Bearing all this in mind, recall our former question. Can the multitude possibly tolerate or believe in the reality of the beautiful in itself as opposed to the multiplicity of beautiful things, or can they believe in anything conceived in its essence as opposed to the many particulars? Not in the least, he said. Philosophy, then, the love of wisdom, 
 is impossible for the multitude. A commonplace of Plato and all intellectual idealists. Cf. 503 B, Polit. 292 E, 297 B, 300 E. Novotny, Plato’s Epistles, p. 87, uses this to support his view that Plato had a secret doctrine. Adam quotes Gorg. 474 A τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς οὐδὲ διαλέγομαι , which is not quite relevant. Cf. Renan, Etudes d’histoire relig. p. 403 La philosophie sera toujours le fait d’une imperceptible minorité, etc. Impossible. It is inevitable, It is psychologically necessary. Cf. ibid , Vol. 1. on 473 E. Cf. 527 A, Laws 655 E, 658 E, 681 C, 687 C, Phaedr. 239 C, 271 B, Crito 49 D. then, that those who philosophize should be censured by them. Inevitable. And so likewise by those laymen who, associating with the mob, desire to curry favor Cf. Gorg. 481 E, 510 D, 513 B. with it. Obviously. From this point of view do you see any salvation that will suffer the born philosopher to abide in the pursuit and persevere to the end? Consider it in the light of what we said before. We agreed In 487 A. that quickness in learning, memory, courage and magnificence were the traits of this nature. Yes. Then even as a boy Cf. 386 A. In what follows Plato is probably thinking of Alcibiades. Alc. I, 103 A ff, imitates the passage. Cf. Xen. Mem. i. 2. 24. among boys such a one will take the lead in all things, especially if the nature of his body matches the soul. How could he fail to do so? he said. His kinsmen and fellow-citizens, then, will desire, I presume, to make use of him when he is older for their own affairs. Of course. Then they will fawn For ὑποκείσονται Cf. Gorg. 510 C, 576 A ὑποπεσόντες Eurip. Orest. 670 ὑποτρέχειν , Theaet. 173 A ὑπελθεῖν . upon him with petitions and honors, anticipating i.e. endeavoring to secure the advantage of it for themselves by winning his favor when he is still young and impressionable. and flattering the power that will be his. That certainly is the usual way. How, then, do you think such a youth will behave in such conditions, especially if it happen that he belongs to a great city and is rich and well-born therein, and thereto handsome and tall? Will his soul not be filled with unbounded ambitious hopes, Cf. Alc. I. 104 B-C ff. and will he not think himself capable of managing the affairs of both Greeks and barbarians, Cf. Alc. I. 105 B-C. and thereupon exalt himself, haughty of mien and stuffed with empty pride and void of sense ὑψηλὸν ἐξαρεῖν , etc., seems to be a latent poetic quotation. He surely will, he said. And if to a man in this state of mind Or perhaps subject to these influences. Adam says it is while he is sinking into this condition. someone gently Cf. Vol. I. on 476 E. Cf. 533 D, Protag. 333 E, Phaedo 83 A, Crat. 413 A, Theaet. 154. E. comes and tells him what is the truth, that he has no sense and sorely needs it, and that the only way to get it is to work like a slave Cf. Phaedo 66 C, Symp. 184 C, Euthydem. 282 B. to win it, do you think it will be easy for him to lend an ear Cf. Epin. 990 A, Epist. vii. 330 A-B. to the quiet voice in the midst of and in spite of these evil surroundings Cf. Alc. I. 135 E. Far from it, said he. And even supposing, said I, that owing to a fortunate disposition and his affinity for the words of admonition one such youth apprehends something and is moved and drawn towards philosophy, what do we suppose will be the conduct of those who think that they are losing his service and fellowship? Is there any word or deed that they will stick at For πᾶν ἔργον cf. Sophocles, E. 615. to keep him from being persuaded and to incapacitate anyone who attempts it, Cf. 517 E. both by private intrigue and public prosecution in the court? That is inevitable, he said. Is there any possibility of such a one continuing to philosophize? None at all, he said. 
