The Prayers,

Hipp.

Not at all, Socrates; he made him most simple; for in The Prayers, when he depicts them talking with one another, he makes Achilles say to Odysseus: The division into twenty-four books was made in Alexandrian times. Before that division was made (and even after) references were made to parts of the Iliad and Odyssey by descriptive titles, The Prayers, The Catalogue of Ships, and the like. Zeus-born son of Laertes, wily Odysseus, I must speak out the word without refraining, as I shall act and think will be accomplished ~~and pray do not mutter in discord sitting here beside me~~. For hateful to me as the gates of Hades is he who hides one thing in his heart and says another. But I shall speak that which shall be accomplished.Hom. Il. 308 ff.In these lines he makes plain the character of each of the men, that Achilles is true and simple, and Odysseus wily and false for he represents Achilles as saying these lines to Odysseus.

Soc.

Now at last, Hippias, I think I understand what you mean; you mean that the wily man is false, apparently.

Hipp.

Certainly, Socrates; for Homer represents Odysseus as that sort of a man in many passages of both Iliad and Odyssey.

Soc.

Homer, then, as it seems, thought that a true man was one man and a false man another, but not the same.

Hipp.

Of course he did, Socrates.

Soc.

And do you think so yourself, Hippias?

Hipp.

Most assuredly; for it would be strange if I did not.

Soc.

Then let us drop Homer, since it is impossible to ask him what he meant when he made those verses; but since you come forward to take up his cause, and agree in this which you say is his meaning, do you answer for Homer and yourself in common.

Hipp.

Very well; ask briefly whatever you like.

Soc.

Do you say that the false are, like the sick, without power to do anything, or that they have power to do something?

Hipp.

I say that they have great power to do many things, and especially to deceive people.

Soc.

They are, then, powerful, according to you, and wily, are they not?

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

But are they wily and deceivers by reason of simplicity and folly, or by reason of shrewdness and a sort of intelligence?

Hipp.

By shrewdness, most assuredly, and intelligence.

Soc.

They are intelligent, then, as it seems.

Hipp.

Yes, by Zeus, too much so.

Soc.

And being intelligent, do they know what they are doing, or do they not know?

Hipp.

Yes, they know very well; that is why they do harm.

Soc.

And knowing these things which they know, are they ignorant, or wise?

Hipp.

Wise, surely, in just this, deception.

Soc.

Stop. Let us recall what you say. You say that the false are powerful and intelligent, and knowing and wise in those things in which they are false?

Hipp.

Yes, I do.

Soc.

And that the true and the false are different and complete opposites of one another?

Hipp.

I do.

Soc.

Well, then, the false are among the powerful and the wise, according to your statement.

Hipp.

Certainly.

Soc.

And when you say that the false are powerful and wise for falsehood, do you mean that they have power to utter falsehoods if they like, or that they are powerless in respect to the falsehoods which they utter?

Hipp.

That they have power.

Soc.

In short, then, the false are those who are wise and powerful in uttering falsehoods.

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

A man, then, who has not the power to utter falsehoods and is ignorant would not be false.

Hipp.

That is true.

Soc.

Well, but every man has power who does what he wishes at the time when he wishes; I am not speaking of one who is prevented by disease or that sort of thing, but as I might say of you that you have power to write my name when you wish or do you not say that a man has power who is in such a condition?

Hipp.

Yes, I do.

Soc.

Tell me, then, Hippias, are you not skillful in arithmetical calculations?

Hipp.

Most assuredly, Socrates.

Soc.

Then if some one were to ask you what the product of three times seven hundred is, you could, if you wished, tell him the truth about that more quickly and better than anyone else?

Hipp.

Certainly.

Soc.

Because you are the most powerful and wisest of men in these matters?

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

Are you, then, merely wisest and most powerful, or are you also best in those matters in which you are most powerful and wisest, namely calculations?

Hipp.

Best also, to be sure, Socrates.

Soc.

Then you would have the greatest power to tell the truth about these things, would you not?

Hipp.

I think so.

Soc.

