To join in a fight or a fray, as the saying is, Socrates, you have chosen your time well enough.

Do you mean, according to the proverb, we have come too late for a feast?

Yes, a most elegant feast; for Gorgias gave us a fine and varied display but a moment ago.

But indeed, Callicles, it is Chaerephon here who must take the blame for this; he forced us to spend our time in the market-place.

No matter, Socrates I will take the curing of it too for Gorgias is a friend of mine, so that he will give us a display now, if you think fit, or if you prefer, on another occasion.

What, Chaerephon? Has Socrates a desire to hear Gorgias?

Yes, it is for that very purpose we are here.

Then whenever you have a mind to pay me a call—Gorgias is staying with me, and he will give you a display.

Thank you, Callicles: but would he consent to discuss with us? For I want to find out from the man what is the function of his art, and what it is that he professes and teaches. As for the rest of his performance, he must give it us, as you suggest, on another occasion.

The best way is to ask our friend himself, Socrates: for indeed that was one of the features of his performance. Why, only this moment he was pressing for whatever questions anyone in the house might like to ask, and saying he would answer them all.

What a good idea! Ask him, Chaerephon.

What am I to ask?

What he is.

How do you mean?

Just as, if he chanced to be in the shoe-making business, his answer would have been, I presume, a shoemaker. Now, don’t you see my meaning?

I see, and will ask him. Tell me, Gorgias, is Callicles here correct in saying that you profess to answer any questions one may ask you?

He is, Chaerephon; indeed, I was just now making this very profession, and I may add that nobody has asked me anything new for many years now.

So I presume you will easily answer, Gorgias.

You are free to make trial of that, Chaerephon.

Yes, to be sure; and, if you like, Chaerephon, of me. For I think Gorgias must be quite tired out, after the long discourse he has just delivered.

Why, Polus, do you suppose you could answer more excellently than Gorgias?

And what does that matter, if I should satisfy you?

Not at all; since it is your wish, answer.

Ask.

Then I ask you, if Gorgias chanced to be skilled in the same art as his brother Herodicus, what should we be justified in calling him? What we call his brother, should we not?

Certainly.

Then we should make a right statement if we described him as a doctor.

Yes.

And if he were expert in the same art as Aristophon, son of Aglaophon, or his brother,Polygnotus, the famous painter who decorated public buildings in Athens from about 470 B.C. what name should we rightly give him?

Obviously that of painter.

But as it is, we would like to know in what art he is skilled, and hence by what name we should rightly call him.

Chaerephon, there are many arts amongst mankind that have been discovered experimentally, as the result of experiences: for experience conducts the course of our life according to art, but inexperience according to chance. Of these several arts various men partake in various ways, and the best men of the best. Gorgias here is one of these, and he is a partner in the finest art of all.

Fine, at any rate, Gorgias, is the equipment for discourse that Polus seems to have got: but still he is not performing his promise to Chaerephon.

How exactly, Socrates ?

He does not seem to me to be quite answering what he is asked.

Well, will you please ask him?

No, if you yourself will be so good as to answer, why, I would far rather ask you. For I see plainly, from what he has said, that Polus has had more practice in what is called rhetoric than in discussion.

How so, Socrates ?

Because, Polus, when Chaerephon has asked in what art Gorgias is skilled, you merely eulogize his art as though it were under some censure, instead of replying what it is.

Why, did I not reply that it was the finest?

You certainly did: but nobody asked what was the quality of his art, only what it was, and by what name we ought to call Gorgias. Just as Chaerephon laid out the lines for you at first, and you answered him properly in brief words, in the same way you must now state what is that art, and what we ought to call Gorgias; or rather, Gorgias, do you tell us yourself in what art it is you are skilled, and hence, what we ought to call you.

Rhetoric, Socrates.

So we are to call you a rhetorician ?

Yes, and a good one, if you would call me what—to use Homer’s phrase—I vaunt myself to be. The regular phrase of a Homeric hero in boasting of his valor, parentage, etc.; cf. Hom. Il. 6.211, Hom. Il. 14.113.

Well, I shall be pleased to do so.

Then call me such.

And are we to say that you are able to make others like yourself?

Yes, that is what I profess to do, not only here, but elsewhere also.

Then would you be willing, Gorgias, to continue this present way of discussion, by alternate question and answer, and defer to some other time that lengthy style of speech in which Polus made a beginning? Come, be true to your promise, and consent to answer each question briefly.

There are some answers, Socrates, that necessitate a lengthy expression: however, I will try to be as brief as possible; for indeed it is one of my claims that no one could express the same thing in briefer terms than myself.

That is just what I want, Gorgias: give me a display of this very skill—in brevity of speech; your lengthy style will do another time.

Well, I will do that, and you will admit that you never heard anyone speak more briefly.