 Do you see, then, said I, that we were not wrong in saying that the very qualities that make up the philosophical nature do, in fact, become, when the environment and nurture are bad, in some sort the cause of its backsliding, For ἐκπεσεῖν cf. 496 C. and so do the so-called goods— Cf. on 591 C. p. 32, note a. riches and all such instrumentalities Cf. Lysis 220 A; Arnold’s machinery, Aristotle’s χορηγία ? No, he replied, it was rightly said. Such, my good friend, and so great as regards the noblest pursuit, is the destruction and corruption Cf. 491 B-E, Laws 951 B ἀδιάφθαρτος , Xen. Mem. i. 2. 24. of the most excellent nature, which is rare enough in any case, For καὶ ἄλλως Cf. Il. ix. 699. as we affirm. And it is from men of this type that those spring who do the greatest harm to communities and individuals, and the greatest good when the stream chances to be turned into that channel, Cf. on 485 D ὥσπερ ῥεῦμα . but a small nature Cf. on 491 E, p. 33, note d. never does anything great to a man or a city. Most true, said he. Those, then, to whom she properly belongs, thus falling away and leaving philosophy forlorn and unwedded, themselves live an unreal and alien life, while other unworthy wooers Cf. on 489 D, and Theaet. 173 C. rush in and defile her as an orphan bereft of her kin, Cf. Taine, à Sainte-Beuve, Aug. 14, 1865 : Comme Claude Bernard, il dépasse sa spécialité et c’est ches des spécialistes comme ceux-là que la malheureuse philosophie livée aux mains gantées et parfumées d’eau bénite va trouver des maris capables de lui faire encore des enfants. cf. Epictet. iii. 21. 21. The passage is imitated by Lucian 3. 2. 287, 294, 298. For the shame that has befallen philosophy Cf. Euthydem. 304 ff., Epist. vii. 328 E, Isoc. Busiris 48, Plutarch 1091 E, Boethius, Cons. i. 3. There is no probability that this is aimed at Isocrates, who certainly had not deserted the mechanical arts for what he called philosophy. Rohde Kleine Schriften, i. 319, thinks Antisthenes is meant. But Plato as usual is generalizing. See What Plato Said, p. 593 on Soph. 242 C. and attach to her such reproaches as you say her revilers taunt her with, declaring that some of her consorts are of no account and the many accountable for many evils. Why, yes, he replied, that is what they do say. And plausibly, said I; for other mannikins, observing that the place is unoccupied and full of fine terms and pretensions, just as men escape from prison to take sanctuary in temples, so these gentlemen joyously bound away from the mechanical Cf. the different use of the idea in Protag. 318 E. arts to philosophy, those that are most cunning in their little craft. τεχνίον is a contemptuous diminutive, such as are common in Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. Cf. also ἀνθρωπίσκοι in C, and ψυχάριον in 519 A. For in comparison with the other arts the prestige of philosophy even in her present low estate retains a superior dignity; and this is the ambition and aspiration of that multitude of pretenders unfit by nature, whose souls are bowed and mutilated Cf. 611 C-D, Theaet. 173 A-B. by their vulgar occupations For the idea that trade is ungentlemanly and incompatible with philosophy Cf. 522 B and 590 C, Laws 919 C ff., and What Plato Said, p. 663 on Rivals 137 B. Cf. Richard of Bury, Philobiblon, Prologue, Fitted for the liberal arts, and equally disposed to the contemplation of Scripture, but destitute of the needful aid, they revert, as it were, by a sort of apostasy, to mechanical arts. Cf also Xen. Mem. iv. 2. 3, and Ecclesiasticus xxxviii. 25 f. How can he get wisdom that holdeth the plough and glorieth in the goad . . . and whose talk is of bullocks? . . . so every carpenter and workmaster . . . the smith . . . the potter . . . even as their bodies are marred by their arts and crafts. Is not that inevitable? Quite so, he said. Is not the picture which they present, I said, precisely that of a little bald-headed tinker For a similar short vivid description Cf. Erastae 134 B, Euthyphro 2 B. Such are common in Plautus, e.g. Mercator 639. who has made money and just been freed from bonds and had a bath and is wearing a new garment and has got himself up like a bridegroom and is about to marry his master’s daughter who has fallen into poverty and abandonment? There is no difference at all, he said. Of what sort will probably be the offspring of such parents? Will they not be bastard It is probably fanciful to see in this an allusion to the half-Thracian Antisthenes. Cf. also Theaet. 150 C, and Symp. 212 A. and base? Inevitably. And so when men unfit for culture approach philosophy and consort with her unworthily, what sort of ideas and opinions shall we say they beget? Will they not produce what may in very deed be fairly called sophisms, and nothing that is genuine or that partakes of true intelligence Cf. Euthydem. 306 D. ? Quite so, he said. 
