Nic. You strike me as not being aware that, whoever comes into close contact with Socrates and has any talk with him face to face, is bound to be drawn round and round by him in the course of the argument—though it may have started at first on a quite different theme—and cannot stop until he is led into giving an account of himself, of the manner in which 

 he now spends his days, and of the kind of life he has lived hitherto; and when once he has been led into that, Socrates will never let him go until he has thoroughly and properly put all his ways to the test. Now I am accustomed to him, and so I know that one is bound to be thus treated by him, and further, that I myself shall certainly get the same treatment also. For I delight, Lysimachus, in conversing with the man, and see no harm in our being reminded of any past or present misdoing: nay, one must needs take more careful thought for the rest of one’s life, if one does not fly from his words but is willing, as Solon said, I grow old learning ever more and more; Solon Fr. 10 γηράσκω δ’ αἰεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος . See below, 189a. and zealous to learn as long as one lives, and does not expect to get good sense by the mere arrival of old age. So to me there is nothing unusual, or unpleasant either, in being tried and tested by Socrates; in fact, I knew pretty well all the time that our argument would not be about the boys if Socrates were present, but about ourselves. Let me therefore repeat that there is no objection on my part to holding a debate with Socrates after the fashion that he likes; but you must see how Laches here feels on the matter. Lach. I have but a single mind, Laches plays with the two meaning of ἁπλοῦν — I am single-minded (simple, straightforward) in such matters, that is, I should rather say, double-minded. Nicias, in regard to discussions, or if you like, a double rather than a single one. For you might think me a lover, and yet also a hater, of discussions: for when I hear a man discussing virtue or any kind of wisdom, one who is truly a man and worthy of his argument, I am exceedingly delighted; I take the speaker and his speech together, and observe how they sort and harmonize with each other. Such a man is exactly what I understand by musical, —he has tuned himself with the fairest harmony, not that of a lyre or other entertaining instrument, but has made a true concord of his own life between his words and his deeds, not in the Ionian, no, nor in the Phrygian nor in the Lydian, but simply in the Dorian mode, The different modes or scales in Greek music were associated with different moral feelings. The Dorian was most favored, as having a manly, stately character: the Ionian was more passionate and contentious. The Phrygian and Lydian were foreign modes, on the character of which there were various opinions. Cf. Rep. 398-99 which is the sole Hellenic harmony. Such a man makes me rejoice with his utterance, and anyone would judge me then a lover of discussion, so eagerly do I take in what he says: but a man who shows the opposite character gives me pain, and the better he seems to speak, the more I am pained, with the result, in this case, that I am judged a hater of discussion. Lach. Now of Socrates’ words I have no experience, but formerly, I fancy, I have made trial of his deeds; and there I found him living up to any fine words however freely spoken. 

 So if he has that gift as well, his wish is mine, and I should be very glad to be cross-examined by such a man, and should not chafe at learning; but I too agree with Solon, while adding just one word to his saying: I should like, as I grow old, to learn more and more, but only from honest folk. Let him concede to me that my teacher is himself good—else I shall dislike my lessons and be judged a dunce—but if you say that my teacher is to be a younger man, or one who so far has no reputation, or anything of that sort, I care not a jot. I therefore invite you, Socrates, both to teach and to refute me as much as you please, and to learn too what I on my part know; such is the position you hold in my eyes since that day on which you came through the same danger with me, This instance of Socrates’ intrepidity (at Delium cf. above, 181b) is more fully described by Alcibiades in Plat. Sym. 221 . and gave a proof of your own valour which is to be expected of anyone who hopes to justify his good name. So say whatever you like, leaving out of account the difference of our ages. Soc. You two, it seems, will give us no bound for complaint on the score of your not being ready to join both in advising and in inquiring. Lys. No, but the matter now rests with us, Socrates; for I venture to count you as one of us. So take my place in inquiring on behalf of the young men make out what it is that we want our friends here to tell us, and be our adviser by discussing it with them. For I find that owing to my age I forget the questions I intend to put, and also the answers I receive; and if the discussion changes in the middle, my memory goes altogether. Do you therefore discuss and elucidate our problem among yourselves; and I will listen, and then with my friend Melesias I will act at once upon whatever may be your decision. Soc. Let us do, Nicias and Laches, as Lysimachus and Melesias bid us. Now the questions that we attempted to consider a while ago— Who have been our teachers in this sort of training? What other persons have we made better? —are perhaps of a kind on which we might well examine ourselves: but I believe this other way of inquiring leads to the same thing, and will probably also start more from the beginning. For if we happen to know of such and such a thing that by being joined to another thing it makes this thing better, and further, if we are able to get the one joined to the other, we obviously know the thing itself on which we might be consulting as to how it might be best and most easily acquired. Now I daresay you do not grasp my meaning. Well, you will grasp it more easily in this way. Soc. If we happen to know 

