Soc. You know, Socrates, how everyone
 praises the man and tells of his mastery of speech: let us step over to him at
 once, to
 make sure of finding him in; he is staying, so I was told, with Callias, son of
 Hipponicus. Now, let us be going. To this I replied: We had better not go there
 yet, my good friend, it is so very early: let us rise and turn into the court
 here, and spend the time strolling there till daylight comes; after that we can
 go. Protagoras, you see, spends most of his time indoors, so have no fear, we
 shall find him in all right, most likely.
 
 So then we got up and strolled in the court; 
 and I,
 to test Hippocrates’ grit, began examining him with a few questions. Tell me,
 Hippocrates, I said, in your present design of going to Protagoras and paying
 him money as a fee for his services to yourself, to whom do you consider you are
 resorting, and what is it that you are to become? Suppose, for example, you had
 taken it into your head to call on your namesake Hippocrates of Cos, the
 Asclepiad, and pay him money as your personal fee, and suppose someone asked
 you—Tell me, Hippocrates, in purposing to pay 
 a fee to Hippocrates, what do you consider him to be? How
 would you answer that?
 
 A doctor, I would say. 
 And what would you intend to become?
 A doctor, he replied.
 And suppose you had a mind to approach Polycleitus the
 Argive or Pheidias the Athenian and
 pay them a personal fee, and somebody asked you—What is it that you
 consider Polycleitus or Pheidias to be, that you are minded to pay them this
 money? What would your answer be to that?
 
 Sculptors, I would reply. 
 And what would you intend to become? 
 Obviously, a sculptor. 
 Very well then, I said; you and I will go now to Protagoras, 
 prepared to pay him money as your fee, from our own means if they are adequate for the purpose of
 prevailing on him, but if not, then drawing on our friends’ resources to make up
 the sum. Now if anyone, observing our extreme earnestness in the matter, should
 ask us,—Pray, Socrates and Hippocrates, what is it that you take
 Protagoras to be, when you purpose to pay him money? What should we reply to
 him? What is the other name that we commonly hear attached to Protagoras? They
 call Pheidias a sculptor and Homer a poet: 
 what title do they give Protagoras?
 
 A sophist, to be sure, Socrates, is what they call him. 
 Then we go to him and pay him the money as a sophist?
 Certainly. Soc. Now suppose someone asked you this further question: And what is it that you yourself hope to become when you go to Protagoras? 
 To this he replied with a blush—for by then there was a glimmer of daylight by which I could see him quite clearly— If it is like the previous cases, obviously, to become a sophist. 
 In Heaven’s name, I said, would you not be ashamed to present yourself before the Greeks as a sophist?
 Yes, on my soul I should, Socrates, if I am to speak my real thoughts. 
 Yet after all, Hippocrates, perhaps it is not this sort of learning that you expect to get from Protagoras, but rather the sort you had from your language-master, your harp-teacher, and your sports-instructor; for when you took your lessons from each of these it was not in the technical way, with a view to becoming a professional, but for education, as befits a private gentleman.
 I quite agree, he said; it is rather this kind of learning that one gets from Protagoras. 
 Then are you aware what you are now about to do, or is it not clear to you? I asked.
 To what do you refer? 
 I mean your intention of submitting your soul to the treatment of a man who, as you say, is a sophist; and as to what a sophist really is, I shall be surprised if you can tell me. And yet, if you are ignorant of this, you cannot know to whom you are entrusting your soul,—whether it is to something good or to something evil.
 I really think, he said, that I know. 
 Then tell me, please, what you consider a sophist to be.
 I should say, he replied, from what the name implies, that he is one who has knowledge of wise matters. 
 Well, I went on, we are able to say this of painters also, and of carpenters,—that they are the persons who have knowledge of wise matters; and if someone asked us for what those matters are wise, of which painters have knowledge, I suppose we should tell him that they are wise for the production of likenesses, and similarly with the rest. But if he should ask for what the matters of the sophist are wise, how should we answer him? What sort of workmanship is he master of?
 How should we describe him, Socrates,—as a master of making one a clever speaker? 
 Perhaps, I replied, we should be speaking the truth, but yet not all the truth; for our answer still calls for a question, as to the subject on which the sophist makes one a clever speaker: just as the harp player makes one clever, I presume, at speaking on the matter of which he gives one knowledge, namely harp-playing,—you agree to that?
 Yes. 
 Well, about what does the sophist make one a clever speaker?
 Clearly it must be the same thing as that of which he gives one knowledge. 
 So it would seem: now what is this thing, of which the sophist himself has knowledge and gives knowledge to his pupil?
 Ah, there, in good faith, he said, I fail to find you an answer.