Soc.

What are they? Tell me. In the same way as I can tell you of other figures, if you request me, so do you tell me of other virtues.

Men.

Well then, courage, I consider, is a virtue, and temperance, and wisdom, and loftiness of mind; and there are a great many others.

Soc.

Once more, Meno, we are in the same plight: again we have found a number of virtues when we were looking for one, though not in the same way as we did just now; but the one that runs through them all, this we are not able to find.

Men.

No, for I am not yet able, Socrates, to follow your line of search, and find a single virtue common to all, as one can in other cases.

Soc.

And no wonder; but I will make an effort, so far as I can, to help us onward. You understand, of course, that this principle of mine applies to everything: if someone asked you the question I put to you just now: What is figure, Meno? and you replied: Roundness; and then he said, as I did: Is roundness figure or a figure? I suppose you would answer: A figure.

Men.

Certainly.

Soc.

And for this reason—that there are other figures as well?

Men.

Yes.

Soc.

And if he went on to ask you of what sort they were, you would tell him?

Men.

I would.

Soc.

And if he asked likewise what color is, and on your answering white your questioner then rejoined: Is white color or a color? your reply would be: A color; because there are other colors besides.

Men.

It would.

Soc.

And if he bade you mention other colors, you would tell him of others that are colors just as much as white?

Men.

Yes.

Soc.

Now suppose that, like me, he pursued the argument and said: We are always arriving at a variety of things, but let me have no more of that: since you call these many things by one single name, and say they are figures, every one of them, even when they are opposed to one another, tell me what is that which comprises round and straight alike, and which you call figure— including straight equally with round under that term. For that is your statement, is it not?

Men.

It is.

Soc.

And in making it, do you mean to say that round is no more round than straight, or straight no more straight than round?

Men.

No, to be sure, Socrates.

Soc.

What you mean is that the round shape is no more a figure than the straight, or the straight than the round.

Men.

Quite right.