 that sight joined to eyes makes those eyes the better for it, and further if we are able to get it joined to eyes, we obviously know what this faculty of sight is, on which we might be consulting as to how it might be best and most easily acquired. For if we did not know first of all what sight or hearing is, we should hardly prove ourselves consultants or physicians of credit in the matter of eyes or ears, and the best way of acquiring sight or hearing. Lach. Truly spoken, Socrates. Soc. And you know, Laches, at this moment our two friends are inviting us to a consultation as to the way in which virtue may be joined to their sons’ souls, and so make them better? Lach. Yes, indeed, Soc. Then our first requisite is to know what virtue Here, and in what follows, virtue embraces the accomplishments and excellences of a good citizen. is? For surely, if we had no idea at all what virtue actually is, we could not possibly consult with anyone as to how he might best acquire it? Lach. I certainly think not, Socrates. Soc. Then we say, Laches, that we know what it is. Lach. I suppose we must. Soc. And of that which we know, I presume, we can also say what it is. Lach. To be sure. Soc. Let us not, therefore, my good friend, inquire forthwith about the whole of virtue, since that may well be too much for us; but let us first see ifwe are sufficiently provided with knowledge about some part of it. In all likelihood this will make our inquiry easier. Lach. Yes, let us do as you propose, Socrates. Soc. Then which of the parts of virtue shall we choose? Clearly, I think, that which the art of fighting in armor is supposed to promote; and that, of course, is generally supposed to be courage, is it not? Lach. Yes, it generally is, to be sure. Soc. Then let our first endeavor be, Laches, to say what courage is: after that we can proceed to inquire in what way our young men may obtain it, in so far as it is to be obtained by means of pursuits and studies. Come, try and tell me, as I suggest, what is courage. Lach. On my word, Socrates, that is nothing difficult: anyone who is willing to stay at his post and face the enemy, and does not run away, you may be sure, is courageous. Soc. Rightly spoken, Laches; but I fear I am to blame, by not putting it clearly, for your having answered not the intention of my question, but something else. Lach. What do you mean by that, Socrates? Soc. I will explain, so far as I can: let us take that man to be courageous who, as you describe him yourself, stays at his post and fights the enemy. Lach. I, for one, agree to that. Soc. Yes, and I do too. But what of this other kind of man, who fights the enemy while fleeing, and not staying? Lach. How fleeing? Soc. Well, as the Scythians are said to fight, as much fleeing as pursuing; and as you know Homer says in praise of Aeneas’ horses, that they knew how to pursue and to flee in fright full swiftly this way and that way; Hom. Il. 8.107-108 and he glorifies Aeneas himself for this very knowledge of fright, calling him prompter of fright. Hom. Il. 8.107-108 Socrates pretends to take the hero’s epithet prompter of fright (in the enemy) as meaning that he prompted fright in himself and his side, and so know all about the feeling. Lach. And very properly too, Socrates; for he was speaking of chariots; and so are you speaking of the mode of the Scythian horsemen. That is the way of cavalry fighting but with men-at-arms it is as I state it. i.e., they stand fast at their posts in the ranks (above, 191 A). Soc. Except, perhaps, Laches, in the case of the Spartans. For they say that at Plataea , when the Spartans came up to the men with wicker shields, they were not willing to stand and fight against these, but fled; when, however, the Persian ranks weree broken, the Spartans kept turning round and fighting like cavalry, and so won that great battle. In the final struggle at Plataea ( 479 B.C.) the Spartans at first hesitated before the barrier of wicker shields opposed to them by the Persians; but by a supreme effort they broke through and defeated the Persians by turning on them in man-to-man combat. Cf. Herod. ix. 61-2. Lach. What you say is true. Soc. And so this is what I meant just now by sayng that I was to blame for your wrong answer, by putting my question wrongly. For I wanted to have your view not only of brave men-at-arms, but also of courage in cavalry and in the entire warrior class; and of the courageous not only in war but in the perils of the sea, and all who in disease and poverty, or again in public affairs, are courageous; and further, all who are not merely courageous against pain or fear, but doughty fighters against desires and pleasures, whether standing their ground or turning back upon the foe—for I take it, Laches, there are courageous people in all these kinds. Lach. Very much so, Socrates. Soc. Then all these are courageous, only some have acquired courage in pleasures, some in pains, some in desires and some in fears, while others, I conceive, have acquired cowardice in these same things. Lach. To be sure. Soc. What either of them i.e., courage and cowardice is—that is what I wanted to know. So try again, and tell me first what is this thing, courage, which is the same in all of these cases; or do you still not comprehend my meaning? Lach. Not very well. Soc. I mean in this way: suppose, for instance, I were asking you what is quickness, as we find it in running and harping, in speaking and learning, and in many other activities, and as possessed by us practically in any action worth mentioning, whether of arms or legs, or mouth or voice, or mind: or do you not use the word so? Lach. Yes, to be sure. Soc. Well then, suppose someone asked me: Socrates, what do you mean by this thing which in all cases you term quickness? My reply would be: The faculty that gets a great deal done in a little time is what I call quickness, whether in a voice or in a race or in any of the other instances. Lach. Your statement would be quite correct. Soc. So now try and tell me on your part, Laches, about courage in the same way: what faculty is it, the same whether in pleasure or in pain or in any of the things in which we said just now it was to be found, that has been singled out by the name of courage? Lach. Well then, I take it to be a certain endurance of the soul, if I am to speak of the natural quality that appears in them all. Soc. Why, of course we must, if we are each to answer the other’s actual question. Now it appears to me that by no means all endurance, as I conceive it, can appear to you to be courage. And my grounds for thinking so are these: I am almost certain, Laches, that you rank courage among the nobler qualities. Lach. Nay, among the noblest, you may be quite certain. Soc. And endurance joined with wisdom is noble and good? Lach. Very much so. Soc. But what of it when joined with folly? Is it not, on the contrary, hurtful and mischievous? Lach. Yes. Soc. And can you say that such a thing is noble, when it is both mischievous and hurtful? Lach. Not with any justice, Socrates. Soc. Then you will not admit that such an endurance is courage, seeing that it is not noble, whereas courage is a noble quality. Lach. That is true. Soc. So, by your account, wise endurance will be courage. Lach. Apparently. Soc. Now let us see in what it is wise. In all things, whether great or small? For instance, if a man endures in spending money wisely, because he knows that by spending he will gain more, would you call him courageous? Lach. On my word, not I.