 There is a very small remnant, Cf. Phaedrus 250 A ὀλίγαι δὴ λείπονται , and 404 A and on 490 E. then, Adeimantus, I said, of those who consort worthily with philosophy, some well-born and well-bred nature, it may be, held in check Perhaps overtaken. Cf. Goodwin on Dem. De cor. 107. by exile, It is possible but unnecessary to conjecture that Plato may be thinking of Anaxagoras or Xenophon or himself or Dion. and so in the absence of corrupters remaining true to philosophy, as its quality bids, or it may happen that a great soul born in a little town scorns Cf. Theaet. 173 B, 540 D. and disregards its parochial affairs; and a small group perhaps might by natural affinity be drawn to it from other arts which they justly disdain; and the bridle of our companion Theages This bridle has become proverbial. Cf. Plut. De san. tuenda 126 B, Aelian, Var. Hist. iv. 15. For Theages cf. also Apol. 33 E and the spurious dialogue bearing is name. also might operate as a restraint. For in the case of Theages all other conditions were at hand for his backsliding from philosophy, but his sickly habit of body keeping him out of politics holds him back. My own case, the divine sign, The enormous fanciful literature on the daimonion does not concern the interpretation of Plato, who consistently treats it as a kind of spiritual tact checking Socrates from any act opposed to his true moral and intellectual interests. Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 456-457, on Euthyphro 3 B, Jowett and Campbell, p. 285. is hardly worth mentioning—for I suppose it has happened to few or none before me. And those who have been of this little company For τούτων . . . γενόμενοι cf. Aristoph. Clouds 107 τούτων γενοῦ μοι . and have tasted the sweetness and blessedness of this possession and who have also come to understand the madness of the multitude sufficiently and have seen that there is nothing, if I may say so, sound or right in any present politics, The irremediable degeneracy of existing governments is the starting-point of Plato’s political and social speculations. Cf. 597 B, Laws 832 C f., Epist. vii. 326 A; Byron, apud Arnold, Essays in Crit. ii. p. 195 I have simplified my politics into an utter detestation of all existing governments. This passage, Apol. 31 E ff. and Gorg. 521-522 may be considered Plato’s apology for not engaging in politics. Cf. J. V. Novak, Platon u. d. Rhetorik, p. 495 (Schleiermacher, Einl. z. Gorg. pp. 15 f.), Wilamowitz, Platon, i. 441-442 Wer kann hier die Klage über das eigene Los überhören? There is no probability that, as an eminent scholar has maintained, the Republic itself was intended as a programme of practical politics for Athens , and that its failure to win popular opinion is the chief cause of the disappointed tone of Plato’s later writings. Cf. Erwin Wolff in Jaeger’s Neue Phil. Untersuchungen, Heft 6, Platos Apologie, pp. 31-33, who argues that abstinence from politics is proclaimed in the Apology before the Gorgias and that the same doctrine in the seventh Epistle absolutely proves that the Apology is Plato’s own. Cf. also Theaet. 173 C ff., Hipp. Maj. 281 C, Euthydem. 306 B, Xen. Mem. i. 6. 15. and that there is no ally with whose aid the champion of justice Cf. 368 b, Apol. 32 E εἰ . . . ἐβοήθουν τοῖς δικαίοις and 32 A μαχούμενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου . could escape destruction, but that he would be as a man who has fallen among wild beasts, Cf. Pindar, Ol. i. 64. For the antithetic juxtaposition cf. also εἷς πᾶσιν below; see too 520 B, 374 A, Menex. 241 B, Phaedr. 243 C, Laws 906 D, etc. More in the Utopia (Morley, Ideal Commonwealths, p. 84) paraphrases loosely from memory what he calls no ill simile by which Plato set forth the unreasonableness of a philosopher’s meddling with government unwilling to share their misdeeds Cf. Democrates fr. 38, Diels ii.3 p. 73 καλὸν μὲν τὸν ἀδικέοντα κωλύειν· εἰ δὲ μή, μὴ ξυναδικεῖν , it is well to prevent anyone from doing wrong, or else not to join in wrongdoing. and unable to hold out singly against the savagery of all, and that he would thus, before he could in any way benefit his friends or the state come to an untimely end without doing any good to himself or others,—for all these reasons I say the philosopher remains quiet, minds his own affair, and, as it were, standing aside under shelter of a wall Maximus of Tyre 21. 20 comments, Show me a safe wall. See Stallbaum ad loc. for references to this passage in later antiquity. Cf. Heracleit. fr. 44, Diels 3 i. 67, J. Stenzel, Platon der Erzieher, p. 114, Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence, p. 33, Renan, Souvenirs, xvii., P. E. More, Shelburne Essays, iii. pp. 280-281 Cf. also Epist. vii. 331 D, Eurip. Ion 598-601. in a storm and blast of dust and sleet and seeing others filled full of lawlessness, is content if in any way he may keep himself free from iniquity and unholy deeds through this life and take his departure with fair hope, Cf. Vol. I on 331 A, 621 C-D, Marc. Aurel. xii. 36 and vi. 30 in fine. See my article Hope in Hasting’s Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. serene and well content when the end comes.