But as for knowledge and truth, even as in our illustration it is right to deem light and vision sunlike, but never to think that they are the sun, so here it is right to consider these two their counterparts, as being like the good or boniform,ἀγαθοειδῆ occurs only here in classical Greek literature. Plato quite probably coined it for his purpose. but to think that either of them is the goodThere is no article in the Greek. Plato is not scrupulous to distinguish good and the good here. cf. on 505 C, p. 89, note f. is not right. Still higher honor belongs to the possession and habitἕξις is not yet in Plato quite the technical Aristotelian habit. However 344 C approaches it. Cf. also 11 D, 41 C, Ritter-Preller, p. 285. Plato used many words in periphrasis with the genitive, e.g. ἕξις 625 C, γένεσις 691 B, 73 B, 76 E, μοῖρα 255 B, 274 E, 249 B,φύσις 109 E, 186 B, 729 C, 845 D, 944 D, etc. He may have chosen ἕξις here to suggest the ethical aspect of the good as a habit or possession of the soul. The introduction of ἡδονή below supports this view. Some interpreters think it = τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὡς ἔχει, which is possible but rather pointless. of the good.An inconceivable beauty you speak of, he said, if it is the source of knowledge and truth, and yet itself surpasses them in beauty. For you surelyFor οὐ γὰρ δήπου Cf. 20 C, 455 A, 13 A. cannot mean that it is pleasure. Hush, said I, but examine the similitude of it still further in this way.i.e. not only do we understand a thing when we know its purpose, but a purpose in some mind is the chief cause of its existence, God’s mind for the universe, man’s mind for political institutions. this, being the only interpretation that makes sense o the passage, is presumably more or less consciously Plato’s meaning. Cf. Introd. pp. xxxv-xxxvi. Quite irrelevant are Plato’s supposed identification of the ἀγαθόν with the ἕν, one, and Aristotle’s statement, 988 a, that the ideas are the cause of other things and the one is the cause of the ideas. the remainder of the paragraph belongs to transcendental rhetoric. It has been endlessly quoted and plays a great part in Neoplatonism, in all philosophies of the unknowable and in all negative and mystic theologies. How? The sun, I presume you will say, not only furnishes to visibles the power of visibility but it also provides for their generation and growth and nurture though it is not itself generation. Of course not. In like manner, then, you are to say that the objects of knowledge not only receive from the presence of the good their being known, but their very existence and essence is derived to them from it, though the good itself is not essence but still transcends essenceIt is an error to oppose Plato here to the Alexandrians who sometimes said ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος. Plato’s sentence would have made ὄντος very inconvenient here. But εἶναι shows that οὐσίας is not distinguished from τοῦ ὄντος here. ἐπέκεινα became technical and a symbol for the transcendental in Neoplatonism and all similar philosophies. cf. Plotinus xvii. 1, Dionysius Areop. ii. 2, Friedländer, i. p. 87. in dignity and surpassing power. And Glaucon very ludicrouslyHe is amused at Socrates’ emphasis. Fanciful is Wilamowitz’ notion ( i. p. 209) that the laughable thing is Glaucon’s losing control of himself, for which he compares Aristoph. 61. Cf. the extraordinary comment of Proclus, p. 265. The dramatic humor of Glaucon’s surprise is Plato’s way of smiling at himself, as he frequently does in the dialogues. Cf. 536 B, 540 B, 223 B, 340 E, 175 E, 426 B, 200 B, 197 D, etc. Cf. Friedländer, i. p. 172 on the said, Heaven save us, hyperboleWhat a comble! would be nearer the tone of the Greek. There is no good English equivalent for ὑπερβολῆς. Cf. Sir Thomas Browne’s remark that nothing can be said hyperbolically of God. The banter here relieves the strain, as is Plato’s manner. can no further go. The fault is yours, I said, for compelling me to utter my thoughts about it. And don’t desist, he said, but at leastCf. 502 A, 222 E, 86 E. expound the similitude of the sun, if there is anything that you are omitting. Why, certainly, I said, I am omitting a great deal. Well, don’t omit the least bit, he said. I fancy, I said, that I shall have to pass over much, but nevertheless so far as it is at present practicable I shall not willingly leave anything out. Do not, he said. Conceive then, said I, as we were saying, that there are these two entities, and that one of them is sovereign over the intelligible order and region and the other over the world of the eye-ball, not to say the sky-ball,Cf. the similar etymological pun in 396 B-C. Here, as often, the translator must choose between over-translating for some tastes, or not translating at all. but let that pass. You surely apprehend the two types, the visible and the intelligible. I do. Represent them then, as it were, by a line dividedThe meaning is given in the text. Too many commentators lose the meaning in their study of the imagery. Cf. the notes of Adam, Jowett, Campbell, and Apelt. See Introd. p. xxi for my interpretation of the passage. into two unequalSome modern and ancient critics prefer ἀν’ ἴσα. It is a little more plausible to make the sections unequal. But again there is doubt which shall be longer, the higher as the more honorable or the lower as the more multitudinous. Cf. Plut. 3. sections and cut each section again in the same ratio (the section, that is, of the visible and that of the intelligible order), and then as an expression of the ratio of their comparative clearness and obscurity you will have, as one of the sections of the visible world, images.

