers. He, however, deliberately slights even the
laws, which preserve for the family sons who have
done no wrong, as well as nature, who draws parents
into great affection for their children. It cannot be
said that, having exceptional grounds for good-will
towards me, he pays me exceptional dues of good-will
and runs the measure over, or that at least he imitates
and rivals me in my love; no, alas! he even hates
one who loves him, repels one who cherishes him,
injures one who helps him, and disowns one who
clings to him. Aye, though the laws are kindly to
children, he employs them against me as if they
were unkindly. Ah, what a conflict you wish to
precipitate, father, between the laws and nature !
 
Truly, truly, this matter is not as you will have it
tobe. Youillinterpret the laws, father, for they are
well made. Nature and law are not at war in the
matter of good-will; they go hand in hand there,
and work together for the righting of wrongs. You
mistreat your benefactor; you wrong nature. Why
wrong the laws, as well as nature? They mean to
be good, and just, and kindly to children, but you will
not allow it, inciting them repeatedly against one
son as if his name were legion, and not suffering
them to rest contented with punishments when they
are willing to rest contented with demonstrations
of filial affection; and yet they were not made,
surely, as a menace to those who have done no
wrong. Indeed, the laws permit suit to be brought
on the charge of ingratitude against persons who do

 

not help those who have helped them. The existence of a law making ingratitude (dyapio7ia) actionable was part of the accepted tradition of the Greek rhetorical seHnee (Sopater in Walz, Rhetores Graect, VIII, 175 and 239; Cyrus, tbsd., 391; cf. Seneca, de Benef., III, 6, 1). For its existence outside the schools the evidence is conflicting. The name of the action is included in the list given by Pollux, VIII, 31, and Valerius Maximus (V, 3, ext. 3) says that Athens had such a law. On the other hand, Xenophon puts into the mouth of Socrates (Mem., II, 2,13; ef. Cyrop. I, 2,7) the statement that Athens took no cognisance of ingratitude except toward parents, and Seneca (loc. cit.) says that no nation except the Macedonians had a law against it, _ But when a
man, besides failing to render like for like, even
deems it right to inflict punishment in return for
the very benefits that he has received, think whether
there is any exaggeration of injustice which he has
overlooked ! 
That it is neither possible for him to disown a
son after having already once for all exhausted his
paternal right and made use of the laws, nor yet just
to thrust away one who has shown himself so great
a benefactor and exclude him from the house has
been, I think, sufficiently established.
 
Therefore
let us now come to the ground of disownment and
let us see what the nature of the charge is. It is
necessary to recur once more to the intent of the
lawgiver; for, suppose we grant you briefly the
right to disown as often as you wish and also concede
you this right even against your benefactor, you are
not to disown casually, I take it, or for any and eve
cause. The lawgiver does not say that the father
may disown for any reason that he may chance to
allege—that it is enough just to express the wish
and find a fault. Else why should we need a court?
No, he commits it to you, gentlemen of the jury,
to consider whether the father’s anger is based upon
just and sufficient grounds or not. This, then, is
what you should now look into. And IJ shall begin
with what immediately followed his insanity.