Soc. Then what would you say is its effect? For instance, if I were to ask you whether medicine, in ruling over all that comes under its rule, has any effect to show; would you not say: Yes, health? Cri. I would. Soc. And what about your art of agriculture? In ruling over all 

 that comes under its rule, what effect does it produce? Would you not say that it supplies us with food from the earth? Cri. I would. Soc. And what of the monarch’s art? In ruling over all that comes under its rule, what does it produce? Perhaps you are not quite ready with the answer. Cri. I am not indeed, Socrates. Soc. Nor were we, Crito; yet so much you know, that if this is really the one we are seeking, it must be beneficial. Cri. Certainly. Soc. Then surely it must purvey something good? Cri. Necessarily, Socrates. Soc. And you know we agreed with each other, Cleinias and I, that nothing can be good but some sort of knowledge. Cri. Yes, so you told me. Soc. And it was found that all effects in general that you may ascribe to statesmanship—and a great many of them there must be, presumably, if the citizens are to be made wealthy and free and immune from faction—all these things were neither bad nor good, while this art must make us wise and impart knowledge, if it really was to be the one which benefited us and made us happy. Cri. True: so at all events you agreed then, by your account of the discussion. Soc. Then do you think that kingship makes men wise and good? Cri. Why not, Socrates? Soc. But does it make all men good, and in all things? And is this the art that confers every sort of knowledge—shoe-making and carpentry and so forth? Cri. No, I think not, Socrates. Soc. Well, what knowledge does it give ? What use can we make of it? It is not to be a producer of any of the effects which are neither bad nor good, while it is to confer no other knowledge but itself. Shall we try and say what it is, and what use we shall make of it? Do you mind if we describe it, Crito, as that whereby we shall make other men good? Cri. I quite agree. Soc. And in what respect are we going to have these men good, and in what useful? Or shall we venture to say they are to make others so, and these again others? In what respect they can possibly be good is nowhere evident to us, since we have discredited all the business commonly called politics, and it is merely a case of the proverbial Corinthus Divine Cf. Pind. N. 7 . Megara , a colony of Corinth , revolted, and when the Corinthians appealed to the sentiment attaching to Corinthus , the mythical founder of Megara , the Megarians drove them off taunting them with using a vain repetition. ; and, as I was saying, we are equally or even worse at fault as to what that knowledge can be which is to make us happy. Cri. Upon my word, Socrates, you got yourselves there, it seems, into a pretty fix. Soc. So then I myself, Crito, finding 

 I had fallen into this perplexity, began to exclaim at the top of my voice, beseeching the two strangers as though I were calling upon the Heavenly Twins to save us, the lad and myself, from the mighty wave Lit. the big wave that comes in every three. of the argument, and to give us the best of their efforts, and this done, to make plain to us what that knowledge can be of which we must get hold if we are to spend the remainder of our lives in a proper way Cri. Well, did Euthydemus consent to propound anything for you? Soc. Why, certainly; and he began his discourse, my good friend, in this very lofty-minded fashion: Would you rather, Socrates, that I instructed you as to this knowledge which has baffled you all this while, or propound that you have it? 

 O gifted sir, I exclaimed, and have you the power to do this?

 Certainly I have, he replied.

 Then for Heaven’s sake, I cried, propound that I have it! This will be much easier than learning foraman of my age.

 Come then, answer me this, he said: Do you know anything? 

 Yes, indeed, I replied. and many things, though trifles.

 That is enough, he said; now do you think it possible that anything that is should not be just that which it actually is? 

 On my soul, not I. 
	
	 Now you, he said, know something? 

 I do.

 Then you are knowing, if you really know? 

 Certainly, in just that something.

 That makes no difference; you are not under a necessity of knowing everything, if you are knowing? 

 No, to be sure, I replied; for there are many other things which I do not know.

 Then if you do not know something, you are not knowing? 

 Not in that thing, my dear sir, I replied.

 Are you therefore any the less unknowing? Just now you said you were knowing; so here you are, actually the very man that you are, and again, not that man, in regard to the same matter and at the same time! 

 Admitted, Euthydemus, I said: as the saying goes, well said whate’er you say. How therefore do I know that knowledge which we were seeking? Since forsooth it is impossible for the same thing to be so and not be so; by knowing one thing I know all;—for I could not be at once both knowing and unknowing;—and as I know everything I have that knowledge to boot: is that your line of argument? Is this your wisdom? 
	
 Yes, you see, Socrates, he said, your own words refute you. 

 Well, but, Euthydemus, I continued, are you not in the same plight? I assure you, so long as I had you and this dear fellow Dionysodorus to share my lot, however hard, I should have nothing to complain of. Tell me, you both know some existent things, of course, and others you do not?

 By no means, Socrates, said Dionysodorus.

 How do you mean? I asked: do you then not know anything?

 Oh yes, we do, he said.