By imagesCf. 402 B, 266 B-C. I mean, first, shadows, and then reflections in water and on surfaces of dense, smooth and bright texture, and everything of that kind, if you apprehend.I do.As the second section assume that of which this is a likeness or an image, that is, the animals about us and all plants and the whole class of objects made by man.I so assume it, he said. Would you be willing to say, said I, that the division in respect of reality and truth or the opposite is expressed by the proportion:Cf. on 508 C, p. 103. note b. as is the opinable to the knowable so is the likeness to that of which it is a likeness? I certainly would. Consider then again the way in which we are to make the division of the intelligible section. In what way? By the distinction that there is one section of it which the soul is compelled to investigate by treating as images the things imitated in the former division, and by means of assumptions from which it proceeds not up to a first principle but down to a conclusion, while there is another section in which it advances from its assumption to a beginning or principle that transcends assumption,Cf. my pp. 230-234, for the ἀνυπόθετον. Ultimately, the ἀνυπόθετον is the Idea of Good so far as we assume that idea to be attainable either in ethics or in physics. But it is the Idea of Good, not as a transcendental ontological mystery, but in the ethical sense already explained. The ideal dialectician is the man who can, if challenged, run his reasons for any given proposition back, not to some assumed axioma medium, but to its relation to ultimate Good, To call the ἀνυπόθετον the Unconditioned or Absolute introduces metaphysical associations foreign to the passage. Cf. also Introd. pp. xxxiii-xxxiv. and in which it makes no use of the images employed by the other section, relying on ideasThe practical meaning of this is independent of the disputed metaphysics. Cf. Introd. pp. xvi-xviii. only and progressing systematically through ideas. I don’t fully understandCf. Vol. I. p. 79, note c on 347 A and p. 47, not f on 338 D; p. 503 on 463 D. what you mean by this, he said. Well, I will try again, said I, for you will better understand after this preamble. For I think you are aware that students of geometry and reckoning and such subjects first postulate the odd and the even and the various figures and three kinds of angles and other things akin to these in each branch of science, regard them as known, and, treating them as absolute assumptions, do not deign to render any further account of themAristot. 100 b 2-3 οὐ δεῖ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστημονικαῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐπιζητεῖσθαι τὸ διὰ τί, exactly expresses Plato’s thought and the truth, though Aristotle may have meant it mainly for the principle of non-contradiction and other first principles of logic. Cf. the mediaeval contra principium negantem non est disputandum. A teacher of geometry will refuse to discuss the psychology of the idea of space, a teacher of chemistry will not permit the class to ask whether matter is real. to themselves or others, taking it for granted that they are obvious to everybody. They take their start from these, and pursuing the inquiry from this point on consistently, conclude with that for the investigation of which they set out. Certainly, he said, I know that. And do you not also know that they further make use of the visible forms and talk about them, though they are not thinking of them but of those things of which they are a likeness, pursuing their inquiry for the sake of the square as such and the diagonal as such, and not for the sake of the image of it which they drawCf. 527 A-B. This explanation of mathematical reasoning does not differ at all from that of Aristotle and Berkely and the moderns who praise Aristotle, except that the metaphysical doctrine of ideas is in the background to be asserted if challenged.? And so in all cases. The very things which they mould and draw, which have shadows and images of themselves in water, these things they treat in their turni.e. a bronze sphere would be the original of its imitative reflection in water, but it is in turn only the imperfect imitation of the mathematical idea of a sphere. as only images, but what they really seek is to get sight of those realities which can be seen only by the mind.Stenzel, 118 das er nur mit dem Verstande (διανοίᾳ) sieht is mistaken. διανοίᾳ is used not in its special sense (understanding. See p. 116, note c), but generally for the mind as opposed to the senses. Cf. 511 c.