But what of falsehoods about these same things? And please answer this with the same splendid frankness as my previous questions, Hippias. If some one were to ask you how much three times seven hundred is, would you have the most power to tell falsehoods and always uniformly to say false things about these matters, if you wished to tell falsehoods and never to reply truly; or would he who is ignorant of calculations have more power to tell falsehoods than you, if you wished to do so? Or would the ignorant man often, when he wished to tell falsehoods, involuntarily tell the truth, if it so happened, because he did not know, whereas you, the wise man, if you wished to tell falsehoods, would tell them always and uniformly?

Hipp.

Yes, it is as you say.

Soc.

Is the false man, then, false about other things, but not about number, and would he not tell falsehoods when dealing with number?

Hipp.

He is false about number also, by Zeus.

Soc.

Shall we, then, assume this also, that there is such a person as a man who is false about calculation and number?

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

Now who would that man be? Must he not, as you just now agreed, have power to tell falsehoods, if he is to be false? For it was said by you, if you recollect, that he who has not the power to tell falsehoods would never be false.

Hipp.

Yes, I recollect, that was said.

Soc.

And just now you were found to have most power to tell falsehoods about calculations, were you not?

Hipp.

Yes, that also was said.

Soc.

Have you, then, also most power to tell the truth about calculations?

Hipp.

Certainly.

Soc.

Then the same man has most power to speak both falsehood and truth about calculations; and this man is the one who is good in respect to them, namely the calculator.

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

Who, then, becomes false in respect to calculation, Hippias, other than the good man? For the same man is also powerful and he is also true.

Hipp.

So it appears.

Soc.

You see, then, that the same man is both false and true in respect to these matters, and the true is in no wise better than the false? For he is indeed the same man, and the two are not utter opposites, as you thought just now.

Hipp.

Apparently not, at least in this field.

Soc.

Shall we, then, investigate elsewhere?

Hipp.

If you like.

Soc.

Well, then, are you expert in geometry also?

Hipp.

I am.

Soc.

Well, has not the same man most power to speak falsehood and truth about geometry, namely the geometrician?

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

In respect to that, then, is any other good than he?

Hipp.

No, no other.

Soc.

The good and wise geometrician, then, has the most power in both respects, has he not? And if anyone is false in respect to diagrams, it would be this man, the good geometrician? For he has the power, and the bad one was powerless, to speak falsehood; so that he who has no power to speak falsehood would not become false, as has been agreed.

Hipp.

That is true.

Soc.

Let us, then, investigate also the third man, the astronomer, whose art you think you know even better than those of the previous ones; do you not, Hippias?

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

Are not the same things true in astronomy also?

Hipp.

Probably, Socrates.

Soc.

Then in astronomy also, if anyone is false, the good astronomer will be false, he who has power to speak falsehood. For he who has not power will not for he is ignorant.

Hipp.

So it appears.

Soc.

The same man, then, in astronomy will be true and false.

Hipp.

So it seems.

Soc.

Come now, Hippias, consider generally in this way concerning all the sciences, whether this is the case, or not. Certainly you are the wisest of men in the greatest number of arts, as I once heard you boast, recounting your great and enviable wisdom in the market-place at the tables of the moneychangers. You said that once, when you went to Olympia, everything you had on your person was your own work; first the ring—for you began with that— which you had was your own work, showing that you knew how to engrave rings, and another seal was your work, and a strigil and an oil-flask were your works; then you said that you yourself had made the sandals you had on, and had woven your cloak and tunic; and, what seemed to every one most unusual and proof of the most wisdom, was when you said that the girdle you wore about your tunic was like the Persian girdles of the costliest kind, and that you had made it yourself. And in addition you said that you brought with you poems, both epics and tragedies and dithyrambs, and many writings of all sorts composed in prose; and that you were there excelling all others in knowledge of the arts of which I was speaking just now, and of the correctness of rhythms and harmonies and letters, and many other things besides, as I seem to remember; and yet I forgot your art of memory, as it seems, in which you think you are most brilliant; and I fancy I have forgotten a great many other things. But, as I say, look both at your own arts—and there are plenty of them—and at those of others, and tell me if you find, in accordance with the agreements you and I have reached, any point where one man is true and another false, where they are separate and not the same. Look for this in any branch whatsoever of wisdom or shrewdness or whatever you choose to call it; but you will not find it, my friend, for it does not exist; just tell me.