Hipp.

Quite true.

Soc.

Well now, would you choose to possess a horse of such spirit that you would ride him badly voluntarily, or involuntarily?

Hipp.

Voluntarily.

Soc.

Then that spirit is better.

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

Then with the horse of better spirit one would do voluntarily the bad acts of that spirit, but with the one of worse spirit involuntarily?

Hipp.

Certainly.

Soc.

And is not that true of a dog, and all other animals?

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

Well now, then, in the case of an archer is it better to possess the mind which voluntarily misses the mark, or that which does so involuntarily?

Hipp.

That which does so voluntarily.

Soc.

Then that is the better mind for the purpose of archery?

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

Is, then, the mind also which errs involuntarily worse than that which errs voluntarily?

Hipp.

Yes, in the case of archery.

Soc.

And how is it in the art of medicine? Is not the mind which does harm to the patients’ bodies voluntarily the more scientific?

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

In this art, then, this mind is better than the other.

Hipp.

It is better.

Soc.

Well now, the more musical, whether with lyre or with flute, and in everything else that concerns all the other arts and sciences—is not that mind better which voluntarily does bad and disgraceful things and commits errors, whereas that which does so involuntarily is worse?

Hipp.

Apparently.

Soc.

And surely we should prefer to possess slaves of such minds that they voluntarily commit errors and do mischief, rather than such as do so involuntarily; we should think them better fitted for their duties.

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

Well now, should we not wish to possess our own mind in the best possible condition?

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

Will it, then, be better if it does evil and errs voluntarily, or involuntarily?

Hipp.

But it would be a terrible thing, Socrates, if those who do wrong voluntarily are to be better than those who do so involuntarily.

Soc.

But surely they appear, at least, to be so, from what has been said.

Hipp.

Not to me.

Soc.

I thought, Hippias, they appeared to be so to you also. But now once more answer me: Is not justice either a sort of power or knowledge, or both? Or must not justice inevitably be one or other of these?

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

Then injustice is a power of the soul, the more powerful soul is the more just, is it not? For we found, my friend, that such a soul was better.

Hipp.

Yes, we did.

Soc.

And what if it be knowledge? Is not the wiser soul more just, and the more ignorant more unjust?

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

And what if it be both? Is not the soul which has both, power and knowledge, more just, and the more ignorant more unjust? Is that not inevitably the case?

Hipp.

It appears to be.

Soc.

This more powerful and wiser soul, then, was found to be better and to have more power to do both good and disgraceful acts in every kind of action was it not?

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

Whenever, then, it does disgraceful acts, it does them voluntarily, by reason of power and art; and these, either one or both of them, are attributes of justice.

Hipp.

So it seems.

Soc.

And doing injustice is doing evil acts, and not doing injustice is doing good acts.

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

Will not, then, the more powerful and better soul, when it does injustice, do it voluntarily, and the bad soul involuntarily?

Hipp.

Apparently.

Soc.

Is not, then, a good man he who has a good soul, and a bad man he who has a bad one?

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

It is, then, in the nature of the good man to do injustice voluntarily, and of the bad man to do it involuntarily, that is, if the good man has a good soul.

Hipp.

But surely he has.

Soc.

Then he who voluntarily errs and does disgraceful and unjust acts, Hippias, if there be such a man, would be no other than the good man.

Hipp.

I cannot agree with you, Socrates, in that.

Soc.

Nor I with myself, Hippias; but that appears at the moment to be the inevitable result of our argument; however, as I was saying all along, in respect to these matters I go astray, up and down, and never hold the same opinion; and that I, or any other ordinary man, go astray is not surprising; but if you wise men likewise go astray, that is a terrible thing for us also, if even when we have come to you we are not to cease from our straying.