True, he said. This then is the class that I described as intelligible, it is true,For the concessive μέν cf. 546 E, 529 D, 225 C. but with the reservation first that the soul is compelled to employ assumptions in the investigation of it, not proceeding to a first principle because of its inability to extricate itself from and rise above its assumptions, and second, that it uses as images or likenesses the very objects that are themselves copied and adumbrated by the class below them, and that in comparison with these latterThe loosely appended dative ἐκείνοις is virtually a dative absolute. Cf. 105 A. Wilamowitz’ emendation ( ii. p. 384) to πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, καὶ ἐκείνοις rests on a misunderstanding of the passage. are esteemed as clear and held in honor.The translation of this sentence is correct. But cf. Adam ad loc. I understand, said he, that you are speaking of what falls under geometry and the kindred arts. Understand then, said I, that by the other section of the intelligible I mean that which the reasonλόγος here suggests both the objective personified argument and the subjective faculty. itself lays hold of by the power of dialectics,Cf. 533 A. 57 E. treating its assumptions not as absolute beginnings but literally as hypotheses,τῷ ὄντι emphasized the etymological meaning of the word. Similarly ὡς ἀληθῶς in 551 E, 80 D, 64 E. For hypotheses cf. Burnet, p. 229, Thompson on 86 E. But the thing to note is that the word according to the context may emphasize the arbitrariness of an assumption or the fact that it is the starting-point—ἀρχή—of the inquiry. underpinnings, footings,Cf. 211 C ὥσπερ ἐπαναβάσμοις, like steps of a stair. and springboards so to speak, to enable it to rise to that which requires no assumption and is the starting-point of all,παντὸς ἀρχήν taken literally leads support to the view that Plato is thinking of an absolute first principle. But in spite of the metaphysical suggestions for practical purposes the παντὸς ἀρχή may be the virtual equivalent of the ἱκανόν of the It is the ἀρχή on which all in the particular case depends and is reached by dialectical agreement, not by arbitrary assumption. Cf. on 510 B, p. 110, note a. and after attaining to that again taking hold of the first dependencies from it, so to proceed downward to the conclusion, making no use whatever of any object of senseThis is one of the passages that are misused to attribute to Plato disdain for experience and the perceptions of the senses. Cf. on 530 B, p. 187, note c. The dialectician is able to reason purely in concepts and words without recurring to images. Plato is not here considering how much or little of his knowledge is ultimately derived from experience. but only of pure ideas moving on through ideas to ideas and ending with ideas.The description undoubtedly applies to a metaphysical philosophy that deduces all things from a transcendent first principle. I have never denied that. The point of my interpretation is that it also describes the method which distinguishes the dialectician as such from the man of science, and that this distinction is for practical and educational purposes the chief result of the discussion, as Plato virtually says in the next few lines. Cf. pp. 233-234. I understand, he said; not fully, for it is no slight task that you appear to have in mind, but I do understand that you mean to distinguish the aspect of reality and the intelligible, which is contemplated by the power of dialectic, as something truer and more exact than the object of the so-called arts and sciences whose assumptions are arbitrary starting-points. And though it is true that those who contemplate them are compelled to use their understandingδιανοίᾳ here as in 511 A is general and not technical. and not their senses, yet because they do not go back to the beginning in the study of them but start from assumptions you do not think they possess true intelligenceνοῦν οὐκ ἴσχειν is perhaps intentionally ambiguous. Colloquially the phrase means have not sense for its higher meaning Cf. 99 C, 962 A. about them althoughUnnecessary difficulties have been raised about καίτοι and μετά here. Wilamowitz, ii. p. 345 mistakenly resorts to emendation. the meaning is plain. Mathematical ideas are ideas or concepts like other ideas; but the mathematician does not deal with them quiet as the dialectician deals with ideas and therefore does not possess νοῦς or reason in the highest sense. the things themselves are intelligibles when apprehended in conjunction with a first principle. And I think you call the mental habit of geometers and their like mind or understandingHere the word διάνοια is given a technical meaning as a faculty inferior to νοῦς, but, as Plato says, the terminology does not matter. The question has been much and often idly discussed. and not reason because you regard understanding as something intermediate between opinion and reason. Your interpretation is quite sufficient, I said; and now, answering toFor ἐπί Cf. 280 A, 463 B. these four sections, assume these four affections occurring in the soul: intellection or reason for the highest, understanding for the second; assign beliefπίστις is of course not faith in Plato, but Neoplatonists, Christians, and commentators have confused the two ideas hopelessly. to the third, and to the last picture-thinking or conjecture,εἰκασία undoubtedly had this connotation for Plato. and arrange them in a proportion,Cf. on 508 C, p. 103, note b. considering that they participate in clearness and precision in the same degree as their objects partake of truth and reality. I understand, he said; I concur and arrange them as you bid.