Come then; since you claim to be skilled in rhetorical art, and to be able to make anyone else a rhetorician, tell me with what particular thing rhetoric is concerned: as, for example, weaving is concerned with the manufacture of clothes, is it not?

Yes.

And music, likewise, with the making of tunes?

Yes.

Upon my word, Gorgias, I do admire your answers! You make them as brief as they well can be.

Yes, Socrates, I consider myself a very fair hand at that.

You are right there. Come now, answer me in the same way about rhetoric: with what particular thing is its skill concerned?

With speech.

What kind of speech, Gorgias? Do you mean that which shows sick people by what regimen they could get well?

No.

Then rhetoric is not concerned with all kinds of speech.

No, I say.

Yet it does make men able to speak.

Yes.

And to understand also the things about which they speak.

Of course.

Now, does the medical art, which we mentioned just now, make men able to understand and speak about the sick?

It must.

Hence the medical art also, it seems, is concerned with speech.

Yes.

That is, speech about diseases?

Certainly.

Now, is gymnastic also concerned with speech about the good and bad condition of our bodies?

Quite so.

And moreover it is the same, Gorgias, with all the other arts; each of them is concerned with that kind of speech which deals with the subject matter of that particular art.

Apparently.

Then why, pray, do you not give the name rhetorical to those other arts, when they are concerned with speech, if you call that rhetoric which has to do with speech?

Because, Socrates, the skill in those other arts is almost wholly concerned with manual work and similar activities, whereas in rhetoric there is no such manual working, but its whole activity and efficacy is by means of speech. For this reason I claim for the rhetorical art that it is concerned with speech, and it is a correct description, I maintain.

Now, do I understand what sort of art you choose to call it? Perhaps, however, I shall get to know this more clearly. But answer me this: we have arts, have we not?

Yes.

Then amongst the various arts some, I take it, consist mainly of work, and so require but brief speech; while others require none, for the art’s object may be achieved actually in silence, as with painting, sculpture, and many other arts. It is to such as these that I understand you to refer when you say rhetoric has no concern with them; is not that so?

Your supposition is quite correct, Socrates.

But there is another class of arts which achieve their whole purpose through speech and—to put it roughly—require either no action to aid them, or very little; for example, numeration, calculation, geometry, draught-playing, and many other arts: some of these have the speech in about equal proportion to the action, but most have it as the larger part, or absolutely the whole of their operation and effect is by means of speech. It is one of this class of arts that I think you refer to as rhetoric.

You are right.

But, mind you, I do not think it is any one of these that you mean to call rhetoric; though, so far as your expression went, you did say that the art which has its effect through speech is rhetoric, and one might retort, if one cared to strain at mere words: So, Gorgias, you call numeration rhetoric! But I do not believe it is either numeration or geometry that you call rhetoric.

Your belief is correct, Socrates, and your supposition just.

Come now, and do your part in finishing off the answer to my question. Since rhetoric is in fact one of these arts which depend mainly on speech, and there are likewise other arts of the same nature, try if you can tell me with what this rhetoric, which has its effect in speech, is concerned. For instance, suppose some one asked me about one or other of the arts which I was mentioning just now: Socrates, what is the art of numeration? I should tell him, as you did me a moment ago, that it is one of those which have their effect through speech. And suppose he went on to ask: With what is its speech concerned? I should say: With the odd and even numbers, and the question of how many units there are in each. And if he asked again: What art is it that you call calculation? I should say that this also is one of those which achieve their whole effect by speech. And if he proceeded to ask: With what is it concerned? I should say— in the manner of those who draft amendments in the Assembly—that in most respects calculation is in the same case as numeration, for both are concerned with the same thing, the odd and the even; but that they differ to this extent, that calculation considers the numerical values of odd and even numbers not merely in themselves but in relation to each other. And suppose, on my saying that astronomy also achieves its whole effect by speech, he were to ask me: And the speech of astronomy, with what is it concerned? I should say: With the courses of the stars and sun and moon, and their relative speeds.

And you would be right, Socrates.

Come then and do your part, Gorgias: rhetoric is one of those arts, is it not, which carry out their work and achieve their effect by speech.

That is so.

Then tell me what they deal with: what subject is it, of all in the world, that is dealt with by this speech employed by rhetoric?

The greatest of human affairs, Socrates, and the best.

But that also, Gorgias, is ambiguous, and still by no means clear. I expect you have heard people singing over their cups the old catch, in which the singers enumerate the best things in life,—first health, then beauty, and thirdly, as the maker of the catch puts it, wealth got without guile.Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Gr. viii., gives four lines of the (anonymous) song: ὑγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστον ἀνδρὶ θνατῷ, δεύτερον δὲ φυὰν καλὸν γενέσθαι, τὸ τρίτον δὲ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως, καὶ τὸ τέταρτον ἡβᾶν μετὰ τῶν φίλων.

Yes, I have heard it; but what is the point of your quotation?